Asset pricing anomalies by Li, Peng
	
	








Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
The University of Leeds 
Leeds University Business School 







The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has 
been given where reference has been made to the work of others. 
 
This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no 
quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement 
 







First I would like to thank my supervisors, Professor Kevin Keasey, Professor Charlie X. 
Cai and Dr. Qi Zhang. They have spent a lot of time during the supervision and provided 
me with valuable support. Their enthusiasm and effort have impressed me and motivated 
me to go forward. I appreciate all the contributions from them in idea generation and 
empirical analysis. In the four-years I have been pursuing my PhD, I had formal meetings 
with my supervisors almost every week and many other discussions in office or on skype 
whenever I have questions to ask. These discussions have increased my knowledge in asset 
pricing and most importantly I learned from them how to think critically and logically and 
also how to solve problems.   
I also appreciate the support from Michelle Dickson who is in charge of 
administration. Her effective and helpful work has saved me a lot of time and made 
everything convenient. I would also like to express my appreciation to all other staff 
members in the department and all my colleagues in CASIF. All of you are so kind and 
helpful and this community is like a home. 
Lastly, I would like to thank my parents for their love and unconditional support. 
I cannot persist without your support and encouragement. And I also want to thank my 









Asset pricing anomalies refer to the evidence that cannot be explained or captured by an 
asset pricing model, i.e. the return is inconsistent with the estimated return from an asset 
pricing model. Anomalies are often used as the evidence against the efficient market 
hypothesis because it is abnormal compared with a normal return from the rational model. 
Recently, Cooper, Gullen and Schill (2008) show an important new anomaly -- the asset 
growth anomaly -- which reveals the negative relation between firm asset growth and 
subsequent stock returns on the US market after controlling for the book-to-market ratio 
and firm size. In addition, international studies of the asset growth anomaly show that it 
is more apparent in developed markets than emerging markets (see Titman, Wei and Xie, 
2013; Watanabe, Xu, Yao and Yu, 2013). The explanations for the asset growth anomaly 
can be grouped into two broad categories: rational explanations (Li and Zhang, 2009; 
Watanabe, Xu, Yao and Yu, 2013; Hou, Xue and Zhang 2015) and behavioural 
explanations (Cooper, Gullen and Schill, 2008; Lipson, Mortal and Schill, 2011).       
In the first empirical chapter, the asset growth anomaly is tested across a long 
period and in different industries (Fama-French industry classification) on the US market. 
By using US data from 1963 to 2011, I show that 13 out of 44 industries feature the asset 
growth anomaly. Motivated by the different asset structure in different industries, I 
examine whether industry characteristics have influence on the asset growth anomaly. 
According to the empirical results, existing explanations (i.e. Q-theory with investment 
frictions and mispricing with limits-to-arbitrage) cannot fully explain the variations of the 
anomaly at the industry level. After controlling for existing explanations, I find the 
anomaly is a function of industry characteristics which proxy for industry competition and 




the asset growth anomaly can be at least partly explained by the reaction of investors to 
the growth opportunities within less competitive industries. 
In the second empirical chapter, I directly investigate if overreaction is the source 
of the asset growth anomaly. Investors have been warned not to pay too much for growth, 
yet empirically there is a strong negative relationship between asset growth and subsequent 
stock returns - the asset growth anomaly. It may suggest overreaction to firm asset growth. 
Previously, Cooper, Gullen and Schill (2008) show the reversal pattern of margin profit by 
comparing before and after the asset growth portfolio formation date. However, it does 
not test how the asset growth anomaly interacts with the degree of overreaction. In 
addition, some studies test how limits-to-arbitrage affect the asset growth anomaly. 
However, limits-to-arbitrage cannot state the source of mispricing. High limits-to-
arbitrage cause high risk (or high transaction cost) for the arbitrage activity and hence 
anomalies cannot be traded away easily; but it does not tell us how investors’ behavioural 
biases move price away from fundamental value. Overall, there is a lack of direct evidence 
of overreaction as the source of the asset growth anomaly. I propose that investors’ 
expectation error on the trend and profitability of asset growth is the reason behind paying 
too much for growth and hence the anomaly. The empirical analyses provide strong 
evidence that investors use the historic growth trend to extrapolate future growth. 
Specifically, the asset growth effect is stronger when the consecutive growth trend is longer. 
The finding is robust to controls for existing explanations of the asset growth anomaly 
(Q-theory with investment frictions and limits-to-arbitrage) and traditional risk measures. 
To control all the proxies of investment frictions and limits-to-arbitrage but avoiding 
multicollinearity, I also conduct factor analysis to extract common factors. Prior literature 




comparison rather than controlling for all the proxies to avoid high correlation among 
these proxies (Li and Zhang, 2010; Lam and Wei, 2011; Watanabe, Xu, Yao and Yu, 2013).  
In the third empirical chapter, I examine if other anomalies, like the asset growth 
anomaly, are more prominent in developed markets than emerging markets. Therefore, I 
study 16 extensively documented anomalies in 45 countries across the globe for the period 
between 1980 and 2013. The results show clear evidence that developed markets have 
more anomalies than emerging markets. And most importantly, I provide news watcher 
efficiency as an explanation of this phenomenon. Developed markets are considered more 
efficient than emerging markets and more efficient markets should have fewer anomalies 
based on the efficient market hypothesis. However, previous literature documents a puzzle 
that developed markets have more asset pricing anomalies than emerging markets. To 
understand the puzzle, I first apply the latest q-factor model (Hou, Xue and Zhang, 2015) 
and 5-factor model (Fama and French, 2015). Although these models provide explanatory 
power for some of the anomalies, the puzzle - a difference between developed and 
emerging markets - still remains. This test also provides an out-of-sample check for the 
new asset pricing model. Furthermore, the difference is more profound in equal-weighted 
than value-weighted anomaly returns. 
Building on Hong and Stein (1999) I hypothesize and show that very slow 
information diffusion in emerging market stocks and especially for small stocks provides 
an explanation of the puzzle. News watcher efficiency determines information diffusion 
speed and there is a nonlinear relation between news watcher efficiency and anomalies. 
When information diffusion is slow which is the first stage, there is no apparent price 
change caused by news watchers. And, therefore, momentum traders have no trend to 
follow; namely, there should be no momentum activities. As a result, anomalies cannot be 




emerging markets. As information diffusion speeds up (which is the second stage), price 
will gradually incorporate information but not immediately. In this situation, there should 
be more momentum activities because momentum traders have a clear trend to follow. 
High momentum intensity, therefore, is more likely to overshoot the price and cause 
overreaction or price continuation. When investors realize the fundamentals, there is 
reversal in the long run. This information diffusion phase is the situation in developed 
markets. Consistent with the prediction, the empirical results show the nonlinear relation 
(the inverted U shape) between anomalies and news watcher efficiency proxies (higher 
education, investor sophistication and accounting standards). 
Therefore, in summary, this thesis considers three aspects of anomalies. First, asset 
growth anomalies, to some extent, relates to industry characteristics. Second, overreaction 
is the source of the asset growth anomaly. Third, there are more anomalies in developed 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
In an efficient market, all the information should be reflected by the asset price and the 
asset return should follow an asset pricing model. One of the main tasks of asset pricing 
is to find how asset prices behave. Asset pricing anomalies provide empirical evidence 
against the market efficiency hypothesis which indicates no predictability of information. 
In other words, asset pricing anomalies suggest return predictability or abnormal return 
over and above the expected return from the fair value model. Many anomalies have been 
documented in the past 30 years. In a recent study, Harvey, Liu and Zhu (2015) summarize 
at least 316 anomalies. And the most important question is how to explain anomalies, i.e. 
why there are anomalies in the market (is it due to risk or mispricing)? This motivates me 
to find the source of asset pricing anomalies. Further, if anomalies are evidence against 
market efficiency, one should expect less anomalies in developed markets than emerging 
markets because there are strong grounds for believing that developed markets are more 
efficient than emerging markets. The existing literature, however, shows some evidence 
inconsistent with the prediction. This also motivates me to resolve the puzzle and 
investigate the mechanism which generates the difference between developed and 
emerging markets.   
 Addressing these questions has implications for academics, professional market 
participants and policy makers. For academics, I provide out of sample evidence to the 
documented anomalies either by longer periods or in another market. In addition, we can 
have a better understanding of the source of anomalies. For professional market 
participants, they will know which anomaly is profitable and in which market the anomaly 
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works. For policy makers, they will know how to improve market efficiency so that 
resources can be better allocated across the market.   
The asset growth anomaly is one of the asset pricing anomalies which is found 
recently and has no clear conclusion of the explanation. Cooper, Gulen and Schill (2008) 
document this anomaly which refers to a negative relationship between asset growth and 
subsequent stock returns. Specifically, investors will earn a higher return by holding low 
asset growth stocks than high asset growth stocks. There are two reasons to start with this 
particular anomaly. First, this is a relatively new anomaly. Second, this is a kind of aggregate 
anomaly which incorporates both the investment side and the financing side. Any 
components from either investment activities or financing activities would be reflected in 
firm total assets. Therefore, the asset growth anomaly can be a representative anomaly for 
many other anomalies which are related to investment and financing. These component 
anomalies (relative to aggregate anomalies) include the investment growth anomaly (Xing, 
2008), the abnormal capital investment anomaly (Titman, Wei and Xie, 2004), the accrual 
anomaly (Sloan, 1996; Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and Tuna, 2005), and the equity issue 
anomaly (Pontiff and Woodgate, 2008).  
To understand the generation and the existence of the asset growth anomaly, many 
studies test both risk explanations and mispricing explanations. Cooper, Gullen and Schill 
(2008) do not favour the risk explanation as the Fama-French 3-factor model cannot 
capture the return pattern for asset growth portfolios. And they suggest that overreaction 
is the potential source of the anomaly due to the reversal profitability performance of firms 
for both high and low asset growth firms.       
Following the original research of the asset growth anomaly, there are many other 
studies of the explanations. Li and Zhang (2010) employ both Q-theory with investment 
frictions and limits-to-arbitrage. The former is from the rational point and the latter is 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
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from a behavioural point of view. The comparison of the two explanations shows that 
limits-to-arbitrage is a more promising explanation. However, the debate is not over. Lam 
and Wei (2011) update the Li and Zhang (2010) article with a more comprehensive 
examination by using more proxies for investment frictions and limits-to-arbitrage. After 
direct comparison the conclusion is mixed as both of the two explanations have power 
and neither dominates the other. In terms of understanding the driver of the asset growth 
anomaly, Lipson, Mortal, and Schill (2011) show that there is a weaker asset growth effect 
when firms have lower idiosyncratic volatility. Gray and Johnson (2011) attribute the asset 
growth anomaly to mispricing in the Australian market. These studies tend to support 
mispricing or behavioural explanations. 
Given the fact that limits-to-arbitrage is linked to the asset growth effect, there 
should be an initial overreaction and then limits-to-arbitrage can take effect. If there is 
overreaction initially, it is very straightforward that limits-to-arbitrage is a key factor to 
explain why the asset growth effect is stronger for firms with high limits-to-arbitrage than 
that with low-limits-to-arbitrage. High limits-to-arbitrage, for example, via low analyst 
coverage, high bid-ask spreads and high idiosyncratic volatility, would incur high risk and 
transaction costs. Hence, arbitragers or rational investors have difficulty in taking the 
arbitrage opportunities. In contrast, there is a weaker asset growth effect for low limits-to-
arbitrage firms because the arbitrage activities can trade away the anomaly easily. However, 
the reason why investors overreact is not clear. And this initial mispricing is the prior 
condition that underpins limits-to-arbitrage. In terms of behavioural explanations, there 
are two seminal behavioural models which explain why behavioural biases cause 
overreaction or underreaction. Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) attribute overreaction 
to representativeness, while Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) argue that 
overconfidence contributes to overreaction.          
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Further, to provide out of sample evidence to the asset growth anomaly and to 
pursue its true source, recent studies show empirical results of the asset growth effect in a 
global context. The international markets provide a platform to compare different 
explanations. Watanabe, Xu, Yao and Yu (2013) and Titman, Wei and Xie (2013) find a 
stronger asset growth effect in more developed markets than less developed markets. The 
former supports Q-theory while the latter favours agency theory with market discipline. 
These international studies related to the asset growth anomaly increase the understanding 
of the asset growth effect. However, such international evidence is not only for the asset 
growth anomaly, but applies to many other asset pricing anomalies. These international 
studies include McLean, Pontiff and Watanabe (2009), Ang, Hodrick, Xing and Zhang 
(2009), Griffin, Kelly and Nardari (2010), Chui, Titman, and Wei (2010) and Kaniel, 
Ozoguz and Starks (2012). 
The international evidence to date raises another question, that is, whether all 
anomalies are stronger in developed markets? If this is true for many anomalies, it 
challenges the traditional wisdom that there should be fewer anomalies in more developed 
markets because such markets are more efficient. Therefore, I may find an asset pricing 
puzzle in global markets. For existing international studies, the literature only provides 
explanations to a particular asset pricing anomaly. For example, investment-based Q-
theory may be helpful for the asset growth anomaly or other investment related anomalies, 
but it is difficult to explain momentum and many other anomalies. Hence, a unified theory 
is required to solve the puzzle. 
Motivated by the empirical evidence and existing explanations, there are three 
questions to be solved. First, to confirm the robustness of the asset growth anomaly. The 
previous literature already examines the asset growth effect during different time periods 
and in different size groups. However, in order to get a better understanding of this 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
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anomaly, the first empirical chapter tests the existence of the asset growth anomaly across 
different industries. The results will give us a robustness test of the asset growth effect 
from a different angle. 
Secondly, if there is an initial overreaction to firm asset growth, what is the 
rationale behind the overreaction in explaining the asset growth anomaly? Following 
representativeness bias from the BSV model, the second empirical chapter tries to find 
whether firms with a longer growth trend show stronger asset growth effects than firms 
with a shorter growth trend. If the hypothesis is true, it means that overreaction is the 
source of the asset growth anomaly. 
Third, some international studies show developed markets have stronger 
anomalies than emerging markets. The question is whether this is only a phenomenon for 
some particular anomalies or is this a general fact? In the third empirical chapter, I test 
many well-documented anomalies in the global markets and I do find more anomalies in 
developed markets than emerging markets. This is counter-intuitive because developed 
markets are more efficient and they should not have more anomalies. Therefore, in the 
third empirical chapter, I try to solve the puzzle. Following the Hong and Stein (1999) 
model, my explanation is that news watchers and information diffusion speed determine 
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1.2. Motivations and Contributions 
1.2.1 Asset Growth Anomaly across Industries 
The first examination of the asset growth anomaly is by Cooper, Gullen and Schill (2008). 
They test the asset growth anomaly in different size groups and across different time 
periods to check its robustness. They find that the asset growth anomaly exists in each size 
group but it is weaker in large firms. They also show a significant asset growth effect during 
different time frames. Another way to check the robustness is to test the anomaly in 
different industries.  
By using US market data from 1963 to 2011, I find a significant asset growth 
anomaly in the US market. However, the industry analysis shows that the anomaly is not 
significant in each of the industries. Following Fama and French (1997), all the firms are 
divided into 44 industries, and a significant asset growth effect (negative coefficient of 
asset growth) occurs in 13 out of 44 industries. Therefore, the fact is that although there 
is an asset growth effect in the US market, it is not a phenomenon in every industry. 
Besides, there are another 23 industries that show a negative slope of asset growth 
although they are insignificant. Accordingly, the majority of industries show the negative 
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1.2.2 Overreaction is the Source of the Asset Growth Anomaly 
Cooper, Gulen and Schill (2008) argue mispricing may cause the asset growth anomaly by 
looking at the profitability performance before and after asset growth portfolio formation. 
They show increasing (decreasing) profit margins for high (low) asset growth firms before 
formation date but decreasing (increasing) profit margins after the formation date. 
However, Cooper, Gullen and Schill (2008) only give this loose test (there is no test 
whether the asset growth anomaly is stronger when there is an expectation error) and there 
is no direct test if the degree of overreaction can determine the magnitude of the asset 
growth effect. Therefore, why investors overreact to firm asset growth is still unknown.  
The Q-theory with investment frictions and limits-to-arbitrage have been more 
recently used to explain the asset growth effect (see Li and Zhang, 2010; Lam and Wei, 
2011). Q-theory is a rational explanation and it stands at the point of firm manager rather 
than the investors view. Specifically, firm managers are rational and their aim is to 
maximize firm value. As a result, firms will invest in projects with a positive net present 
value. High expected return implies low present value and firms are likely to disinvest. And 
therefore there should be a negative return-investment relation. Furthermore, firms with 
high investment frictions should be less sensitive to the negative relation because such 
firms have higher investment costs. In other words, only a lower discount rate can induce 
them to invest. Therefore, if Q-theory has power to explain, we should expect that firms 
with higher investment frictions have a stronger asset growth effect. But this explanation 
cannot rule out limits-to-arbitrage (which is a mispricing explanation) in the direct 
comparison. Firms with high limits-to-arbitrage are much riskier and hence it is difficult 
to correct the price and arbitrage away any asset growth anomaly. Lam and Wei (2011) 
show a stronger asset growth effect for firms with high investment frictions even 
controlling for limits-to-arbitrage. They also show a stronger asset growth effect in high 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
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limits-to-arbitrage firms after controlling for investment frictions. Therefore, it is difficult 
to distinguish between the two explanations. 
To make the debate between rational and mispricing explanations clearer, in the 
second empirical chapter, I investigate whether investor’s bias is a source of the asset 
growth anomaly after controlling for Q-theory and limits-to-arbitrage (Q-theory is from 
rational perspective; limits-to-arbitrage is from the mispricing point of view, but it is a 
constraint to arbitrage not the cause of mispricing). First, the reason behind overreaction 
is the investors’ representativeness bias. Investors tend to overreact more when a firm 
experiences a longer sequence of asset growth than a shorter one. Further, the length of 
the sequence is significantly positive after controlling for investment frictions and limits-
to-arbitrage. Second, I explicitly test whether there is an expectation error to asset growth 
portfolios by comparing the return around earnings announcement dates and the return 
outside the event window. The empirical results show that investors do have expectation 
errors when analysing asset growth information and investors make corrections when they 
realize the true value. 
1.2.3. News Watchers and Asset Pricing Anomalies 
Overreaction seems to be the source of the asset growth anomaly and it is still significant 
even after controlling for the Q-theory and limits-to-arbitrage. However, it does not 
exclude these explanations. To compare rational against irrational explanations further, 
Watanabe, Xu, Yao and Yu (2013) use the global context to distinguish the two 
explanations. Developed markets are seen as being more efficient and the optimal 
investment (asset growth) decision is seen as relying on efficient prices as indicated by Q-
theory. Therefore, the asset growth effect should be stronger in developed markets 
according to Q-theory. In contrast, more efficient markets should have less mispricing and 
a low level of limits-to-arbitrage. Therefore, more efficient markets should have a weaker 
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asset growth anomaly. They show evidence to support Q-theory that the asset growth 
effect is getting stronger when market efficiency is better after controlling for limits-to-
arbitrage. This comparison, therefore, differentiates Q-theory and limits-to-arbitrage in 
explaining the asset growth anomaly.  
However, global market studies bring some new questions. First, it is counter-
intuitive to see anomalies being more prominent in developed markets than less developed 
markets. The question to answer is whether the asset growth anomaly is an individual case 
by chance or this is true for other anomalies. Second, Q-theory is related to investment- 
or production-based anomalies. It is hard to explain other types of anomalies, for example, 
momentum, the financial distress anomaly and the short-term reversal effect. Therefore if 
there are more anomalies in developed markets, Q-theory cannot be the unified 
explanation to apply to each anomaly. Therefore, a deeper explanation is needed to 
establish a more unified theory. 
Therefore, I include another 15 popular asset pricing anomalies and cover 45 
markets including 23 developed markets and 22 emerging markets based on MSCI market 
development. This comprehensive study finds that there are more anomalies in developed 
markets than emerging markets. To confirm this finding, not only are raw hedged returns 
examined, but alphas from the most recent asset pricing model have been checked. This 
results show that the risk factor model cannot explain the anomaly difference between 
developed markets and emerging markets. To solve the puzzle, I borrow and extend the 
agent model from Hong and Stein (1999). According to the model, news watchers affect 
the information diffusion speed which is the key to determine the activities of momentum 
traders. The interaction between news watchers and momentum traders produces an 
inverted U shape of anomaly generation. Hence, the number of anomalies is not a linear 
relationship with market efficiency or market development. The simulation results in 
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chapter 5 show fewer anomalies when the markets have low level of news watcher 
efficiency, more anomalies when news watcher efficiency is improved, and fewer 
anomalies eventually if news watchers are more efficient. And the empirical results show 
significantly negative coefficients of the squared news watcher proxy in the quadratic 
regressions of anomaly number on the news watcher proxy. The negative squared term 
confirms the prediction of the inverted U shape. 
In summary, my thesis will address three questions. In chapter 3, I will show the 
existence of the asset growth anomaly across industries. In chapter 4, I will show that 
investors are paying too much attention to firm asset growth and overreaction is the source 
of the asset growth anomaly. In chapter 5, I will test a unified theory to explain anomaly 
differences between developed markets and emerging markets by using multiple anomalies. 
In chapter 6, I conclude my thesis. Overall, my thesis contributes to the market anomalies 
and market efficiency literature. First, the asset growth anomaly does not exist in each 
industry in the US market and it is probably due to investors’ overreaction to asset growth. 
Second, news watcher efficiency causes more anomalies in developed markets. Third, 
mispricing is likely to be the source of market anomalies globally. Fourth, most markets 
are not efficient but market efficiency is improved with the development of a market.     
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Chapter 2  
Literature Review 
In this chapter I review the existing literature. Section 2.1 reviews the empirical findings 
of the asset growth anomaly and other asset pricing anomalies. Section 2.2 covers 
explanations of asset pricing anomalies. Section 2.3 reviews the anomalies in global 
markets and the underlying explanations. Section 2.4 focuses on the Hong and Stein (1999) 
model, which is the foundation of the explanation in the third empirical chapter. 
2.1. Empirical Findings in Asset Pricing Anomalies 
Asset pricing anomalies offer evidence against the efficient market hypothesis. The 
evidence shows that investors are able to earn abnormal return or economic profits.    
2.1.1. Asset Pricing Anomalies and the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(EMH) 
Fama (1970) describes the efficient market concept as prices reflect all the information in 
the market. It states that if information is available to investors without cost and investors 
are rational, then the price will incorporate all the information and there should be no 
pricing error between expected and realized price. The implication is that prices follow 
random walks and no variable can predict returns. After risk adjustment, there is no 
abnormal return for investors to earn. The only way to obtain a higher return is to take 
extra risk. This is why market efficiency depends on a correct asset pricing model which 
can incorporate all the risk factors. Otherwise, the abnormal return cannot represent a true 
anomaly if the asset pricing model is inadequate. The effort to have a benchmark model 
to test market efficiency includes CAPM (Sharpe, 1964), the Fama-French 3-factor model 
(Fama and French, 1992; Fama and French, 1993), the q factor model (Li and Zhang, 2010; 
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Lam and Wei, 2011; Hou, Xue and Zhang, 2015), and the Fama-French 5-factor model 
(Fama and French, 2015). These models try to capture the behaviour of cross sectional 
returns. The expected return or required rate of return from the model is also the 
stochastic discount factor (SDF) which determines the pricing of an asset. 
Asset pricing anomalies are the facts that are inconsistent with efficient markets 
and anomalies are usually used as evidence to oppose EMH. There are a large number of 
anomalies challenging the EMH; well-documented anomalies include post earnings 
announcement drift, size effect, value premium and momentum with some of them even 
considered as risk factors from 1990s onwards. Harvey, Liu and Zhu (2015) summarize at 
least 316 anomalies. The findings of anomalies motivate the improvement of asset pricing 
models, agent behaviour models (Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Daniel, Hirshleifer 
and Subrahmanyam, 1998; Hong and Stein, 1999) and the understanding of the 
relationship between anomalies and market efficiency (Griffin, Kelly and Nardari, 2010).     
2.1.2. Asset Growth Anomaly and Other Investment-related Anomalies 
The first paper to test the asset growth anomaly is Cooper, Gullen and Schill (2008). 
Motivated by the asset expansion and asset contraction anomaly, (for example, the equity 
issue effect and accrual anomaly), they argue that asset growth is an aggregate 
measurement because both asset expansion and contraction are components of a firm’s 
total assets. During 1963 to 2003 on the US market, they show significantly higher returns 
for low asset growth firms than high asset growth firms. The asset growth rate is defined 
as the percentage change of a firm’s total assets as compared to the previous year. In other 
words, the asset growth effect refers to a negative relationship between asset growth and 
subsequent return. In their paper, the asset growth effect is confirmed by using both sort 
and regression techniques. For the deciles sort (i.e. the univariate test), both raw returns 
and the intercept (alpha) from the Fama-French three-factor model show that the low 
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asset growth decile has significantly higher return than the high asset growth decile. For 
the Fama-MacBeth regression (i.e. multivariate test), the coefficient of asset growth is 
significantly negative after controlling for firm size, book-to-market ratio and previous 6-
month returns. In addition, they show that the asset growth effect can last for five years 
and three years after the formation of asset growth portfolios for equal-weighted and 
value-weighted return respectively.  
Furthermore the asset growth anomaly is robust to various considerations. First, 
the asset growth effect is robust in terms of both equal- and value-weighted returns. 
Second the asset growth effect is weaker in large firms, but the anomaly still exists across 
most different firm size groups (see Cooper, Gullen and Schill, 2008; Fama and French, 
2008; Lipson, Mortal and Schill, 2011). The third consideration is the asset growth anomaly 
across different time periods. Cooper, Gullen and Schill (2008) show a significant asset 
growth effect in 1968-1980, 1981-1990 and 1991-2003. Lastly, Lipson, Mortal and Schill 
(2011) also confirm the asset growth effect by examining different measurements of asset 
growth, for example, fixed asset growth.  
Asset growth reflects the change of firm investments, namely, any change of 
investment will increase or decrease firm total assets. In addition, there are some other 
anomalies which are related to firm investment, for instance, investment growth, abnormal 
capital expenditures, investment-to-asset ratio and net operating assets. 
Xing (2008) explicitly tests the relationship between investment growth (capital 
expenditure) and future returns. The empirical results show that subsequent stock returns 
are negatively related to investment growth. They also argue that the investment growth 
factor plays a similar role to the book-to-market ratio. Titman, Wei and Xie (2004) also 
find that abnormal capital investment is negatively related to stock returns. For the 
investment-to-asset anomaly, both Lyandres, Sun, and Zhang (2008) and Xing (2008) 
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document a negative relation between investment-to-asset and future stock returns. 
Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, and Zhang (2004) find another negative investment-return 
relationship, i.e. net operating assets.  
In terms of interpretation of investment-related anomalies there is no clear 
conclusion so far. Cooper, Gulen and Schill (2008) find little support for the risk 
explanation. Since then, Li and Zhang (2010) employ an investment-based asset pricing 
model (Q-theory) as an explanation. Lam and Wei (2011) compare Q-theory and limits-
to-arbitrage and both are found to have only partial explanatory power.   
2.1.3. Accrual Anomaly 
Sloan (1996) discovered a negative relation between the level of firm accrual and stock 
returns. Following the paper, other researchers investigate firm accruals including 
Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and Tuna (2005) and Hirshleifer, Hou, and Teoh (2009). The 
latter not only confirms the negative accrual-return relation at the firm level (cross 
sectional level), but also shows a positive relationship of accrual and stock returns at the 
market level (aggregate or time series level).  
The accrual anomaly is the evidence which rejects that price can reflect information 
contained in firm accrual, because there should be no significant hedge return if price 
already incorporates accrual information.   
An explanation of this anomaly is the earnings fixation hypothesis provided by 
Sloan (1996). This hypothesis argues that there are two components of earnings—accruals 
and cash flow. However, the effect of the two components on earnings forecasts is 
different. The earnings forecast based on cash flow is more positive than that based on 
accruals. Consequently, stocks are mispriced when investors make earnings forecasts and 
they cannot distinguish the difference between the two components. Stocks are overvalued 
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if there is high accrual but low cash flow. In contrast, stocks are undervalued if there is 
low accrual and high cash flow. 
2.1.4. Value Premium 
It is well known that value stocks earn higher returns than growth stocks – the value 
premium. To identify value stocks, previous literature uses the value of book equity relative 
to market value (book-to-market ratio), and value stocks are stocks with a higher book-to-
market ratio. Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein (1985) show that there is positive relationship 
between the book-to-market ratio and stock returns on the US market. Fama and French 
(1992) also find higher returns for high book-to-market ratio stocks than low book-to-
market ratio stocks. Other studies of the relation between the book-to-market ratio and 
stock returns are Stattman (1980), DeBondt and Thaler (1987), Chan, Hamao and 
Lakonishok (1991) and Dechow and Sloan (1997). Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013) 
find a value premium not only in stock markets but fixed income, commodity and currency 
markets. 
In addition to the book-to-market ratio, there are many other measurements of 
book value relative to market value. Basu (1977) finds that the ratio of earnings to price is 
positively associated with stock returns. Fama and French (1992) also show a positive 
relation between asset-to-market (total asset divided by market value) and stock returns. 
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) find the cash flow-to-market ratio and the 
earnings-to-market ratio are positively correlated with stock returns. 
Explanations of the value premium are controversial. One interpretation is 
fundamental risk. Fama and French (1992, 1993) argue that value stocks are much riskier 
than growth stocks and hence value stocks have superior returns. Alternatively, DeBondt 
and Thaler (1985) suggest market overreaction as an explanation. Lakonishok, Shleifer and 
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Vishny (1994) assert that investors extrapolate good (bad) performance in the past too far 
into the future (investors expect good (bad) performance based on past good (bad) 
performance); but the performance actually cannot persist. The growth firms with good 
performance in the past are overvalued while the value firms with bad performance in the 
past are undervalued. As a result, value stocks have higher return and growth stocks have 
lower returns subsequently.    
2.1.5. Profitability Anomaly 
Novy-Marx (2013) finds a positive relationship between gross profits and stock returns. 
The author measures firm gross profits as revenue minus cost of goods and then divides 
by firm total assets. Similarly, Haugen and Baker (1996) show that return on equity is 
positively related to stock returns. Balakrishnan, Bartov and Faurel (2010) sort firms into 
earnings deciles and firms in the top decile earn superior abnormal returns than firms in 
the bottom decile. 
Q-theory provides the explanation to these profitability anomalies (see Li and 
Zhang, 2010; Hou, Xue and Zhang, 2015). According to Q-theory, the discount rate or 
cost of capital depends on two channels—profitability and investment. Intuitively, lower 
discount rates suggest higher present values and therefore it induces more investment. 
This causes a negative relationship between the discount rate and investment. However, 
due to decreasing marginal profit as investment increases, profitability is negatively 
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2.1.6. Financial Distress Anomaly 
Fama and French (1993) suggest that the book-to-market factor may be linked to financial 
distress risk. Given this interpretation, a positive relation between financial distress risk 
and stock returns should be observed. Dichev (1998) argues that bankruptcy risk is a good 
proxy for financial distress. Ohlson (1980) constructs this O score to measure the risk of 
firm bankruptcy. By using O score, Dichev (1998) finds that firms experiencing a higher 
bankruptcy risk have a lower return than firms with lower bankruptcy risk. 
2.1.7. Price Continuation and Reversal Anomalies 
Price continuation and reversal are two of most widely investigated anomalies. Price 
continuation is the phenomenon that stock prices continue the trend after portfolio 
formation. In contrast, the reversal of return demonstrates that price goes in the opposite 
direction after portfolio formation. 
Momentum is an example of price continuation.  Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
find that the past winner stocks earn higher returns than past loser stocks. Specifically, the 
stocks with a high return (based on the return in the past 6 months) have higher 6-month 
holding period returns than stocks with low return (based on the past 6-month return). 
Their empirical results also show that the momentum effect exists when the formation 
period return and holding period return are within one year. Other price continuation 
anomalies include earnings surprise and earnings forecast revisions (see Foster, Olsen and 
Shevlin, 1984; Bernad and Thomas, 1989; Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok, 1996). 
On the reversal side, Jegadeesh (1990) reports significantly negative serial 
correlation between last month and current month. This first order monthly return relation 
is the short-term reversal anomaly. In addition, another price reversal anomaly is the long-
term reversal effect. DeBondt and Thaler (1985) find that higher return stocks in the past 
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three to five years have worse performance than lower return stocks in the past three to 
five years. This result is widely referred as evidence of market overreaction and evidence 
against the efficient market hypothesis. 
2.1.8. Trading Friction Anomalies 
There are many studies investigating anomalies related to trading frictions. These trading 
frictions include risk, trading volume and the visibility of stocks which can either raise the 
cost of trading or have an influence on investors’ attention. These empirical results extend 
the list of asset pricing anomalies. More specifically, we have the followings: 
1. Beta anomaly. Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) show that abnormal returns are 
superior for firms with a low beta than those with a high beta. This negative beat-return 
relation can even spread into bond markets and futures markets. 
2. Maximum daily return anomaly. Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011) show that 
firms in the high maximum daily return group in the last month tend to earn lower returns 
in the next month than firms in the low maximum daily return portfolio.  
3. Idiosyncratic volatility anomaly. Ang, Hodrick, Xing and Zhang (2006) provide 
evidence that high idiosyncratic volatility stocks have a lower return that low idiosyncratic 
volatility stocks. This cannot be explained by traditional risk factors. The idiosyncratic 
volatility is firm specific risk which is left unexplained by the asset pricing model. 
4. Trading volume anomaly. Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998) show 
a significantly negative correlation between stock returns and trading volume. This 
phenomenon can be attributed to liquidity risk -- low trading volume stocks face higher 
liquidity risk and, therefore, require higher premiums. 
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5. Illiquidity anomaly. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) discovered a positive 
relation between stock returns and bid-ask spreads. They argue that the bid-ask spread is 
a natural proxy of illiquidity because the bid-ask spread reflects the ease or cost of 
immediate execution. There are numerous other empirical studies of the illiquidity-return 
relation. Although the measurement of liquidity is different, the positive illiquidity-return 
relation holds (see Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996; Amihud, 2002; Bekaert, Harvey 
and Lundblad, 2007). For the reason of illiquidity premium, investors need compensation 
to hold illiquid stocks because such stocks cannot be traded immediately at a favourable 
price. 
2.2. Explanations of Asset Pricing Anomalies 
This section reviews the theory in explaining asset pricing anomalies. Broadly, all these 
explanations can be grouped into two categories—rational and behavioural explanations. 
For the rational explanations, both risk factor models (e.g. CAPM, Fama-French 3-factor 
model) and investment-based models (e.g. q-factor model) can be used to explain asset 
pricing anomalies. On the other hand, behavioural explanations assert that investors are 
irrational and they have a behavioural bias (psychology bias) in their decision making -- 
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2.2.1. Traditional Asset Pricing Model 
A factor model is considered as a benchmark to determine the existence of anomalies. 
This is because a factor model is used to describe the return or price behaviour and hence 
the required rate of return (or compensation) that should come from the factors.  
The first asset pricing model is the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) delivered 
by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). It summarizes the positive relationship between 
stock returns and systematic risk (beta). It implies that higher stock returns should 
compensate higher systematic risk to induce investors to hold the assets. CAPM works 
very well to capture stock return movements before 1963. For example, Cochrane (2011) 
shows that the average return of each 10 book-to-market portfolio is very close to the 
predicted line of the CAPM model. In addition, lower book-to-market portfolios (growth 
stocks) with lower betas have lower return while higher book-to-market portfolios (value 
stocks) with higher betas have higher return. This evidence confirms the success of CAPM 
in describing the behaviour of stock returns. However, Cochrane (2011) finds that the 
book-to-market portfolios are located far away from the predicted line from 1963 onwards 
and value and growth stocks, most surprisingly, seem to have the same beta more or less. 
This implies that value stocks with higher return are not riskier than growth stocks with 
lower returns. In other words, the risk-adjusted return of value stocks is still higher than 
the risk-adjusted return of growth stocks. Therefore, systematic risk fails to explain the 
return pattern and the value premium is left as an anomaly which is referred to as evidence 
against market efficiency.  
However, it difficult to deny the efficient market hypothesis. The existence of 
abnormal return does not necessarily mean market inefficiency. The abnormal return may 
be either by chance or the current asset pricing model is not adequate. If the abnormal return is 
significant in a few years over a long period, this means that abnormal return is not 
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persistent. It implies that the abnormal return occurs by chance. If the asset pricing model 
cannot capture the return pattern completely, then the asset pricing model is not adequate. 
In this case, it may appear as a market anomaly if the anomaly is tested using an inadequate 
asset pricing model even if the market is efficient. Therefore, the examination of market 
efficiency also needs an out-of-sample test and a prefect asset pricing model. With the 
development of financial markets, there are more trading data available for researchers to 
conduct such tests. The value premium does exist within longer periods. Similar to the 
value premium, many other anomalies are uncovered. For instance, the size effect and post 
earnings announcement drift are found to be inconsistent with the beta-return relation 
(see Banz, 1977; Ball and Brown, 1968).  
To solve these puzzles, Fama and French (1992, 1993) construct a three-factor 
model (FF3) to describe stock return movements. As mentioned above, the robustness of 
an anomaly is also used to improve asset pricing models. FF3 is much more powerful in 
explaining cross sectional stock returns. Therefore, the confirmation of anomalies should 
be checked via FF3. The FF3 states that expected return is determined by not only market 
return (systematic risk) but also by a size factor and the book-to-market factor. Fama and 
French (1996) argue size and book-to-market are measurements of firm distress risk. A 
higher factor loading indicates higher risk and, therefore, it should have a higher return 
with respect to the high risk. However, it is not clear whether the two factors reflect the 
firm risk level. Dichev (1998) finds the conflicting result that higher book-to-market stocks 
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2.2.2 Q-theory (Investment-based Asset Pricing Model) 
The initial effort to build the relation between return and firm investment is by Cochrane 
(1991). The prior consumption-based asset pricing model describes the relation between 
return and an investor’s decision to save or consume. As an analogue of the consumption-
based asset pricing model, he constructs a production-based asset pricing model to 
uncover the relation between return and firms’ decisions relating to production plans.  
The asset growth anomaly is related to firm investment in a very intuitive way, 
because if a firm increases (decreases) investment, there is positive (negative) asset growth. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that an investment-based or production-based asset 
pricing model should have the power to explain the negative relation between return and 
asset growth. In addition, all other investment-related anomalies should also be explained 
in this framework. Li and Zhang (2010) start from a Q-theory of investment to explain 
the asset growth anomaly and other investment related anomalies. Intuitively, Q-theory 
argues that firms increase investment when there is a positive present value after deduction 
of investment cost because positive profits can increase firm value. Therefore, firms tend 
to invest when there is a higher net present value. The net present value of a project or 
investment depends on future cash flows and the discount rate or expected return. This 
links the investment decision to the expected return. Net present value is the sum of 
discounted future cash flows minus investment costs. And the expected return is in the 
denominator, so it is negatively related to net present value. As a result, investment should 
connect to expected return negatively. Specifically, firms tend to invest when the expected 
return is lower, because the net present value is higher with a low discount rate; while firms 
would not invest if expected return is higher, because the net present value may be negative 
after investment cost. Consequently, the Q-theory predicts the negative relation between 
investment and subsequent stock returns. The asset growth anomaly documented by 
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Cooper, Gullen and Schill (2008) is just the negative asset growth-return relation. 
Therefore, Q-theory may be one of the explanations to the asset growth anomaly. 
However, Q-theory relies on the assumption that firm managers  
The asset growth anomaly is in line with the prediction of Q-theory; the difficulty, 
however, is how to test Q-theory to explain the asset growth anomaly, i.e. how to apply 
the investment-based asset pricing model to quantify the relationship between asset 
growth and future stock returns. To examine the Q-theory to explain the asset growth 
anomaly, Li and Zhang (2010) construct an investment-based model with investment 
frictions. There are two advantages of adding investment frictions into the model. First, 
investment frictions are important to firms’ investment decisions. Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997) find that firms with less financial constraints are more likely to pay attention to 
internal cash flows when making investment decisions. Cleary (1999) shows that 
investment decisions are conditional on firm creditworthiness. Besides, financial 
constraints are also correlated with returns. Livdan, Sapriza and Zhang (2009) model the 
relationship of return and financial frictions. Previous literature does not include the 
important factor into the production-based model -- for example, Cochrane (1991, 1996). 
Second, with investment friction proxies, it provides a testable hypothesis that firms with 
high (low) investment frictions should have a stronger (weaker) asset growth anomaly. 
This will be shown in the following model demonstration. 
In the Li and Zhang (2010) model, the inputs are capital (!"), the long-term average 
of return on asset () and the discount rate (#"). There are two periods in the model, time 
0 and time 1. Firm invests $"% at time 0 with capital !"% and operating profits !"%. The 
investment cost occurs due to investment frictions (there should be more costs for more 
constrained firms). The cost of investment frictions follows a quadratic function of 
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!"%, where 0" indicates cost level (high 0" 
means high cost or investment frictions and 0" > 0). Therefore, the total cost at time 0 is 
$"% + & $"%, !"% . At time 1, the firm has capital !"4 which follows the equation !"4 =
	$"% + 1 − 7 !"% , where 7 is depreciation (0 ≤ 7 ≤ 1). In the two period model, the 
object of the firm is to maximize the sum of value at time 0 and the discounted value with 
discount rate #" at time 1. Intuitively, firms are facing an investment decision to trade-off 
between today’s cash flow and future cash flow (either investing at time 0 to exchange 
higher cash flow at time 1 or disinvesting to have cash flow at time 0 by foregoing the cash 
flow in time 1).  
To maximize the market value of the firm at time 0 which is the sum of cash flow 
at time 0 and the discounted value of cash flow at time 1, so the objective function is (see 
Equation (2) of Li and Zhang (2010)): 
9:;	
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To solve the optimization problem, we first need the first-order derivative with 








@ +	 F − H = >     (Eq. 2-2) 
	
After we rearrange the equation (2-2), the optimal solution can be written as the 





     (Eq. 2-3) 
	
Therefore, this equation links the return and investment. Given that the 
investment is in the denominator, there should be a negative relation between return and 
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investment. To explicitly show the return-investment relationship, the equation (2-3) can 
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After rearranging N $"%∗ !"%  in equation (2-4) to the left hand side, we can get the 




= 	− FJC= <=>
∗ A=> D
C= @JFKH
< >     (Eq. 2-5) 
	
Equation (2-5) will always be less than zero because both the numerator and 
denominator are greater than zero. The negative value exactly describes that investment 
change is negatively related to expected returns, i.e. the increase in investment will lead to 
a decrease of stock return. This implies that the slope to regression of stock returns on 
asset growth should be negative, i.e. the asset growth effect.  
Further, the Li and Zhang (2010) model also examines the effect of investment 
friction on this negative relationship, namely, how the investment-return relation changes 
given changes in investment friction. This can be shown by using the total differentiate of 
the absolute value of equation (2-5) with respect to 0" . The reason for taking the absolute 
value is to measure the magnitude of the return-investment relation responding to the 
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Divided by N0" of both sides of equation (2-6), we can get the ratio of the return-
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< >     (Eq. 2-9) 
	
The equation (2.9) indicates how the negative return-investment relation responds 
given the change in investment frictions. The reciprocal of R -+.
∗ /+.
RS+
 on the left hand 
side can be considered as the absolute value of the regression slope, hence, the lower the 
absolute value of R -+.
∗ /+.
RS+
 the steeper the slope of asset growth from the regression of 
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return on asset growth; namely, the stronger the asset growth effect. Intuitively, the 
increase in investment frictions will make R -+.
∗ /+.
RS+
 flatter, and, therefore, the firm’s 
investment is not sensitive to the discount rate. As a result, a firm chooses to invest only 
if the discount rate has a larger decrease that induces a stronger asset growth effect. Overall, 
if the negative relationship between asset growth and stock return is caused by firms’ 
optimal investment (as implied by Q-theory) then it should predict that the asset growth 
anomaly is stronger for firms with high investment frictions.     
Following Li and Zhang (2010), Lam and Wei (2011) conduct a more 
comprehensive empirical study by including more proxies of investment frictions. They 
find a fair amount of evidence to support Q-theory with investment frictions in explaining 
the asset growth anomaly, that is, firms with higher investment frictions tend to have a 
stronger asset growth effect.        
However, Q-theory relies on the assumption that firm manager will maximize firm value. 
And therefore, firm managers will make investment decisions based on the net present value which 
adds value or reduces the value of firm. The limitation of the assumption is that there is an agency 
problem, because firm managers will not always have goals consistent with shareholders. In the 
case of empire building, firm managers will invest when it can increase firm assets regardless of 
the net present value. As a result, there should be no negative relation between investment and 






Chapter 2 Literature Review 
28	
	
2.2.3. Behavioural Explanations 
Both risk factor models and Q-theory consider that investors or firm managers are rational. 
It implies that investors update newly received information correctly and the decision 
making is based on subjective expected utility (SEU, see Sargent (1993)). Instead of 
assuming investors are rational, behavioural finance asserts that investors have behavioural 
biases which can be used to explain anomalies in the market. In general, two consequences 
caused by psychological biases are overreaction and underreaction1. A large number of 
behavioural studies apply the behavioural approach to tackle the anomalies. For 
overreaction applications, Cooper, Gullen and Schill (2008) suggest that overreaction is a 
potential source of the asset growth anomaly. DeBondt and Thaler (1985) find that stocks 
which have higher (lower) returns in the past three to five years earn lower (higher) returns 
in the next three to five years: this indicates the past winners (losers) over the past three 
to five years are overvalued (undervalued). Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) argue 
that investors exploit past firm performance too far into the future when making forecasts 
and, therefore, investors are more likely to overreact to firm performance. They find 
evidence to support the overreaction explanation for many contrarian strategies, for 
instance, the book-to-market ratio, the cash flow-to-price ratio, the earnings-to-price ratio 
and the five-year average growth rate. Haugen (1995) also supports overreaction as an 
interpretation of the high return for high book-to-market ratio stocks. Hirshleifer, Hou, 
Teoh and Zhang (2004) argue that overreaction is the reason why net operating assets are 
negatively related to future stock returns. Bali, Cakici and Whitelaw (2011) attribute 
maximum daily return effects to overreaction to stocks that have a small chance to earn 
large returns. For the underreaction stream of research, Bernard and Thomas (1990) show 
																																								 																				
1 For example, investors who are more overconfident tend to overreact to news; while investors who are 
conservative tend to underreact to news.  
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that investors underreact to earnings because they do not recognize the positive 
autocorrelation of earnings. Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) show that analysts tend to 
underreact to firms’ earnings which is consistent with post earnings announcement drift. 
Titman, Wie and Xie (2004) argue that the negative relation between investment and stock 
returns is due to the underreaction to a firm manager’s overinvestment. Hong, Lim and 
Stein (2000) show that momentum is because of slow information incorporation into price 
and, therefore, momentum is stronger for firms with poor analyst coverage and small size. 
Zhang (2006) supports the underreaction explanation for short-term price continuation 
because information uncertainty (more information uncertainty should lead to more 
underreaction) makes price continuation even more obvious. 
Another block of behavioural finance is limits-to-arbitrage (see Barberis and 
Thaler, 2002). If those anomalies have resulted from mispricing, then arbitrageurs will take 
advantage of it and eventually trade away (buy undervalued stocks and sell overvalued 
stocks) the anomalous phenomenon. However, arbitrage is not riskless and not free of 
cost. For example, DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990) and Morck, Yeung 
and Yu (2000) argue that arbitrage is risky because of noisy trading. Mashruwala, Rajgopal 
and Shevlin (2006) point out that arbitrage activity may have significant transaction costs. 
Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford (2002) suggest that imperfect information and market 
frictions make arbitrage difficult. Further, arbitrage is complicated in real markets even for 
the simplest arbitrage (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Due to the above difficulties for 
arbitrage, high limits-to-arbitrage will impede the arbitrage activities and hence the 
anomalies can exist for a longer time periods. As the result of limits-to-arbitrage, it 
provides a prediction that if an anomaly is generated by mispricing then it should be more 
prominent when firms have high limits-to-arbitrage. 
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Although the above literature shows that mispricing (over- or under-reaction) has 
reasonable power to explain asset pricing anomalies, the underlying reason why investors 
over- or under-react to information and how investors experience behavioural bias are not 
clarified entirely. There are three seminal theoretical models which help with this purpose.  
Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998, thereafter BSV) argue that investors have 
behavioural bias when they forecast the future cash flow and therefore the stock price is 
mispriced. The incorrect expectation of future cash flow comes from two psychological 
elements. One is the representativeness bias that leads to neglect of the base rate and 
neglect of the sample size. For neglect of the base rate, when investors evaluate the 
probability of an event, they are more likely to focus on new information and put little 
weight on the base rate, i.e. prior probability. For neglect of the sample size, even though 
the small sample may not represent the population, investors tend to ignore the size of 
sample and infer from it based on a small sample too quickly rather than knowing more 
evidence. Another bias is conservatism. In contrast to representativeness, conservatism 
results in too much weight being placed on the base rate and little weight on new 
information.         
According to the two biases mentioned above, BSV uses mean reversion and trend 
to capture representativeness and conservatism. When there is a series of good news about 
future cash flows, investors tend to over weight the good news due to representativeness 
and believe the trend of cash flows will continue into future. Consequently, the price will 
be pushed too high which causes a lower return after correction in the future and a reversal 
phenomenon (i.e. the negative relationship between anomaly variable and return is 
observed). On the other hand, when there is an unexpected future cash flow increase or 
positive surprise, investors are reluctant to update their belief because of conservatism and 
believe in mean reversion of future cash flows. Therefore, the price incorporates new 
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information inadequately which leads to underreaction and the observation of a price 
continuation effect, i.e. the positive relationship between the anomaly variable and stock 
returns.        
Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998, hereafter DHS) also build a model 
to interpret the under- and over-reaction based on psychological biases. One difference 
from BSV is that they include different biases in their model. DHS considers 
overconfidence and self-attribution as the reason for over- and under-reaction. 
Overconfidence refers to investors being too confident about the precision of their private 
information, namely, investors generate a signal by the means of their own analysis and 
therefore the price suffers from overreaction. Then the correction of the overvalued price 
occurs when the public information fully uncovers the fair value of stock. This is why a 
stock return reversal is to be found. Self-attribution also plays an important role when 
investors update their beliefs. After investors analyse their private information, 
information which confirms their analysis will increase their confidence even more. 
However, they are less likely to update this private signal when there is opposite 
information or a counter event in the market. So the confirmation of a private signal fuels 
the overreaction caused by overconfidence and this is the process of price continuation. 
The reversal and continuation generated by overconfidence and the interaction with self-
attribution imply another difference between BSV and DHS. BSV argue that the investors 
over- and under-react to public information; while DHS suggest that investors overreact 
to private information and underreact to public information.  
In addition to the two theoretical models based on the assumption of investors’ 
psychological bias and single agent in the market, Hong and Stein (1999, thereafter HS) 
consider a model including two types of investors—news watcher and momentum trader. 
There is no need to clarify a particular psychological bias to cause over- or under-reaction, 
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and hence the HS model avoids the problem about why investors overreact to particular 
types of information and underreact to another type of information. HS argue that price 
continuation and the later reversal come from the interaction between news watcher 
traders and momentum traders who are not fully rational. News watchers form 
expectations only based on news or information about fundamentals and do not follow 
past price changes. In contrast, momentum traders make forecasts only based on past 
price change regardless of any information relevant to fundamentals. Firstly, when there 
is new information in the market, news watchers incorporate this information into price 
slowly due to gradual information diffusion. As a result, HS show evidence of a positive 
return correlation in the short-term which is consistent with short-term momentum. If 
there are only news watchers in the market, we should observe underreaction but no 
overreaction. If there are momentum traders in the market, momentum traders will trade 
conditional on the price change. Accordingly, when there is good news about 
fundamentals there is an uptrend of price change and hence momentum traders will make 
a buy decision when they see the price change caused by news watchers. These early 
momentum traders will accelerate the process that price reaches long-run value. However, 
momentum traders trade only according to price change rather than fundamental 
information. Therefore, late momentum traders will trade based on the price change 
fuelled by early momentum traders. The late momentum traders drive the price in the 
same direction even more and the overreaction is generated. HS show negative return 
autocorrelation in the long-run which is consistent with long-term reversal. Further, HS 
show the simulated results to describe how news watchers interact with momentum 
traders. There is a negative relationship between information diffusion and momentum 
intensity, that is, momentum activities are stronger when the information travels slower 
which indicates stronger overreaction. HS compare the results by using various parameters. 
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2.2.4. Recent Development of Asset Pricing Model 
Using asset pricing anomalies as evidence against market efficiency can never bypass the 
question if there is an asset pricing model to capture all risks. Some anomalies (for example, 
the size anomaly) which cannot be explained by CAPM are captured successfully by the 
Fama-French three-factor model (see Fama and French, 1992; Fama and French, 1993). 
Therefore, there is always the motivation to construct new asset pricing models to 
subsume new anomalies. Hou, Xue and Zhang (2015) construct a four-factor model based 
on Q-theory including the market return premium, the size premium, the investment 
premium and the profitability premium. They show evidence that the four-factor model 
works better than FF3. In the meantime, Fama and French (2015) suggest a new five-
factor model by incorporating investment and profitability factors in addition to the 
existing three factors.    
2.2.5 International Evidence of Asset Pricing Anomalies 
The finding of anomalies is originally from the US market. The global examination of 
these anomalies can show an out-of-sample evidence to check the existence of an anomaly 
and the variation of an anomaly in different markets also provides a platform to justify 
possible explanations. 
Watanabe, Xu, Yao and Yu (2013) show a stronger asset growth effect in 
developed markets than in less developed markets. This result can be attributed to an 
optimal investment effect implied by the Q-theory model. The firm decision relies on 
discounting the cash flow by using discount rate and this requires correct prices in the 
market (i.e. the level of market efficiency). In other words, if the price cannot reflect the 
information conveyed by optimal investment, then firm investment or asset growth should 
have weaker links between stock return and investment. Therefore, the asset growth effect 
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should be stronger in developed markets because they are more efficient at reflecting 
information. Motivated by the prediction, Watanabe, Xu, Yao and Yu (2013) compare the 
Q-theory prediction with limits-to-arbitrage and the results support Q-theory. Lam and 
Wei (2011) run a horse race between Q-theory and limits-to-arbitrage in the US market 
and find no winner between the two explanations. Therefore, Watanabe, Xu, Yao and Yu 
(2013) contribute to the literature by distinguishing between the two explanations in the 
context of global markets. Titman, Wei and Xie (2013) also find a stronger asset growth 
anomaly in more developed markets and they also support Q-theory. They argue that firms 
are more likely to make decisions based on the investment-return relation in more 
developed markets because firm managers follow the rule of maximizing firm value in 
developed markets. Griffin, Hirschey and Kelly (2011) investigate how different markets 
react to news announcement and show that developed markets have a stronger reaction 
than emerging markets. They suggest that the source of this response is insider trading. 
Specifically, there are more leakages of news before news announcements in emerging 
markets than developed markets. And this leakage causes less reaction to news in emerging 
markets. Kaniel, Ozoguz and Starks (2012) find more developed markets have a stronger 
extreme volume effect. They argue that more developed markets have less visibility of 
stocks and, therefore, investors ask for a higher premium.   
Overall, there are two gaps which will be addressed in empirical chapters of the 
thesis. The first gap is the source of the asset growth anomaly. The existing evidence has 
no conclusion given that both rational and irrational explanations show explanatory power. 
Second, in the context of global markets with the fact that developed markets are more 
efficient than emerging markets, why are there more anomalies in developed markets than 
emerging markets will be examined.   
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Chapter 3  
Asset Growth Anomaly across Industries 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The efficient market hypothesis has faced a long line of challenges from anomalies (see 
Schwert, 2003, for a survey).  The asset growth anomaly (where subsequent returns are 
negatively related to asset growth) is one of the latest challenges to be investigated.  Cooper 
et al. (2008) provide empirical evidence in support of a mispricing explanation of the 
anomaly. They find that there is a clear reversal pattern of returns for the high and low 
asset growth groups between the pre- and post-formation date. Li and Zhang (2010) 
construct an optimal investment model for firms with investment frictions based on Q-
theory which provides testable hypotheses. Intuitively, firms with high investment 
frictions are less sensitive to the discount rate and, therefore, only a large change of the 
discount rate can induce firms to invest. From a mispricing perspective, they argue that 
the anomaly will be stronger for firms with high limits-to-arbitrage because it will be more 
difficult to trade away the anomaly. Empirically, a stronger anomaly is observed for firms 
with high investment frictions and firms with high limits-to-arbitrage. They offer weak 
evidence in support of Q-theory with investment frictions to explain the asset growth 
anomaly but find that limits-to-arbitrage is a better explanation2. Lam and Wei (2011) use 
more comprehensive proxies for investment frictions and limits-to-arbitrage to test the 
two explanations and they show that firms with high investment frictions or high limits-
																																								 																				
2	They proposed that managers make investment decisions conditional on future required rates of return. 
Therefore, lower future returns are associated with higher current period investment.  This relationship will 
be stronger for high investment friction firms which, therefore, have a stronger anomaly.			
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to-arbitrage have a stronger asset growth anomaly; neither explanation, however, is found 
to dominate. They indicate that the difficulty in distinguishing between the two 
explanations is due to the high correlation between the proxies for investment frictions 
and limits-to-arbitrage.  
Given the mixed evidence for the Q-theory with investment frictions or mispricing 
with limits-to-arbitrage explanations of the asset growth anomaly, I analyze the asset 
growth anomaly from a new angle; namely, I examine whether the anomaly is different 
across industries and industry characteristics determine variations in the anomaly. The 
research is motivated by different industries having radically different asset structures and 
performance/asset structure relationships (for example, compare IT, retailing and 
shipbuilding). It is clear that the asset structures of firms reflect the nature of the industry 
they belong to.  For example, firms in the heavy chemicals industry need very significant 
investment (large chemical plants) in assets to generate profits, while the asset investment 
needed to produce similar profits in retailing is likely to be less. Asset structures also affect 
the competitive structure of industries through barriers to entry and economies of scale. 
There is an extensive literature concerned with the relationship between firm performance 
and industry characteristics. Mann (1966) and Kilpatrick (1968) find a positive relation 
between concentration and profits, Grabowski and Muller (1978) show that firms in 
research intensive industries earn greater returns and Vernon and Nourse (1973) find a 
positive association between the advertising-to-sales ratio and industry profit. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that investors’ valuation of firms is conditional on industry 
characteristics. For example, Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) show that momentum 
profits derive partially from industry components of stock returns and Waring (1996) finds 
that industry characteristics can explain the persistence of firm investment returns. 
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The industry characteristics provide a platform to test a possible explanation of 
the asset growth effect. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Hirshleifer (1994) argue that overreaction 
is due to investors’ extrapolation of firm’s past good (bad) performance far into future so 
that it is more likely to have a negative (positive) shock and lower (higher) returns. If 
overreaction is a potential explanation of the asset growth anomaly (i.e. investors 
overestimate the chance to maintain asset growth), one should expect that the asset growth 
anomaly should be stronger when the firm is in a low competition and high growth 
opportunities industry, because investors tend to raise the probability that such a firm can 
keep its high growth. And therefore investors are likely to overestimate the chance to have 
sustainable growth and we can observe a much stronger anomaly.    
The results presented here offer two key findings. First, the asset growth anomaly 
is limited to 13 of 44 industries for the US for the period from 1963 to 2011. Second, I 
show that certain factors influence the asset growth anomaly at the industry level. After 
controlling for the major, existing explanations of the asset growth anomaly (Q-theory 
with investment frictions and mispricing with limits-to-arbitrage), I find the anomaly is a 
function of industry characteristics which proxy for industry competition and to a lesser 
degree the growth opportunities within an industry. The findings suggest that the asset 
growth anomaly can be at least partly explained by the reaction of investors to the growth 
opportunities within less competitive industries.  
 The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the data 
used and the research methodology building on the exiting literature. Section three 
presents the results. Section four offers conclusions. 
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3.2. Data, Variables and Methodology 
3.2.1 The Asset Growth Anomaly in Each Industry 
I use US data including NYSE, Nasdaq and Amex from 1963 to 2011 and identify 44 non-
financial industries following the Fama and French (1997) classification. The return data 
is from CRSP and the accounting data is from Compustat. I do not include financial firms 
due to their different accounting practices (Durnev, Morck, Yeung and Zarowin, 2003). 
To test whether each industry displays an asset growth anomaly, following the standard 
approach in this literature (Fama and French, 2008), I run the following Fama-MacBeth 
regression for each industry in each month: 
GWX=,X = 	Y + ZF[\	(F + ^_=,XKF) + ZDabcd=,XKF + Zeabd?=,XKF + f=X     (Eq. 3-1) 
	
where Retit is return of stock i in time t, AGi,t-1 is firm asset growth, BMi,t-1 is book-to-
market ratio and MVi,t-1 is market value. 
Specifically, asset growth, the book-to-market ratio and firm size are updated at the end 
of June in each year t. Asset growth is the logarithm of one plus the percentage change of 
firm total assets in year t-1 and year t-2. The book-to-market ratio is book equity in the 
previous fiscal year divided by market equity at the end of December in the previous year. 
Book equity is firm total assets minus total liabilities, plus balance sheet deferred taxes and 
investment tax credits; then if available, minus preferred stock liquidation value, 
redemption value, or carrying value. In addition, I take the natural log of the book-to-
market value. Market value is the multiple of stock price and the number of shares 
outstanding at the end of December and I take the natural log of market value. Cross 
sectional returns are from July in year t to June in year t+1 and updated monthly. The 
time-series average of coefficients of asset growth from the cross sectional regressions is 
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obtained with Newey-West (1987) standard errors that correct for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation.  
3.2.2 The Asset Growth Anomaly – Existing Explanations 
The existing literature has focused on examining the mispricing with limits-to-arbitrage 
and Q-theory with investment frictions explanations of the asset growth anomaly at firm 
level. These literatures use idiosyncratic volatility, the number of analysts following a firm 
and closing price as proxies of limits-to-arbitrage and firm size as the proxy of investment 
frictions (see, for example, Li and Zhang, 2010; and Lam and Wei, 2011). For limits-to-
arbitrage, the higher the limits-to-arbitrage the more costly it is to arbitrage and, therefore, 
the anomaly should be stronger for firms with high limits-to-arbitrage. Idiosyncratic 
volatility is positively related to arbitrage risk or costs (Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002; 
Mashuwala, Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2006) and Lam and Wei (2011) show that idiosyncratic 
volatility is positively related to the asset growth anomaly. The number of analysts is the 
measure of information uncertainty. With high information uncertainty, the arbitrage risk 
is high. Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) find that there is high information uncertainty when 
the number of analysts following a firm is small. That is, the number of analysts is 
negatively associated with limits-to-arbitrage as well as the level of asset growth anomaly. 
The last limits-to-arbitrage proxy is stock price. It is documented that there is a negative 
relationship between the price of a stock and its bid-ask spread (Ball, Kothari and Shanken, 
1995). As a high bid-ask spread means high arbitrage risk, a high stock price should indicate 
a low limits-to-arbitrage. I use firm size (as measured by market value) as the proxy of 
investment frictions. Li and Zhang (2010) and Lam and Wei (2011) suggest that the asset 
growth anomaly is stronger among firms with smaller firm size.  
 
Chapter 3 Asset Growth Anomaly across Industries 
40	
	
3.2.3 The Asset Growth Anomaly – Industry Characteristics 
Given the myriad of industry characteristics that have been analyzed by industrial 
economists, I use Waring (1996) as a guide to the selection of a number of indicative 
factors. Waring (1996) reviewed the economics and management literatures to identify 
industry characteristics that might explain the persistence of firm specific returns. From 
his extensive list of variables I choose five characteristics that have the potential to explain 
asset growth and the response of investors. More specifically, in the context of asset 
growth, I expect two groups of industry characteristics to influence investors’ valuation of 
a company; namely, growth opportunities and the level of competition within an industry.  
In terms of growth opportunities, Anthony and Ramesh (1992) show that sales 
growth is a characteristic of the firm life cycle and firms in early stages have better growth 
prospects and higher sales growth. With better growth opportunities, investors may 
overreact more to future firm performance and then the price will be corrected in the long 
run. As a result, the asset growth anomaly should be stronger for industries with high sales 
growth rates. Indeed, Dong et al. (2012) show that mis-valuation is stronger in firms that 
have more growth opportunities. To proxy for growth opportunities, I use sales growth 
as well as research and development expenses (R&D). Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994) suggest that past sales growth rate can be used as a measure of future expectations 
of firm growth. Cooper, Gullen and Schill (2008) also use sales growth as the growth 
measure. Furthermore, Abernathy and Utterback (1978) show that firm innovation 
activities are intensive in a new industry in order to achieve market share and market 
growth. Therefore, R&D expenditure is another proxy for firm growth opportunities. For 
example, Ho et al. (2006) provide evidence to show the positive impact of R&D 
investment on the growth opportunities of a firm. In summary, sales growth and R&D 
expenditure are proxies for growth opportunities. 
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In terms of industry competition, in highly competitive industries the gains from 
growth are likely to be short lived because of competitive pressures. In contrast, in less 
competitive (concentrated) industries, firms should be more able to reap the benefits of 
their investment in growth. Concentrated industries have higher barriers to entry and firms 
have more control over the market to ensure good performance. Waring (1996) shows 
that concentration leads to persistence of firm profitability. Investors are expected to be 
able to recognize these economic forces and react accordingly. I use three proxies for 
competition/concentration. The first proxy is the concentration ratio (CONCEN) which 
is the sales of the largest four firms within an industry divided by the sales of all firms in 
that industry. A high concentration ratio means that only a small number of firms accounts 
for a large proportion of sales in the industry. The second proxy is the number of firms in 
an industry (NUMFIRM). If a specific industry has no dominant power and is easy to 
enter, there should be many firms in that industry. The third proxy is advertising cost 
(AD/S). In a competitive industry, firms have to attract the attention of consumers to 
increase sales. As a result, firms in a competitive industry need to advertise more and 
consequently, have higher advertising costs.  In summary, there is a range of literature 
which suggest that firms in different industries have different asset/performance 
relationships and different industries have different growth opportunities and competitive 
situations. Consequently, investors, at least partially, evaluate stocks conditional on 
industry characteristics. Table 3-1 shows the averages of the above variables for each of 
the industries in the sample. Healthcare, medical equipment and pharmaceutical products 
show high asset growth and the three industries are also the leaders in terms of research 
input; alcoholic beverages, candy and soda and consumer goods have higher advertisement 
costs; for concentration, defense and tobacco, no surprise, are controlled by a few firms; 
the business services industry has more firms than any other and there is a small number 
of firms in defense industry. Some of the industries have a low number of firms, for 
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example, the defense industry has six firms and the coal industry has nine firms. Although 
the estimation with small sample size has larger standard errors, it is statistically feasible to 
run regressions because the number of observations is greater than the number of 
independent variables. In addition, I am interested with the industry asset growth anomaly 
and these firms represent the industry rather than the case that there are a small number 
of firms selected out of many firms in this industry.  
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Table 3-1 Industry characteristics 
This table reports the time-series average of industry characteristic for each industry. Industry 
characteristics include natural log of sale growth (SALEG), R&D expense (RD/S) which is R&D 
expenditure dividend by sales, concentration ratio (CONCEN) which is the sum of sales of top 
four firms ranked by sales divided by total sales of all firms in that industry, number of firm 
(NFIRM) which is the number of firms at the end of June in each year in each industry, advertising 
costs (AD/S) which is the advertising expense divided by sales.  
 Industry SALEG AD/S RD/S CONCEN NFIRM 
1 Agriculture 0.1187 0.0126 0.0315 0.8383 20 
2 Food Products 0.0790 0.0320 0.0060 0.3898 84 
3 Candy and Soda 0.0906 0.0597 0.0066 0.8506 16 
4 Alcoholic Beverages 0.0740 0.0756 0.0055 0.6981 22 
5 Tobacco Products 0.0708 0.0391 0.0053 0.9468 10 
6 Recreational Products 0.0791 0.0436 0.0280 0.7411 55 
7 Entertainment 0.0946 0.0465 0.0018 0.6874 69 
8 Printing and Publishing 0.0772 0.0647 0.0079 0.4318 52 
9 Consumer Goods 0.0749 0.0577 0.0225 0.5868 109 
10 Apparel 0.0734 0.0335 0.0063 0.5073 68 
11 Healthcare 0.2746 0.0116 0.0616 0.6055 92 
12 Medical Equipment 0.1548 0.0198 0.0722 0.6998 116 
13 Pharmaceutical Products 0.1351 0.0539 0.2560 0.3538 160 
14 Chemicals 0.0850 0.0226 0.0284 0.4356 98 
15 Rubber and Plastic Products 0.0885 0.0099 0.0184 0.6689 38 
16 Textiles 0.0526 0.0120 0.0224 0.3993 49 
17 Construction Materials 0.0757 0.0148 0.0124 0.2804 144 
18 Construction 0.1034 0.0136 0.0187 0.4632 58 
19 Steel Works, Etc. 0.0723 0.0165 0.0092 0.4426 81 
20 Fabricated Products 0.0778 0.0153 0.0098 0.8363 20 
21 Machinery 0.0879 0.0142 0.0231 0.3190 165 
22 Electrical Equipment 0.0999 0.0322 0.0620 0.7333 106 
23 Miscellaneous 0.0985 0.0193 0.0274 0.8251 65 
24 Automobiles and Trucks 0.0806 0.0179 0.0176 0.6783 79 
25 Aircraft 0.0842 0.0267 0.0239 0.7197 28 
26 Shipbuilding, Railroad Eq 0.0762 0.0189 0.0123 0.8853 11 
27 Defense 0.0911 0.0190 0.0195 0.9707 6 
28 Precious Metals 0.1098 7.1929 0.0247 0.5609 57 
29 Nonmetallic Mining 0.0952 0.0154 0.0105 0.6242 50 
30 Coal 0.1093 0.0093 0.0106 0.8590 9 
31 Petroleum and Natural Gas 0.1277 0.0184 0.0065 0.4810 238 
32 Utilities 0.0845 0.0075 0.0063 0.1593 168 
33 Telecommunications 0.1501 0.0248 0.0252 0.6787 123 
34 Personal Services 0.1300 0.0436 0.0058 0.5936 51 
35 Business Services 0.1527 0.0166 0.0877 0.2981 498 
36 Computers 0.1345 0.0165 0.0818 0.6783 131 
37 Electronic Equipment 0.1170 0.0180 0.0686 0.4852 250 
38 Measuring and Control Equip 0.1112 0.0142 0.0742 0.6260 88 
39 Business Supplies 0.0716 0.0179 0.0107 0.4088 50 
40 Shipping Containers 0.0754 0.0141 0.0140 0.5706 33 
41 Transportation 0.1062 0.0287 0.0100 0.3522 129 
42 Wholesale 0.1090 0.0195 0.0013 0.5119 192 
43 Retail 0.0968 0.0377 0.0000 0.3455 241 
44 Restaurants, Hotel, Motel 0.1086 0.0288 0.0000 0.4245 93 
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3.2.4 Empirical Method 
Empirically I use a two-stage generalized least square (GLS) method because this can 
address the problem of heteroscedasticity of the dependent variable (see Waring, 1996). 
In the first stage, for each month I run a cross sectional ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression of monthly returns on asset growth to estimate g4 in equation (3-1) in each 
industry.  In the second stage I use −g4 as the dependent variable measuring the extent 
of the asset growth anomaly for each industry month. By multiplying the slope by minus 
1, we can interpret the slope as the larger the value the stronger the asset growth effect. I 
use value-weighted industry characteristics as the independent variables. Value-weighed 
value is used because the results are not influenced by some small firms in an industry. In addition, 
I include the value-weighted average of four control variables: idiosyncratic volatility, 
number of analysts, stock price and the natural log of firm size in each industry (see Table 
3-2 for detailed definitions)3. Li and Zhang (2010) and Lam and Wei (2011) show these 
variables have explanatory power in terms of the asset growth anomaly. To estimate 
efficient parameters, I use the standard errors of g4 from the first stage as the weights in 
the second stage regression4. The reason is that the dependent variable (slope of asset 
growth in each industry) is from regression estimation and the slopes are not constant due 
to the standard error; in addition, it can solve the problem of heteroscedasticity 





3 The advantage of value-weighted characteristics is that the result is not affected by small firms. 
4 See Saxonhouse (1976) for the details of the procedure. 
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Table 3-2 Variable definition and construction 
Variable   Definition   Computation Reference 
SALE  Sales (Net)  #12 (Compustat)  
AD  Advertising expense  #45 (Compustat)  
R&D   Research and development expense  #46 (Compustat)  
      
Industry characteristics    
SALEG  Sale growth  (SALE& − SALE&())/SALE&() Waring (1996) 
AD/S  Advertising expense divided by Sales  AD/SALE Waring (1996) 
RD/S  Research and development expense 
divided by sales 
 R&D/SALE Waring (1996) 
CONCEN  Concentration: sales of largest four  
firms within an industry to total sales in  
the industry ratio  
 SALE(Largest 4)/SALE(total) Waring (1996) 
NFRIM  Number of firms  firm number in each  
industry per year 
Waring (1996) 
      
Control variables    
MV  Firm size: market value  price*outstanding shares Lam and Wei (2011) 
NANAL  Number of analysts for a firm  sum of analyst for a stock Rajgopal and Venkatachalam 
(2011) 
PRICE  Closing price  average of closing price over past 12 months Lam and Wei (2011) 
IVOL  Idiosyncratic volatility  variance of residual from CAPM Lam and Wei (2011) 
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3.3. Empirical Results 
Table 3-3 shows that the asset growth anomaly exists for only 13 out of the 44 industries 
(agriculture, candy and soda, chemicals, rubber and plastic products, construction, steel 
works, automobiles and trucks, nonmetallic mining, petroleum and natural gas, electronic 
equipment, transportation, wholesale and restaurants, hotel and motels). Furthermore, the 
coefficients range from -0.0346 to -0.0084 for the industries displaying the growth anomaly. 
The results show, therefore, that the asset growth anomaly is not a universal phenomenon 
for all industries and it varies across different industries. Testing the asset growth effect in 
general (by pooling firms from all industries) gives a slope of -0.0101 with t value of -8.19.  
Taken together these results show that the asset growth effect is significant for the overall 
US market and this seemingly general result is driven by specific industries. 
Table 3-4 shows how the asset growth anomaly responds to industry characteristics. The 
dependent variable is asset growth slope from equation 3-1 times minus one. By doing 
this, we can interpret the results that the larger the slope the stronger the anomaly (because 
of negative effect of asset growth on subsequent returns). The independent variables 
include natural log of sale growth (lnSALEG), R&D expense (RD/S), concentration ratio 
(CONCEN), number of firms (NFIRM), advertising costs (AD/S). Control variables 
include idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), number of analysts following a firm (NANAL), 
stock closing price (PRICE) and natural log of market value (lnMV). The results presented 
in Model 1 (industry characteristics) and Model 3 (industry characteristics, Q-theory and 
limits-to-arbitrage) show that the asset growth anomaly is positively but weakly related to 
sales growth (Model 1) and R&D expenses (Model 3). Model 2 shows the relation between 
the asset growth anomaly and limits-to-arbitrage or investment frictions. It shows that the 
asset growth anomaly is stronger in industries with high limits-to-arbitrage and high 
frictions. This is consistent with Li and Zhang (2010) and Lam and Wei (2011). The results 
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for competition are, however, of more importance with the asset growth anomaly being 
positively related to concentration and negatively related to the number of firms and 
advertising expenses. The adjusted R square values in Table 3-4 show 8%, 6% and 13% 
explanatory power for industry characteristics, the two existing explanations (investment 
frictions and limits-to-arbitrage) and the combination of industry characteristics and 
existing explanations, respectively. These results indicate that industry characteristics have 
explanatory power over and above the existing explanations of investment frictions and 
limits-to-arbitrage, and that the asset growth anomaly is related to industry characteristics.
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Table 3-3 Asset growth anomaly in each industry 
This table reports asset growth anomaly in each industry. I regress monthly return on lagged asset growth and two control variables (natural log of firm size and 
book-to-market ratio) in each month and summarize the time-series mean of the slope coefficient. The standard error is corrected by the Newey-West (1987) method. 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.  
  Industry Slope t     Industry Slope t 
1 Agriculture -0.0318** -2.40  23 Miscellaneous -0.0309 -0.41 
2 Food Products -0.0074 -1.20  24 Automobiles and Trucks -0.0104* -1.75 
3 Candy and Soda -0.0346*** -2.78  25 Aircraft -0.0081 -0.63 
4 Alcoholic Beverages -0.0159 -1.30  26 Shipbuilding, Railroad Eq -0.3892 -1.01 
5 Tobacco Products 0.0057 0.27  27 Defense 0.1479 0.15 
6 Recreational Products -0.0439 -0.88  28 Precious Metals -0.0016 -0.25 
7 Entertainment -0.0070 -0.99  29 Nonmetallic Mining -0.0177*** -2.57 
8 Printing and Publishing 0.1391 1.52  30 Coal -0.0329 -0.40 
9 Consumer Goods -0.0134 -1.27  31 Petroleum and Natural Gas -0.0084*** -3.09 
10 Apparel -0.0149 -2.86  32 Utilities -0.0045 -1.25 
11 Healthcare -0.0109 -1.22  33 Telecommunications -0.0041 -0.65 
12 Medical Equipment 0.0312 0.55  34 Personal Services 0.0043 0.33 
13 Pharmaceutical Products -0.0094 -1.56  35 Business Services 0.0597 0.65 
14 Chemicals -0.0086** -1.95  36 Computers -0.0033 -0.26 
15 Rubber and Plastic Products -0.0337* -1.70  37 Electronic Equipment -0.0110*** -2.68 
16 Textiles -0.0056 -0.50  38 Measuring and Control Equip -0.0142 -1.21 
17 Construction Materials -0.0093 -1.46  39 Business Supplies 0.0094 0.30 
18 Construction -0.0143*** -2.56  40 Shipping Containers 0.0149 1.13 
19 Steel Works, Etc. -0.0259*** -2.75  41 Transportation -0.0136*** -2.87 
20 Fabricated Products -0.0120 -0.74  42 Wholesale -0.0103** -2.07 
21 Machinery -0.0044 -1.03  43 Retail -0.0078 -1.59 
22 Electrical Equipment -0.0052 -0.61   44 Restaurants, Hotel, Motel -0.0120*** -2.45 
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Table 3-4 Effect of industry characteristics on the asset growth anomaly 
This table reports how the asset growth anomaly responds to industry characteristics and other 
control variables. The dependent variable is the asset growth slope from equation (3-1) times minus 
one. Industry characteristics include natural log of sale growth (lnSALEG), R&D expense (RD/S) 
which is R&D expenditure dividend by sales, concentration ratio (CONCEN) which is the largest 
four sales divided by total sales of all firms in that industry, number of firms (NFIRM) which is 
the number of firms at the end of June in each year in each industry, advertising costs (AD/S) 
which is the advertising expense divided by sales. Control variables include idiosyncratic volatility 
(IVOL), number of analysts following a firm (NANAL), stock closing price (PRICE) and natural 
log of market value (lnMV). Industry characteristics are past three-year average and control 
variables are measures at one period before the measurement period of the dependent variable. 
The regression uses the standard error of the asset growth slope in the first stage estimation as the 
weight. VIF is the variance inflation factor. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significant at 10%, 5% 
and 1%. 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
  
slope 
(t) VIF   
slope 
(t) VIF   
slope 
(t) VIF 
Intercept -0.0288*** 0  0.1819*** 0  0.1013*** 0 
 (-8.33)   (17.62)   (9.81)  
lnSALEG 0.0272*** 1.54     0.0065 1.63 
 (5.81)      (1.42)  
RD/S 0.0000 1.03     0.0005* 1.05 
 (0.12)      (1.91)  
CONCEN 0.1323*** 1.59     0.1132*** 1.69 
 (23.81)      (20.80)  
NFIRM -0.00001*** 2.12     -0.00002*** 2.55 
 (-2.48)      (-3.82)  
AD/S -0.1830*** 1.10     -0.2015*** 1.12 
 (-9.44)      (-11.71)  
IVOL    0.3143*** 1.08  0.4466*** 1.41 
    (11.67)   (15.10)  
NANAL    -0.0000 1.85  0.0000 1.92 
    (-1.26)   (0.00)  
PRICE    0.0011*** 2.13  0.0012*** 2.28 
    (15.40)   (16.28)  
lnMV    -0.0150*** 3.23  -0.0134*** 3.35 
        (-18.44)     (-16.83)   
         
Adj.		R' 8%   6%   13%  
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The additional explanatory power of the industry characteristics are further 
evidenced in Table 3-5 that presents the correlations across the industry characteristic 
proxies with those of the two existing explanations. Lam and Wei (2011) show a high 
correlation across investment frictions and limits-to-arbitrage proxies that make it difficult 
to identify the source of the explanatory power from the two explanations.  The 
correlations shown in Table 3-5 confirm that there is high correlation among investment 
friction and limits-to-arbitrage proxies which range from 0.22 to 0.69 in absolute value. If 
industry characteristics are also highly correlated with investment frictions and limits-to-
arbitrage proxies, it would be difficult to confirm that industry characteristics have 
additional information beyond the two explanations. I find, however, very low correlations 
across the industry characteristic proxies and existing explanations - with correlation 
coefficients ranging from -0.07 to 0.19.   
Therefore, the results demonstrate that industry growth characteristics have 
additional explanatory power over and above the existing Q-theory with frictions and 
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Table 3-5 Correlation among the explanatory variables 
This table reports the correlation coefficients among the variables. 
  ln(SALEG) RD/S CONCEN NFIRM AD/S IVOL NANAL PRICE ln(MV) 
ln(SALEG) 1.00         
RD/S 0.00 1.00        
CONCEN 0.01 -0.05 1.00       
NFIRM 0.00 0.04 -0.51 1.00      
AD/S 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.08 1.00     
IVOL 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.10 -0.04 1.00    
NANAL 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.10 -0.14 -0.22 1.00   
PRICE 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 0.14 0.02 -0.33 0.33 1.00  
ln(MV) 0.02 0.03 -0.07 0.19 0.02 -0.33 0.61 0.69 1.00 
 
  




The financial markets have been shown to feature a range of asset pricing anomalies, the 
latest being the asset growth anomaly. This paper demonstrates that the asset growth 
anomaly is not a general feature of the US market but is specific to 13 out of 44 industries. 
In addition, the asset growth anomaly is found to be a function of industry characteristics 
proxying for growth opportunities (sales growth and R&D costs) and competition 
(concentration, the number of firms and advertising costs). Therefore, this paper shows 
that the asset growth anomaly is not a feature of the whole market but is specific to a 
relatively small number of industries and industry characteristics. The finding is consistent 
with arguments that the asset growth anomaly is driven by investors’ mispricing and such 
mispricing is especially acute in industries with higher growth opportunities and lower 
competition.  
One of the main limitations of this chapter is the proxies used to measure growth 
opportunities and competition. I collect these proxies from one source and the source is 
relatively old so that the proxies may contain a lot of noise. For example, large number of 
firm is either the indicator of low barriers to entry or more competitors. Another limitation 
is that there are only a few observations in some industries, which make the regression 
results less conclusive.  However, it needs to be recognised that the measures used are the 
best available. 
The response to asset growth given industry characteristics show some evidence that 
overreaction to asset growth may the driver of the asset growth effect. However, this is 
not the direct test for overreaction explanation. Therefore, in the second chapter, I will 
explicitly design a test to examine the relation between degree of overreaction and the 
asset growth anomaly.   
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Chapter 4  
Paying too Much for Growth!  
An Overreaction Explanation of the Asset Growth Anomaly 
4.1. Introduction 
Investment textbooks and financial newspapers often warn investors not to pay too much 
for growth (see, e.g., Penman 2012, pages 154-156).  Even the most experienced of 
investors such as Warren Buffett can, however, make the mistake of paying too much for 
growth.  Berkshire Hathaway’s investment in the British supermarket Tesco is one of the 
few mistakes that Warren Buffett has admitted to making. When he invested in Tesco back 
in 2006, he cited the promising growth of Tesco5.   
Warren Buffet’s Tesco debacle exemplifies the dangers of paying too much for 
growth for ordinary investors. Running parallel is a debate in the academic literature about 
the cause of the asset growth anomaly - the negative relationship between asset growth 
and subsequent stock returns (Cooper et al., 2008).  What remains unclear is the driver 
behind this phenomenon. In this paper I study the common driver that provides a unified 
explanation for the industry and academic views on the growth and valuation relationship. 
I anchor the analysis in an accounting valuation model to understand investors’ reactions 
to asset growth. In particular, I propose that the reason behind investors paying too much 
for growth (and, hence, the asset growth anomaly) is because of their expectation errors 
																																								 																				
5 Berkshire Hathaway began building its Tesco holding in 2006 after the grocery chain announced plans for 
an expansion in the U.S and internationally. (http://www.warrenbuffett.com/warren-buffetts-investments-
in-uk-companies/ Accessed April 2015).  In the 2014 annual report, Buffet admits his mistake of investing 
in the company that cost Berkshire Hathaway $444 million. 
(http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2014ar/2014ar.pdf accessed April 2015). 
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in the trend and profitability of asset growth where trend is captured by the growth rate and 
profitability by the asset turnover ratio and the net profit margin. When such expectations 
are not realized, there is a market correction and this induces the negative relationship 
between asset growth and subsequent returns.   
The argument is developed as follows. Managers of a company are assumed to act 
to the benefit of shareholders and to only select positive NPV projects given the cash 
flows of the projects and the firm’s discount rate. Every addition of assets to the company 
through these projects should add value to shareholders’ wealth. Therefore, in general, 
asset growth increases firm value and, ceteris paribus, on the announcement of asset 
growth there will be an increase in the market value of the firm. This assumption is crucial 
for q theory or optimal investment. Otherwise, if there is an agency problem and firm 
managers do not make investment decisions according to net present value, there should 
be a weak or no relation between return and investment. As a result, one should not 
observe the asset growth effect. Watanabe, Xu, Yao and Yu (2013) and Titman, Wei and 
Xie (2013) show stronger asset growth effect in developed markets than less developed 
markets. This evidence may suggest that the assumption is reasonable in developed 
markets and therefore they have stronger effect. Importantly, the extent of this increase in 
the market value of the firm depends on the investors’ expectations of the firm’s future 
prospects given the additional assets and investors may overreact to asset growth in two 
ways.   
First, in the context of accounting valuation models (such as residual income or 
abnormal earnings), estimating the growth rate (both in the short and long term) is an 
important, yet speculative, task in applying the models.  This leads to the first hypothesis 
which I refer to as the “trend hypothesis”:  if investors’ overestimation of the trend of 
asset growth is the driver of the asset growth anomaly, investors should overreact more 
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when they expect that the current growth is more likely to continue. To test this hypothesis 
empirically, I need an approach to capture investors’ expectation formation.  It is 
documented that investors form expectations about growth based on their past 
experiences and there is a large amount of evidence that investors are prone to the 
representativeness bias after observing a sequence of the same signed signal6. In the 
current context investors are seen as estimating that future growth is more likely after 
observing a sequence of growth; the sequence of growth not only providing information 
regarding the future cash flows generated from the additional assets but also the future 
prospect of further growth in the assets.  I expect, therefore, that investors will overreact 
more to asset growth and hence, there is a stronger asset growth anomaly in firms that 
experience a longer sequence of growth.     
A second factor that would affect investors’ assessment of the value of asset 
growth is the direct benefit of the asset growth on future cash flows.  In other words, how 
much additional value can the new assets bring to the company?  The accounting ratio 
that helps investors evaluate a company’s profitability in combination with total assets is 
the return on assets (ROA) that can further be broken down into the asset turnover ratio 
(ATO) and the net profit margin (NPM). Importantly, investors do not focus on these 
two ratios equally given a firm’s asset growth status.  Aghion and Stein (2008) argue that 
the market places different weights on the two profitability drivers (ATO and NPM) 
conditional on the adopted strategy of a firm. Particularly, analysts focus more on growth 
related metrics when a company is in a growth phase and conversely more on per unit 
profitability measures in cost-cutting/efficiency phases. In this regard, for a high growth 
firm, the market will focus more on ATO and ignore the effect of NPM. For a firm that 
																																								 																				
6 For example, according to Barberis et al. (1998), after a trend of good or bad news, representativeness 
causes investors to overreact to information and push a stock’s price too high or too low. Hong and Stein 
(1999) argue that momentum traders make decisions conditional on past price changes; that is, momentum 
traders push stock prices higher (lower) when there is an up (down) trend.   
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has a high asset turnover ratio, the addition of new assets should have a strong effect on 
earnings and, therefore, residual earnings. I expect investors in firms with a higher ATO 
to overreact more to asset growth.  In other words, as ATO increases I expect the asset 
growth anomaly to increase.  By contrast, for a low growth firm, the market will focus 
more on the NPM and ignore the effect of ATO.  Low asset growth and low NPM are 
both seen as bad news since they indicate that a firm has neither a growth nor an efficiency 
focus. Therefore, investors will overreact to low asset growth even more when the NPM 
is low. In other words, as the NPM increases I expect that the asset growth anomaly will 
decrease.    
Using US data from 1963 to 2011, I test the above hypotheses in the following 
ways. First, by comparing the slope coefficients of asset growth in asset growth regressions 
(regressing asset growth on stock return with other control variables) for each growth 
sequence portfolio (from one to four years of consecutive high or low growth), I find that 
as the asset growth sequence lengthens the asset growth anomaly becomes stronger.  This 
confirms that the representativeness bias is at work in predicting growth given prior 
sequences. Second, I show, by comparing the asset growth slope coefficients of the four 
portfolios of stocks sorted by their asset turnover ratio and net profit margin respectively, 
that stocks with a higher asset turnover ratio (low net profit margin) have a stronger asset 
growth anomaly in the high (low) asset growth companies.  These findings support 
investors placing different weights on the two profitability drivers (ATO and NPM) 
conditional on the adopted strategy of a firm (Aghion and Stein, 2008).   
I examine the robustness of the results in a number of ways. First, I study the 
explanatory power of growth sequences, the asset turnover ratio and the net profit margin 
after controlling for factors that proxy for three possible alternative explanations: limits to 
arbitrage, investment frictions (Q-theory - Li and Zhang, 2010) and a traditional risk 
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explanation (Berk, et al., 1999).  Following Lam and Wei (2011) I include 14 proxies.  As 
they point out and I empirically demonstrate, these proxies are highly correlated – 
therefore, to maximize the information and reduce the effect of multicollinearity in the 
regressions, I abstract factors using principal component analysis. Furthermore, as some 
of the proxies are only available later on in the sample period, I abstract factors using the 
maximum number of available proxies in any given sample sub-period. In all of the cases, 
three factors are identified: a size factor, an idiosyncratic factor and an illiquidity factor. In 
the regressions including the three constructed factors, the growth sequence results are 
very robust in all the sub period analyses. The asset growth and its sequence interaction 
term is significant and negative, suggesting that the asset growth anomaly is stronger as 
the sequence lengthens. The coefficients of the asset turnover ratio and net profit margin, 
however, are not significant in the regressions, suggesting that their effect on the anomaly 
is weak and subsumed by other explanatory variables (particularly the size factor) in the 
regression analysis.   
Second, I further test the overreaction explanation by examining the formation 
and correction phases around the asset growth. If the overreaction of investors to growth 
is the driver of the anomaly, i.e., the observed anomaly is a correction of mispricing, I 
should observe a price movement that leads to the formation of mispricing and such a 
price movement should be opposite to the post growth price movement.  In other words, 
there should be a clear reversal pattern in the price around the portfolio formation point. 
To confirm this, I plot the market adjusted return for the growth deciles portfolio one 
year before and after the formation year. I show that the pair-up of the pre formation run-
up and post formation decline are nearly perfectly ordered by asset growth deciles. For the 
highest asset growth portfolio, there is the largest cumulated price run-up from one year 
(highest return) before the portfolio formation point; this largest price run-up is associated 
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with the largest decline in price in the post formation period (lowest return) and vice versa. 
This evidence provides strong support to the mispricing explanation of the anomaly.   
Furthermore, for the correction phase, if the expectation error in the growth trend 
is the driver of the anomaly, the correction will be mainly concentrated on those firms that 
cannot maintain their growth trend expectations. I, therefore, examine the asset growth 
effect conditional on the following year’s asset growth rate.  I show in the post formation 
period that if the trend of growth, either high or low growth trend, cannot be maintained, 
there is a larger correction in price and a higher expectation error (the spread between the 
earnings announcement day [EAD] return and the non-EAD return).    
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, I dig deeper 
into the mispricing explanation of the asset growth anomaly. The importance of asset 
growth has been recognized formally as the investment factor in recently developed multi-
factor asset pricing models such as the q-factor model by Hou, Xie and Zhang (2015) and 
5-factor model by Fama and French (2015). While both mispricing and rational 
explanations of the asset growth factor have been proposed, much of the recent evidence 
in the literature has been focused on rational explanations via Q-theory and it is largely 
inconclusive, with mispricing as an explanation receiving a lot less attention. I identify the 
potential source of investors’ expectation error in the use of accounting valuation models 
that helps to contextualize the links between valuation fundamentals and the pricing 
anomaly.   
Second, the prior literature related to mispricing explanations mainly tests whether 
firms with different limits-to-arbitrage levels show different degrees of the asset growth 
anomaly (Lam and Wei, 2011; Watanabe et al., 2013). However, as Shleifer (2000) argues 
“Limited arbitrage … explains why markets may remain inefficient when perturbed by 
noise trader demands, but it does not tell us much about the exact form that inefficiency 
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might take. For that, I need the second foundation of behavioural finance, namely investor 
sentiment: the theory of how real-world investors actually form their beliefs and 
valuations, and more generally their demands for securities.” Ch 1, p24.  The limits-to-
arbitrage approach only studies the constraints to the correction of the initial mispricing, 
it does not explicitly analyze whether the mispricing is due to over- or under-reaction. I 
contribute to this line of literature by studying over-reaction to current growth as the 
source of the mispricing.   
Third, while Cooper et al. (2008) provide some evidence on testing the over-
reaction to past earnings, they do not identify the sources of the expectation errors 
explicitly – in contrast, I show that it is the over-reaction of investors to current growth 
that leads to them forming expectation errors on the trend of growth and this is the core 
of the asset growth anomaly. I extend the mispricing analyses of Cooper et al. (2008) with 
a direct investigation of the representative bias as the source of the asset growth anomaly. 
Importantly, I provide a direct test of the extrapolation hypothesis (Lakonishok et al., 
1994) in the context of the asset growth anomaly.  The mispricing analysis also takes into 
consideration the alternative rational explanation (Q-theory with investment frictions) that 
was not available to Cooper et al. (2008) at the time of their analyses.    
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. I review the extant asset 
growth anomaly literature and construct the hypotheses in section 2. I describe the data 
and variables used in this study in section 3.  In section 4 I show results for the growth 
sequence portfolios and asset turnover ratio, while in section 5 I present further evidence 
on expectation errors and corrections around asset growth. I provide conclusions in 
section 6.   
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4.2. Related Literatures and Hypothesis Development 
4.2.1. Asset Growth Anomaly 
The efficient market hypothesis has faced a long line of challenges from anomalies (see 
Schwert, 2003, for a survey). The asset growth anomaly (where subsequent returns are 
negatively related to asset growth) is one of the latest challenges to be investigated. Cooper, 
Gulen and Schill (2008) and Fama and French (2008) show that firms with high asset 
growth have lower future returns: that is, firms earn lower subsequent returns when they 
expand their assets; whereas firms earn higher subsequent returns when they experience a 
contraction of their assets7. Furthermore, as the Fama-French 3-factor model cannot 
explain the returns of portfolios sorted by asset growth, this negative relationship between 
asset growth and future stock returns at the cross sectional level is referred to as the asset 
growth anomaly. 
Two branches of explanation are proposed in the literature: risk-based (rational) 
and mispricing (behavioural) explanations. Regarding the risk-based explanation, upon 
discovery of the asset growth anomaly, Cooper et al. (2008) test the risk based explanation 
and show that standard risk factors such as three factor models and the conditional CAPM 
model using a standard set of macroeconomic variables cannot explain the effect.  More 
recent searches for a rational explanation shift from an investor to a firm point of view. 
Q-theory suggests that firms invest when the discount rate (expected return) is lower 
because a lower discount rate leads to a higher net present value and consequently, a 
negative investment-return relation is observed (e.g., Cochrane, 1991; 1996). However, 
such a prediction is difficult to test empirically since managerial expectations of a discount 
rate are unobservable and it requires the strong assumption of market efficiency to make 
																																								 																				
7 For events associated with expansion, Loughran and Ritter (1995) show that firms with equity issuance 
earn lower stock returns. For events associated with contraction, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990) show 
firms with share repurchases earn higher returns.   
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connections between managerial expected discount rates and subsequent realized stock 
returns.  As a way forward, Li and Zhang (2010) construct an optimal investment model 
by incorporating investment frictions within Q-theory. Firms with high investment 
frictions produce higher investment costs and are, therefore, not as sensitive to changes 
in the discount rate; that is, only large decreases in the discount rate can induce firms with 
high frictions to invest.  If Q-theory is the reason behind the asset growth anomaly, it 
predicts that firms with higher investment frictions should show a stronger asset growth 
anomaly. Q-theory with investment frictions has received support in the literature; for 
example, Chen and Zhang (2010) develop a 3-factor model based on Q-theory and find 
supportive evidence8.   
A parallel development in the literature is the mispricing explanation of the asset 
growth anomaly. Cooper et al. (2008) argue that the asset growth anomaly reflects investor 
overreaction to firm growth (contraction). They find that firms that grow (contract) tend 
to be firms with future negative (positive) profitability shocks with respect to performance 
in the sorting year. Furthermore, they show that subsequent earnings announcements for 
low growth firms are associated with positive abnormal returns and vice versa. While the 
results are consistent with the La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) 
expectation errors mispricing story, there has been no development of this line of enquiry.  
Further developments in the study of the mispricing explanation of the asset 
growth anomaly focus instead more on why it persists after it occurs rather than why it 
occurs in the first place. For example, both Li and Zhang (2010) and Lam and Wei (2011) 
propose that if mispricing leads to the asset growth anomaly, firms with high limits-to-
arbitrage should show a stronger asset growth anomaly than firms with low limits-to-
																																								 																				
8 Titman, Wei and Xei (2013) and Watanabe et al. (2013) undertake cross country studies and find a stronger 
asset growth anomaly in more developed stock markets, this is consistent with dynamically optimal 
investment; that is, they find support for Q-theory. 
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arbitrage. The reason is that the anomaly cannot be traded away quickly and should last 
for longer periods when there are high limits-to-arbitrage such as high transaction costs, 
high stock volatility and/or little information about the firm. It is important to note that 
these studies do not directly study the underlining cause of the mispricing.  There is an 
implicit assumption that mispricing occurs in the market and arbitrage fails to fully correct 
the mispricing.   
In summary, while the literature finds support for both Q-theory with investment 
frictions and mispricing with limits-to arbitrage to explain the asset growth anomaly, recent 
studies have focused more towards the Q-theory explanation.  Mispricing as an 
explanation of the phenomenon has received less attention since Cooper et al.’s early 
analysis. Importantly, recent studies on the mispricing explanation only focus on the 
condition of the subsequent persistence of mispricing rather than the cause of the initial 
pricing.  This study aims to fill this void.  
4.2.2. Investors’ Expectation of Firm Growth 
Concerns about investors paying too much for “growth” prospects can be dated back to 
the 1960s.  Little (1962) and Rayner and Little (1966) argue that the implicit assumption 
in the growth investment philosophy is that “past growth is repeated in the future”.  
Challenging this assumption, they empirically show that the past earnings growth has little 
explanatory power in terms of future growth in the UK; similar evidence is documented 
in the US by Lintner and Glauber (1967).  This evidence concludes that ‘growth’ 
investment – investing in stocks with high historic growth is speculative.  Haugen (1995) 
argues that good and bad quickly converge to the average; in other words, growth rates 
are mean reverting. This characteristic of firm growth is robust over different periods.  For 
example, I examine the migration of firms from one asset growth group to another using 
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US stocks from 1963 to 2011 in Figure 4-1. I plot the average asset growth rank for stocks 
starting from their ranks in the formation year and for the coming ten years. I do this 
analysis for every year and report the average pattern in Figure 4-1. A clear mean reverting 
pattern is observed.  Importantly, the reversion is very quick. This finding suggests that 
firms struggle to maintain relative growth – evidence points towards competition, 
economic cycles and technological shocks being the key drivers of firm growth (Klepper, 
1996; Agarwal and Gort, 2002). 
Given that firms face difficulties in maintaining their growth trend, investors are warned 
not to pay too much for current and historic growth (Penman, 2013)9.  However, there is 
evidence that investors are excited by growth news and make investment decisions citing 
the further growth opportunities10. In forming expectations about the future, investors 
often rely on the historical data and are prone to the representative bias and extrapolate 
the current trend too far ahead into the future (Lakonishok et al., 1994; Barberis et al., 
1998). Chan et al. (2003) test for persistence and predictability in earnings growth and 
show that while some firms have grown at high rates historically, there is no persistence 
in long-term earnings growth beyond chance. Yet, even the professionals are overly 
optimistic in their forecasts and add little predictive power - Lipson et al. (2012) find that 





9 See also the example of such a warning in the industry:  https://prudena.com/Risks/paying-too-much-
for-growth 
10 For example, growth opportunity is the reason behind Buffet’s buying and selling of Tesco’s shares.  
(http://www.iii.co.uk/articles/124653/why-warren-buffett-sold-tesco-plc Access Jan 2014).	




Figure 4-1 Firm growth evolution 
This figure plots the average ranking of the growth deciles up to ten years after the formation year. 
At the end of June of each year t from 1965 to 2001, stocks are allocated into deciles based on 
their asset growth rates defined as the percentage change in total assets over the previous fiscal 
year. For each of the deciles in each formation year, the following ten years average ranking is 
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4.2.3. Expectation error in the context of an accounting valuation 
model  
In this section I borrow the residual income model from Penman (2012) and develop 
hypotheses concerning how investors use information about the current asset growth of 
a firm to form expectations about its future in the context of the residual income valuation 
model. Such a model provides a useful benchmark to conceptualize how market value 
relates to accounting data and other information (Olson, 1995). Applying it to analyze 
asset pricing anomalies will allow us to identify the potential source of investors’ valuation 
errors.  
I start with a simple one period perpetual growth residual income model: 
 
!" = $" +
&'(
)*+
     (Eq. 4-1) 
	
where ,- is the equity value at time 0; .- is the book value of equity; / is the 
required rate of return; 0 is the growth rate; and  123 is the residual earnings in time 1 
which is further defined as: 
 
&'( = '4)565+7(		– 	)×$"     (Eq. 4-2) 
	
where 2;/<=<0>3  is the comprehensive earnings at time 1. In other words, 
residual earnings are the earnings after charging the equity employed at the required rate 
of return. Equation (4-1) shows that the value of equity is equal to its book value and the 
present value of the future value added from the residual earnings. In order to understand 
how total asset growth will affect valuations I can rewrite equation (4-2) to include total 
assets in the following equation: 
&'( = &?@(×A@"		– 	)×$"     (Eq. 4-3) 




Where 1BC3 is the return on assets at time 1 and DC- is total assets at time 0. And 
this can be further extended to 
&'( = @A?(×EFG( ×A@"		– 	)×$"     (Eq. 4-4) 
	
Where CDB3 and HIJ3 are the asset turnover ratio and net profit margin at time 
1.  If I substitute equation (4-4) into equation (4-1) I have  
!" = $" +
(@A?(×EFG()×A@"		–	)×$"	
)*+
     (Eq. 4-5) 
	
Given this valuation model, I can pinpoint the key parameters that require 
investors’ input for generating their valuations: CDB3, HIJ3, / and	0. Asset growth will 
affect firm valuation through three types of expectations:  the direct benefit of asset growth 
on future earnings (CDB3 and HIJ3), the trend growth rate (0) and the required rate of 
return (/). I discuss these three aspects in the following paragraphs. 
First, the most important (and speculative) element of the valuation model is the 
future growth rate (Penman 2012, chapter 5). In observing asset growth, even if investors 
are able to accurately estimate its immediate economic impact on firm value, their 
speculations on future growth, given current growth, may induce large mis-valuations. If 
investors wrongly believe that the high level of growth will be maintained in the future, 
they will overvalue the stock. In an earnings research context, Lakonishok et al. (1994) 
show that investors extrapolate firm performance too far into the future and, therefore, 
push price too high or too low causing a subsequent reversal.  
Furthermore, Barberis et al. (1998) argue that investors tend to confirm a trend 
when they witness a growth surprise followed by another surprise and this is consistent 
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with representativeness11. Therefore, the representativeness bias will induce investors to 
extrapolate firm level information. This suggests that the longer is the asset growth trend 
the stronger should be the asset growth anomaly. Specifically, when investors see a series 
of high (low) asset growth they believe the trend will continue and push the price to a high 
(low) level; and they push the price to an even higher (lower) level when the series is longer. 
Afterwards, when investors recognize reality and correct their valuations, the stock price 
reverses. As a result, a negative relation between asset growth and subsequent returns 
should be observed. If this is the case, the findings will tend to support overreaction as 
the explanation of the asset growth anomaly and, furthermore, the representativeness 
heuristic will be the underlying driver of the overreaction. Hence, I develop the first 
hypothesis.   
H1. Firms with longer asset growth sequences should display a stronger asset growth 
anomaly (a negative relationship between asset growth and stock returns), ceteris paribus, 
than firms with shorter asset growth sequences because of the representativeness bias. 
Second, regarding the estimation of the direct benefit of asset growth, Aghion and 
Stein (2008) argue that market valuation will place different weights on the two profitability 
drivers (ATO and NPM) conditional on the adopted strategy of the firm.  For example, 
Hong and Stein (2003) demonstrate this in a case study of Amazon.  They show that during 
the period of “… the growth phase (roughly through the end of 1999), analysts were 
almost uniformly focused on growth-related metrics in valuing Amazon stock, to the 
virtual exclusion of profitability or cost-related metrics. Conversely, during the cost-cutting 
phase that followed, analysts began to pay much more attention to per-unit measures of 
costs and profits” p. 1026, Aghion and Stein (2008).  In this regard, for high growth firms, 
																																								 																				
11  Tversky and Kahneman (1974) show representativeness as a behavioural heuristic; that is, people 
determine probability by using a sample that they think reflects the distribution of the population. Such a 
process results in the bias of over-generalizing recent observations.   
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the market will focus more on ATO and ignore the effect of NPM. For the firms that have 
a high asset turnover ratio, the addition of new assets should have a strong effect on 
earnings and, therefore, residual earnings. Therefore, I expect investors to react more to 
asset growth when firms also have a higher ATO ratio.   
By contrast, according to Aghion and Stein’s (2008) arguments discussed above 
for low growth firms, investors will focus more on the NPM and ignore the effect of ATO.  
Low asset growth and low NPM are both seen as bad news since they indicate that the 
firm is focused on neither growth nor efficiency and, therefore, investors overreact to low 
asset growth even more. Whereas, low asset growth with a high NPM would suggest that 
the firm is focusing on a cost cutting strategy. I expect that a high NPM will lead to less 
overreaction to the low asset growth and hence a lower AG anomaly. Overall I have the 
following two hypotheses: 
H2. Firms with a higher asset turnover ratio should show a stronger asset growth anomaly 
(negative relation between asset growth and stock returns) than those with a lower asset 
turnover ratio. 
H3. Firms with a higher net profit margin should show a weaker asset growth anomaly 
(negative relation between asset growth and stock returns) than those with a lower net 
profit margin.   
Third, asset growth may affect (for the traditional risk explanation see Berk, Green 
and Naik, 1999) or have been conditioned (Q-theory) on the future required rate of return. 
Berk, Green and Naik (1999) argue that low systematic risk investment opportunities are 
more attractive to firms, and risk will be reduced after low risk investment because the 
cash flows from the investment in the future are less risky. Therefore, firms with higher 
investments should have lower risk of future cash flow and, therefore, lower expected 
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returns. Their argument suggests that there is a negative relationship between asset growth 
and expected return.  
There is another rational explanation of the asset growth anomaly which relies on 
the Q-theory model that studies the investment-return relationship from a production-
based asset pricing or firm optimal investment standpoint (e.g., Cochrane, 1991, 1996; 
Chen and Zhang, 2010; Li, Livdan and Zhang, 2009; Li and Zhang, 2010). The basic 
argument is that firms with low discount rates (expected returns) have high net present 
values and high investment, whereas firms with high discount rates have low net present 
values and low investment. Li and Zhang (2010) show that limits-to-arbitrage dominates 
Q-theory in explaining the asset growth anomaly. Watanabe, Xu, Yao and Yu (2013) 
favour the optimal investment explanation by using global stock markets; they find that 
the asset growth anomaly is stronger in more advanced markets where stocks are more 
efficiently priced. Finally, Lam and Wei (2011) present evidence to support both limits-to-
arbitrage and Q-theory. Therefore, in testing the behavioural Hypotheses 1 to 3, I have to 
control for the factors that are relevant to these rational explanations. I detail the 
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4.3. Sample and measurement 
I use US data including NYSE, Amex and NASDAQ from 1963 to 2011 based on the 
CRSP and Compustat datasets. Monthly and daily stock returns are from CRSP and yearly 
or quarterly financial reporting variables are from Compustat. Also, I exclude financial 
firms with four-digit SIC codes between 6000 and 699912 . High leverage has different 
meaning for financial firms and non-financial firms. For financial firms, high leverage is their 
nature, for example, banks have large number of savings from clients. High leverage, however, is 
likely to indicate distress for other firms (See Fama and French, 1992). To avoid the problems 
of survivorship or selection biases, I follow Fama and French (1993) and Cooper et al. 
(2008) to retain firms with at least two years of Compustat data13. For some portfolio 
formations, I require four-years of data availability prior to the formation date. There are 
134,879 firm-year observations after following the sample selection procedure. For the 
Fama-MacBeth regressions, I update returns monthly and asset growth or other financial 
variables on a yearly basis.      
Following Cooper et al. (2008) I use the percentage change of a firm’s assets between 
the current and previous year as the measure of firm asset growth. That is, firm asset 
growth, AG = Assett-1/Assett-2-1. Lipson et al. (2011) compare different definitions of 
asset growth and show that there is little effect on the asset growth anomaly.  I discuss the 




12 Fama and French (2008), Cooper et al. (2008) and Lam and Wei (2011) do not include financial firms in 
their samples when investigating the asset growth anomaly.  
13 Banz and Breen (1986) and Lam and Wei (2011) also set this requirement to select their samples in order 
to minimize the selection bias. 




4.4.1. The Asset Growth Anomaly Sorted by Conditional Variables 
The hypothesis posits that if the asset growth anomaly is driven by overreaction, I expect 
the sequence of asset growth to affect the asset growth anomaly. More specifically, 
investors overreact to firm asset growth when they see a growth trend and as the trend 
becomes longer, investors overreact more. 
To construct asset growth sequence portfolios I first divide firms into deciles in the June 
of each year based on asset growth. Then I look back to find which asset growth decile 
the firm is allocated to in previous years. The top two asset growth deciles are considered 
as the high asset growth group, while the bottom two asset growth deciles are viewed as 
the low asset growth group. Decile 10 is the firms with highest growth. However, 
maintaining high growth is difficult. I need to look back to the past five years to construct 
sequence portfolio. If only firms in decile 10 is considered as high asset growth, there are 
less observations. Therefore, I consider the top two deciles as high asset growth group. I 
then trace back firm asset growth to count how many consecutive years that a firm stays 
in the high (low) two deciles. Trends 1 to 4 denote the portfolios of firms that have 1 to 4 
consecutive years of high (low) growth. Panel A of Table 4-1 demonstrates the process of 
eight portfolios. They are [+], [++], [+++], [++++], [-], [--], [---] and [----] (x indicates 
that the asset growth trend has stopped; for high (low) asset growth, either medium asset 
growth or low (high) asset growth will interrupt the trend).       
To examine whether the anomaly increases with an increase in the length of the asset 
growth trend, I examine the difference between the high and low asset growth portfolios’ 
equal weighted average monthly returns in the next 12 months. Further, I examine the 
slope of the asset growth regression in each portfolio. I only report equal weighted return 
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in Table 4-1 because the regression analysis in Table 4-1 considers firm size as one of the 
control variables. The results of equal weighted return and slope from the regression are 
consistent. Therefore, firm size cannot change the conclusion. 
Panel B of Table 4-1 shows the return pattern of the growth trend portfolios. The 
evidence is consistent with investors behaving according to the representativeness 
heuristic. The anomaly measured by the differences between the low and high growth 
portfolios (Return Spread) are statistically significant and positive.  Importantly, the return 
spreads, hence the anomaly, are monotonically increasing as the length of the asset growth 
sequence increases.  The difference between Trends 4 and 1 is highly significant and 
economically important.  It suggests that investing in the high-low growth hedge return in 
stocks with 4 consecutive high/low growth sequences will earn an annualized 9.5% more 
than investing in the hedge portfolios with only 1 growth sequence.  
For the second test reported in Panel B of Table 4-1, I study the effect of asset 
growth in a Fama-MacBeth regression. Within each asset growth sequence portfolio, I 
employ a Fama-MacBeth regression that controls for the natural logarithm of market value, 
the natural logarithm of the book-to-market ratio and the previous six months of returns14. 
The mean slope coefficient is reported in the ‘Asset growth Slope Coefficient’ column in 
Table 4-1. The asset growth coefficients are negative and significant confirming the asset 
growth anomaly in each sub-Trend portfolio. Consistent with the return analysis, the 
magnitudes of the slope coefficient are monotonically increasing - suggesting an increase 
in the anomaly as the length of the trend increases. Overall, the analyses in Table 4-1 show 
																																								 																				
14 The sample with total asset data is from the fiscal year 1963.  This enables us to calculate asset growth 
from the fiscal year 1964. When I analyze growth sequence data, I require at least five years of data; therefore, 
I start the analysis from the fiscal year 1968. Furthermore, because I need the return data in the subsequent 
year, I conduct the regression from the calendar year 1969. 
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evidence to support the first hypothesis that the asset growth anomaly is stronger for firms 
with a longer sequence of asset growth.  
4.4.2 The Asset Turnover Ratio, the Net Profit Margin and the Asset 
Growth Anomaly 
I have four groups of sequence portfolios in Table 4-1 and to make it consistent I 
also divide firms into four groups in Table 4-2. Table 4-2 reports the asset growth anomaly 
conditional on the asset turnover ratio and net profit margin ranked in quartiles. The 
ATOs are calculated as sales divided by average total assets. The NPMs are calculated as 
income before extraordinary items divided by sales15. The Hypotheses 2 and 3 posit that 
there is an asymmetric focus on the two profitability drivers conditional on the firm’s 
growth status. I, therefore, report the slopes of the asset growth anomaly for both low and 
high asset growth firms. Table 4-2 presents strong support for the hypotheses.  Particularly, 
Panel A shows that the asset growth anomaly is affected by the ATO sorting in the high 
asset growth portfolios but not in the low asset growth portfolios. The difference between 
the highest and lowest ATO portfolios is negative and only significant for the high asset 
growth portfolios.  This confirms that the anomaly increases (the slopes become more 
negative) with ATO in high growth firms. When observing high growth, investors turn 
their focus to the growth metric of ATO. A higher ATO amplifies the good news of high 
growth and there is, therefore, more overreaction that leads to subsequent market 
corrections when a firm’s performance cannot live up to these expectations.   
  
																																								 																				
15 In this regard, I start the analysis on the 2nd year of the sample (1964) since I need two years of accounting 
data and the availability of accounting data has a one year lag.  Furthermore, because I need the return data 
in the subsequent year, I run the regression from the calendar year 1965.	
Chapter 4 An Overreaction Explanation of the Asset Growth Anomaly 
74	
	
Table 4-1 Asset growth trends and the asset growth anomaly  
This table presents returns and the asset growth anomaly for growth trend portfolios. The sample 
period is 1963 to 2011.To identify growth trends, I require firms with at least five years of asset 
growth and I first sort firms into deciles based on their asset growth rate at the end of June in each 
year; and define the top two deciles as high asset growth and the bottom two deciles as low asset 
growth.  I then trace back firm asset growth to count how many consecutive years that a firm stays 
in the high (low) two deciles. Trends 1 to 4 denote the portfolios of firms that have consecutive 1 
to 4 years of high (low) growth. Return Spread is the mean monthly return difference between the 
low and high growth portfolio.  The asset growth slope coefficient reports the average of monthly 
coefficients from cross sectional regressions from July 1969 to December 2011 with 510 months. 
The cross sectional regression is the regression of monthly return between July of year t and June 
of year t+1 on the natural log of gross asset growth with control variables of the natural log of 
book-to-market ratio, the natural log of market value and the past six month returns in year t-1. 
Diff(4-1) reports the difference between the portfolios of Trend 4 and Trend 1.  The t-values are 
in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate the significance level at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01. 
Panel A. Formation of growth trend portfolio 
Trend t t-1 t-2 t-3 t-4 
1 + x    
2 + + x   
3 + + + x  
4 + + + + x 
      
      
1 - x    
2 - - x   
3 - - - x  
4 - - - - x 
 
Panel B. Asset growth effect in different trend portfolios 
Trend 
 Return Spread 
(Low - High) 
 Asset Growth Slope 
Coefficient   
1  0.0086***  -0.0089*** 
  (6.53)  (-6.12) 
2  0.0136***  -0.0104*** 
  (6.59)  (-4.47) 
3  0.0166***  -0.0118*** 
  (5.36)  (-2.75) 
4  0.0227***  -0.0190*** 
  (6.73)  (-3.25) 
Diff(4-1)  0.0141***  -0.0101* 
  (4.76)  (-1.69) 
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 In contrast, Panel B in Table 4-2 shows that the asset growth anomaly decreases 
(the slope become less negative) with the NPM rank (although they are not monotonic, 
the trend is that the asset growth effect is weaker) and such an effect is only found to be 
significant in the low asset growth portfolios. This suggests that when observing 
companies with low growth, investors turn their focus to a per-unit profit measure such 
as NPM. Low asset growth (seen as bad news) is amplified by low NPM (less profitable 
or efficient in cost cutting) and, therefore, investors overreact more to the low asset growth 
news. This leads to the largest price reversal (most negative slope) in the low asset growth 
and low NPM portfolios.   
 Finally, for the full sample result, the sequences in the ATO and NPM ranks are 
consistent with the high and low asset growth sequences, respectively, as discussed above.  
Specifically, the asset growth slopes become more (less) negative as ATO (NPM) increases. 
Overall, these results support Hypotheses 2 and 3 that investors place different weights 
on the two profitability drivers – such that the asset growth anomaly increases with ATO 
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Table 4-2 The asset turnover ratio, the net profit margin and the asset growth anomaly 
This table reports the asset growth anomaly conditional on the asset turnover ratio (Panel A) and 
net profit margin (Panel B). At the end of June in each year, firms are divided into quartiles based 
on their asset turnover ratio and net profit margin and also divided into deciles based on their asset 
growth rate.  The asset turnover ratio (ATO) is sales scaled by the average of total assets. Net 
profit margin (NPM) is income before extraordinary items divided by sales. For each asset turnover 
ratio quartile, the asset growth anomaly is measured by slope. The ATO (NPM) column reports 
the average ATO (NPM). The slope is the average of coefficients from cross sectional regressions 
from July 1965 to December 2011 (558 months). The cross sectional regression is the regression 
of monthly return between July of year t and June of year t+1 on the natural log of gross asset 
growth with control variables of the natural log of book-to-market ratio, the natural log of market 
value and the past six month returns in year t-1.  The slope differences between the high and low 
ATO (NPM) groups are tested [diff(4-1)].  The t-values are in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate 
the significance level at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01. N is the firm-year observations. 










1 (lowest) -0.0077* -0.0045** -0.0065*** 40915 
 (-1.80) (-2.55) (-4.87)  
2 -0.0112** -0.0095*** -0.0120*** 40936 
 (-2.41) (-4.66) (-7.26)  
3 -0.0117** -0.0088*** -0.0113*** 40948 
 (-2.24) (-4.26) (-6.59)  
4 (highest) -0.0084 -0.0124*** -0.0128*** 40930 
 (-1.49) (-6.46) (-8.29)  
     
diff(4-1) -0.0006 -0.0079*** -0.0063***  
 (-0.09) (-3.04) (-3.06)  
 










1 (lowest) -0.0128*** -0.0080*** -0.0125*** 40773 
 (-3.73) (-3.29) (-8.45)  
2 -0.0050 -0.0116*** -0.0135*** 40796 
 (-1.13) (-5.74) (-9.09)  
3 -0.0054 -0.0131*** -0.0113*** 40811 
 (-1.09) (-6.72) (-6.73)  
4 (highest) 0.0005 -0.0047** -0.0043** 40782 
 (0.11) (-2.32) (-2.17)  
     
diff(4-1) 0.0133** 0.0033 0.0082***  
 (2.24) (1.44) (3.30)  
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4.4.3. Regression Analyses 
The analyses in the previous two sub-sections provide supporting evidence to the three 
hypotheses in a univariate framework through sorting. In this sub-section, I test the 
hypotheses via regression analysis in order to control for existing risk and limits-to-
arbitrage measures. To this end, I perform Fama-MacBeth regressions of monthly returns 
on asset growth, interacting between the asset growth sequence, asset turnover, limits-to-
arbitrage and investment friction proxies. In addition, the regular control for cross-
sectional variations of return such as firm size, the book-to-market ratio, beta and prior 
six-month returns are included in the regression.  
Two important considerations in the empirical setup are worth noting. First, in 
selecting the proxy it is a challenging task to identify proxies that are unique in capturing 
either limits-to-arbitrage or investment frictions (for testing Q-theory). For example, 
Watanabe et al. (2013) note that these two groups of variables are closely related.  Lam 
and Wei (2011) present a comprehensive list of 14 proxy variables. The definition and 
source of the proxy variable construction used in this study is given in Table 4-3. To 
address the potential multicollinearity issue, the prior literature controls for limits-to-
arbitrage and investment friction proxies separately (see, e.g., Watanabe et al. 2013) or uses 
each proxy variable separately to sort the data into portfolios and compare the asset growth 
slope among the portfolios (Li and Zhang, 2010; Lam and Wei, 2011).  However, these 
approaches suffer from an omitted variable problem and ignore factors that are known to 
be important in this research domain.  In order to maximize the information content while 
reducing multicollinearity in the analysis, I use principal components to extract common 
factors among the proxies (see, e.g., Zhang, Cai and Keasey, 2013) and examine the 
interactive effect of these factors on the asset growth slope coefficients in the Fama-
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MacBeth regressions 16 . Second, the inclusion of some of the proxy variables would 
dramatically reduce the sample size (for example, analyst coverage [COV] and analyst 
dispersion [DISP] are available from 1976; institutional ownership [INSTOWN] and the 
number of institutional shareholders [INSTN] are available from 1980, and Bid-ask spread 
[BAS] is available from 1993) and, therefore, the use of the full list of control variables 
would mean a large reduction in the sample. In order to examine the robustness of the 
result for the whole period, I conduct analysis in sub periods that include different 
numbers of control variables while maximizing the sample period length.   
Table 4-4 reports the descriptive statistics and correlations for the proxies. The 
descriptive statistics are comparable to those in the existing literature (Zhang, 2006; Lam 
and Wei, 2011). Panel B confirms that there are many high correlations among the 
variables especially when the nonparametric correlation (Spearman Rank correlations 
above the diagonal of the table) is considered.  Table 4-5 reports the factor analysis for 
two sub periods. Panel A reports the analysis for the full sample from 1968 for which nine 
proxies are available. The eigenvalues of the correlation matrix suggests that three factors, 
having an eigenvalue larger than 1, are sufficient to capture the variation of the data. The 
rotated pattern in Panel A2 provides a clear economic grouping of the variables. Factor1, 
which captures the largest contribution to the variance, is a size factor including 
characteristics that are highly correlated with total assets, trading volume, the likelihood of 
having a credit rating, price level and the age of the firm. These include both investment 




16 Fama and French (2008) argue that sorts can capture stock return patterns based on an anomaly variable 
but sorts cannot show the marginal effect and the unique information of an anomaly variable.  Regression 
is one solution to this shortcoming of sorts.  
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Table 4-3 Summary of limits-to-arbitrage and investment friction proxies   
This table reports the definition of investment and limits-to-arbitrage proxies, the data sources and references. The proxies of limits-to-arbitrage are also grouped 
into different categories: arbitrage risk, information uncertainty and transaction cost. 
Category Proxy Definition Periods Data source Studies 




Idiosyncratic volatility is the standard deviation of the error 
term from regressions of monthly stock return on the market 
index return in a 36-month window at the end of June in each 
year 
1963-2011 CRSP 
Mashruwala et al.(2006) 
Li and Zhang(2010) 
Lam and Wei(2011) 
INSTN Number of institutional shareholders is the number of institutional investors of a firm at the end of June in each year 1980-2011 
Institutional 
Holdings (13F) 
Ali et al.(2003) 
Lam and Wei(2011) 
      
Information 
uncertainty 
COV Analyst coverage is the number of analysts of a firm making annual earnings forecasts at June in each year  1976-2011 I/B/E/S 
Zhang(2006) 
Lam and Wei(2011) 
Zhang et al.(2013) 
DISP Dispersion is the standard deviation of annual earnings per share forecast scaled by stock price at the end of June in each year  1976-2011 I/B/E/S 
Zhang(2006) 
Lam and Wei(2011) 
Zhang et al.(2013) 
CVOL 
Cash flow volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow in the 
past 5 years window (at least three years if five years of data are 
not available). Cash flow is earnings before extraordinary items 
minus total accruals, scaled by average total assets. Total accruals 
is the change in current assets less the change in cash, the change 
in current liabilities, and depreciation plus the change in short-
term debt 
1963-2011 Compustat Zhang(2006) Lam and Wei(2011) 




Dollar trading volume is the average of monthly dollar trading 
volume in the past 12 months before the end of June in each 
year. Monthly dollar trading volume is the monthly volume 
multiplied by monthly closing price 
1963-2011 CRSP Li and Zhang(2010) Lam and Wei(2011) 
ILLIQ Illiquidity is the average of absolute daily returns divided by daily dollar trading volume in the past one year before the end of 1963-2011 CRSP 
Amihud(2002) 
Lam and Wei(2011) 
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June in each year. Daily dollar trading volume is the daily volume 
multiplied by daily closing price 
PRICE Price is the closing share price at the end of June in each year 1963-2011 CRSP Stoll(2000) Lam and Wei(2011) 
INSTOWN 
Institutional ownership is the shares held by institutional 
investors divided by outstanding shares at the end of June in each 
year  
1980-2011 Institutional Holdings (13F) 
Nagel(2005) 
Lam and Wei(2011) 
BAS 
Bid-ask spread is the average of monthly bid-ask spread in the 
past 12 months at the end of June in each year. Monthly bid-ask 
spread is computed as 
 2× #$%&' ()*+,%-. /01234 
1993-2011 CRSP Saffi and Sigurdsson(2010) Lam and Wei(2011) 
      
Panel B: Investment frictions    
 lnASSET Total asset is a firm's total assets in the previous fiscal year 1963-2011 Compustat Li and Zhang(2010) Lam and Wei(2011) 
 AGE Age is the number of years a firm exists in CRSP at the end of June in each year  1963-2011 CRSP 
Zhang(2006) 
Lam and Wei(2011) 
Zhang et al.(2013) 
 RATING 
Credit rating is a dummy variable. It equals one if a firm has a 
Standard & Poor’s long-term credit rating in Compustat in the 
sample period and zero if a firm never has a rating 
1963-2011 Compustat Lam and Wei(2011) 
  PAYOUT 
Payout rank is the tercile ranking of the payout ratio. The payout 
ratio is a firm's payout divided by operating income before 
depreciation. Payout includes share repurchases, dividends to 
preferred stock, and dividends to common stock. Firms with 
earnings less than or equal to zero but positive distributions are in 
the high payout ratio tercile, while firms with earnings less than 
or equal to zero but zero distributions are in the low payout ratio 
tercile. 
1963-2011 Compustat Li and Zhang(2010) Lam and Wei(2011) 
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Table 4-4 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
This table reports descriptive statistics and correlations of the ten limits-to-arbitrage proxies and 
four investment friction proxies (see definition of proxies in Table 4-3). Analyst coverage (COV) 
and analyst dispersion (DISP) are included from 1976. Institutional ownership (INSTOWN) and 
the number of institutional shareholders (INSTN) are included from 1980. Bid-ask spread (BAS) 
is included from 1993. Panel A reports descriptive statistics and Panel B reports the correlation 
matrix, below the diagonal are Pearson correlations and above the diagonal are Spearman Rank 
correlations. 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
  Mean Min Median Max Std N 
Arbitrage 
risk 
IVOL 0.129 0.013 0.110 2.232 0.083 85670 
INSTN 138.708 1 92 1651 160.616 37726 
Information 
uncertainty 
DISP 0.008 0 0.002 2.523 0.037 39178 
COV 8.947 2 7 54 7.202 39178 
CVOL 0.092 0.001 0.063 12.451 0.146 85670 
Transaction 
cost 
lnDVOL 11.329 0.616 11.221 20.988 2.862 85670 
BAS 0.007 0 0.004 0.273 0.009 26875 
ILLIQ 7.04×10-6 1.85×10-12 1.01×10-7 2.29×10-2 1.26×10-4 85670 
INSTOW
N 0.545 5.7E-06 0.554 4.932 0.273 37726 
PRICE 20.606 0.031 14.750 2418.000 27.314 85670 
Investment 
frictions 
lnASSET 5.438 -2.071 5.281 12.795 2.102 85670 
AGE 19.507 5 14 86 15.019 85670 
RATING 0.419 0 0 1 0.493 85670 
PAYOUT 1.073 0 1 2 0.851 85670 
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Table 4-4 (continued) 
Panel B. Correlation matrix 
  IVOL INSTN DISP COV CVOL lnDVOL BAS ILLIQ INSTOWN PRICE lnASSET AGE RATING PAYOUT 
IVOL 1.00 -0.28 0.29 -0.30 0.55 -0.26 0.50 0.39 -0.24 -0.63 -0.51 -0.40 -0.38 -0.49 
INSTN -0.23 1.00 -0.29 0.73 -0.24 0.70 -0.67 -0.69 0.81 0.52 0.59 0.24 0.32 0.16 
DISP 0.09 -0.05 1.00 -0.18 0.21 -0.20 0.21 0.23 -0.19 -0.51 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.12 
COV -0.25 0.66 -0.05 1.00 -0.23 0.71 -0.55 -0.72 0.47 0.50 0.62 0.23 0.42 0.17 
CVOL 0.30 -0.09 0.07 -0.07 1.00 -0.23 0.36 0.30 -0.21 -0.45 -0.45 -0.29 -0.32 -0.29 
lnDVOL -0.21 0.66 -0.06 0.66 -0.07 1.00 -0.78 -0.97 0.73 0.63 0.78 0.23 0.46 0.17 
BAS 0.35 -0.29 0.16 -0.35 0.08 -0.53 1.00 0.83 -0.61 -0.71 -0.71 -0.27 -0.42 -0.25 
ILLIQ 0.08 -0.03 0.05 -0.07 0.03 -0.12 0.15 1.00 -0.72 -0.70 -0.82 -0.29 -0.50 -0.24 
INSTOWN -0.14 0.33 -0.06 0.34 -0.06 0.47 -0.25 -0.05 1.00 0.50 0.57 0.20 0.33 0.12 
PRICE -0.29 0.35 -0.08 0.39 -0.11 0.42 -0.24 -0.04 0.17 1.00 0.66 0.34 0.45 0.36 
lnASSET -0.43 0.60 -0.02 0.58 -0.18 0.78 -0.47 -0.08 0.35 0.44 1.00 0.39 0.64 0.32 
AGE -0.30 0.39 -0.02 0.30 -0.09 0.31 -0.19 -0.02 0.13 0.26 0.45 1.00 0.29 0.29 
RATING -0.31 0.37 -0.01 0.39 -0.12 0.46 -0.28 -0.04 0.21 0.29 0.63 0.33 1.00 0.23 
PAYOUT -0.38 0.20 -0.02 0.18 -0.11 0.18 -0.17 -0.04 0.07 0.21 0.32 0.28 0.23 1.00 
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Table 4-5 Factor analysis 
This table reports the summary of the factor analysis on the ten limits-to-arbitrage proxies and the 
four investment friction proxies (see the definition of proxies in Table 4-3). Analyst coverage 
(COV) and analyst dispersion (DISP) are included from 1976. Institutional ownership 
(INSTOWN) and the number of institutional shareholders (INSTN) are included from 1980. Bid-
ask spread (BAS) is included from 1993. Panels A and B report the factor analysis for 9 and 14 
proxies, respectively. For each factor analysis, eigenvalues and rotated factor patterns are reported. 
Panel A. 9 proxies from 1968 
Panel A1. Eigenvalues of the correlation matrix 
Factors Eigenvalue Difference Proportion 
1 3.318 2.190 0.369 
2 1.128 0.127 0.125 
3 1.001 0.117 0.111 
4 0.884 0.129 0.098 
5 0.755 0.082 0.084 
6 0.672 0.088 0.075 
7 0.584 0.075 0.065 
8 0.509 0.360 0.057 
9 0.149 0.000 0.017 
 
Panel A2. Rotated factor pattern 
Variables Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Final Communality Estimates 
lnASSET 0.886 -0.255 -0.044 0.852 
lnDVOL 0.877 0.037 -0.120 0.785 
RATING 0.712 -0.187 0.020 0.542 
PRICE 0.581 -0.193 -0.002 0.374 
AGE 0.469 -0.393 0.142 0.395 
IVOL -0.276 0.736 0.045 0.619 
CVOL -0.011 0.660 0.107 0.448 
PAYOUT 0.195 -0.656 0.073 0.474 
ILLIQ -0.051 0.052 0.976 0.958 
     
Variance explained 2.735 1.704 1.009 5.447 
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Table 4-5 (continued) 
Panel B. 14 proxies from 1993 
Panel B1. Eigenvalues of the correlation matrix 
Factors Eigenvalue Difference Proportion 
1 4.825 3.320 0.345 
2 1.505 0.299 0.108 
3 1.206 0.224 0.086 
4 0.981 0.098 0.070 
5 0.884 0.058 0.063 
6 0.826 0.071 0.059 
7 0.755 0.091 0.054 
8 0.664 0.020 0.047 
9 0.644 0.094 0.046 
10 0.549 0.024 0.039 
11 0.525 0.212 0.038 
12 0.313 0.115 0.022 
13 0.198 0.072 0.014 
14 0.126 0.000 0.009 
 
Panel B2. Rotated factor pattern 
Variables Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Final Communality Estimates 
lnDVOL 0.862 0.016 -0.371 0.881 
INSTN 0.848 -0.164 -0.099 0.756 
lnASSET 0.804 -0.372 -0.049 0.788 
COV 0.785 0.007 -0.146 0.638 
RATING 0.585 -0.297 0.129 0.447 
PRICE 0.509 -0.294 -0.267 0.417 
AGE 0.460 -0.457 0.090 0.428 
IVOL -0.196 0.757 0.148 0.633 
CVOL -0.014 0.640 0.125 0.425 
PAYOUT 0.198 -0.615 0.070 0.422 
BAS -0.429 0.120 0.633 0.600 
DISP 0.116 0.244 0.577 0.406 
ILLIQ -0.014 -0.008 0.470 0.221 
INSTOWN 0.296 0.122 -0.609 0.473 
     
Variance explained 3.902 1.997 1.637 7.535 
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The second factor captures firm specific risk including idiosyncratic volatility, cash flow 
volatility and the payout ratio.  The last factor is the illiquidity factor of the stock.   
Panel B reports the analyses for 14 proxies from 1993. The factors and loading 
factors are relatively stable when additional proxies are added and a shorter sample period 
is used.  The three factors mentioned above are identified by this factor analyses and the 
additional proxies are absorbed by factor1 (the size factor) and factor3 (the illiquidity 
factor). 
With the newly constructed factors, I run the following cross sectional regression 
for each month: 
!"#$,# = ' + ) *+ , + -. $,#/, + 0, *+ , + -. $,#/, ×234$,#/, + 05 *+ , +
-. $,#/, ×-67	9:;<$,#/, 	+ 0= *+ , + -. $,#/, ×>?@	9:;<$,#/, +




<F, + J$,#     (Eq. 4-6) 
	
Where KLM is the monthly return between July of year t and June of year t+1; AG is asset 
growth (Assett-1/Assett-2-1) that updates on an annual basis; Sequence (SEQ) is the length 
of consecutive years of high (top two growth deciles) or low (bottom two growth deciles) 
growth, and zero otherwise; ATO rank is the asset turnover ratio rank (from 0-lowest to 
3-highest); NPM rank is the net profit margin rank (from 0-lowest to 3-highest); and 
NOPMQRS are the three factors constructed in Table 4-5; control variables include all the 
variables that are interactive with the asset growth, the natural logarithm of market value 
(lnMV), the natural logarithm of the book-to-market ratio (lnBM), systematic risk (Beta) 
and the prior six month returns (Pre6ret) – all of which are widely used predictors of cross 
sectional returns. I estimate the above model for different subsamples and the full sample 
where the maximum amount of proxy data is available.  
Table 4-6 reports the regression results.  In the baseline models 1 and 2 I do not 
add controls for the limits-to-arbitrage and investment friction proxies. The results 
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confirm that there is a significant negative relationship between asset growth and 
subsequent returns.  Such a negative relationship is deepened when a longer sequence of 
a consecutive growth pattern is observed. The coefficient for the asset growth and 
sequence interactive term is negative and highly significant in Model 2.  Furthermore, 
consistent with the sorting results, increases in asset turnover deepen the negative 
relationship between asset growth and return, while increases in the net profit margin have 
an opposite effect on the anomaly. These result provide further support to the three 
hypotheses.  
When proxies of investment friction and limits-to-arbitrage are taken into 
consideration, the results in Models 3 to 6 demonstrate consistent evidence that the length 
of the sequence of the growth pattern is important in terms of the growth anomaly. The 
coefficients are significant and negative. For the asset turnover ratio and the net profit 
margin variables, the coefficients for their interaction with asset growth are with the same 
signs as in the baseline model. However, only the coefficient for the net profit margin 
interactive term is statistically significant in Model 4 where 9 proxies are used. These results 
suggest that the effect of asset turnover and net profit margin play a less important role in 
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Table 4-6 Fama-MacBeth regression: growth sequence, asset turnover ratio, net profit 
margin, limits-to-arbitrage and investment frictions  
This table reports the time-series average of estimated coefficients of monthly regressions. In each 
month I run the following regression: 
KLMS,T = U + V ln 1 + Z[ S,T/\ + ]\ ln 1 + Z[ S,T/\ ×^_`S,T/\ + ]a ln 1 + Z[ S,T/\ ×





mF\ + pS,T      
Where KLM is the monthly return between July of year t and June of year t+1; AG is firm asset 
growth; sequence (SEQ) indicates the length of asset growth sequence (from 1-shortest to 4-
longest); asset turnover ratio ranking (ATOrank) is measured by ranking firms into quartiles in 
each year (from 0-lowest to 3-highest) based on asset turnover ratio. Asset turnover ratio is sales 
scaled by average total assets; net profit margin ranking (NPMrank) is measured by ranking firms 
into quartiles in each year (from 0-lowest to 3-highest) based on net profit margin. Net profit 
margin is income before extraordinary items scaled by sales. Model 1 to Model 4 are the baseline 
regressions without controlling for limits-to-arbitrage and investment frictions factors. Models 5 
to 6 report the interactive effect of both the growth sequence and the asset turnover rank with 
asset growth by controlling for limits-to-arbitrage and investment friction proxies. The three 
factors--Factor 1, Factor 2 and Factor 3 are extracted from limits-to-arbitrage and investment 
friction proxies. There are two versions of factors based on the number of proxies used in different 
models. Model 3(4) and Model 5(6) use 9 and 14 proxies, respectively (see Table 4-5 for detailed 
factor analysis).  Control variables include all the variables that are interactive with the asset growth, 
the natural logarithm of market capitalization (lnMV), the natural logarithm of the book-to-market 
ratio (lnBM), rolling beta based on past 36-month ending at the end of June (Beta) and the previous 
6-month returns at the end of June (Pre6ret). The t-values are reported in parentheses; *, **, and 
*** indicate the significance level at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01. 
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Table 4-6 (continued) 
  Baseline 9 proxies 14 proxies 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept 0.0182*** 0.0156*** 0.0129*** 0.0110*** 0.0126*** 0.0117*** 
 (5.84) (4.53) (5.93) (4.24) (3.74) (2.92) 
ln(1+AG) -0.0106*** -0.0070*** -0.0074*** -0.0060* -0.0067*** -0.0036 
 (-7.88) (-2.78) (-4.55) (-1.83) (-3.62) (-1.01) 
ln(1+AG)×SEQ  -0.0027***  -0.0026**  -0.0030** 
  (-2.89)  (-2.13)  (-1.99) 
ln(1+AG)×ATOrank  -0.0022***  -0.0015  -0.0013 
  (-2.82)  (-1.44)  (-1.09) 
ln(1+AG)×NPMrank  0.0018*  0.0023**  0.0016 
  (1.79)  (2.08)  (1.30) 
SEQ  0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001 
  (0.38)  (-0.40)  (-0.15) 
ATOrank  0.0009***  0.0009**  0.0005 
  (2.64)  (2.30)  (0.62) 
NPMrank  0.0008*  0.0004  -0.0001 
  (1.79)  (1.06)  (-0.15) 
ln(1+AG)×Factor 1   0.0044*** 0.0036*** 0.0034** 0.0036*** 
   (3.35) (2.58) (2.45) (2.59) 
ln(1+AG)×Factor 2   -0.0010 -0.0001 -0.0018 -0.0010 
   (-0.63) (-0.06) (-1.37) (-0.69) 
ln(1+AG)×Factor 3   0.0005 0.0011 -0.0006 -0.0006 
   (0.10) (0.18) (-0.31) (-0.32) 
Factor 1   -0.0018** -0.0018*** -0.0013* -0.0013* 
   (-2.48) (-2.58) (-1.64) (-1.69) 
Factor 2   0.0003 0.0008 0.0019 0.0018 
   (0.30) (0.83) (1.35) (1.37) 
Factor 3   0.0042** 0.0051*** 0.0014 0.0014 
   (2.25) (2.80) (1.50) (1.49) 
lnBM 0.0014*** 0.0015*** 0.0014*** 0.0016*** 0.0000 -0.0000 
 (3.20) (3.54) (4.05) (4.58) (0.06) (-0.06) 
Beta 0.0005 0.0007 0.0006 0.0006 0.0012 0.0011 
 (0.50) (0.79) (0.78) (0.79) (0.84) (0.81) 
Pre6ret 0.0010 0.0008 0.0014 0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0007 
  (0.72) (0.60) (0.87) (0.66) (-0.34) (-0.32) 
lnMV -0.0009** -0.0010***     
 (-2.14) (-2.79)     
       
N 1143466 1138256 944628 941178 293687 292928 
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Among the three factors, only the size factor (Factor 1) demonstrates a consistent 
influence on the anomaly. The coefficient of the size factor and asset growth interaction 
term is significant and positive.  It suggests that as size increases, the negative effect on 
the asset growth coefficient become less negative.  This finding is consistent with both 
limits-to-arbitrage arguments that larger firms have less limits-to-arbitrage (Wurgler and 
Zhuravskaya, 2002; Baker and Wurgler, 2006) and Q-theory with investment frictions that 
larger firms have lower investment frictions (Almeida and Campello, 2007; Li and Zhang, 
2010). These findings are consistent in different model specifications across different 
sample lengths.  Importantly, in the fully controlled model (Model 6) that includes the 
sequence variables, the asset growth anomaly is fully explained by the interactive factors 
and the sequence variable. The coefficient for asset growth (ln(1+AG)) is not significant.  
To summarize, the results support the prediction that there is a stronger asset 
growth anomaly when the asset growth trend is longer after controlling for a large number 
of firms and stock specific characteristics that are related to limits-of-arbitrage and Q 
investment frictions. Finally, the effect of asset turnover and net profit margin are 
subsumed by other firm specific factors (particularly the size factor).   
4.5. Expectation Error and Correction 
Previous sections provide strong support to the first hypothesis that the length of the 
growth sequence affects the asset growth anomaly. This evidence is consistent with the 
argument that overreaction is the mechanism that drives the asset growth anomaly and 
representativeness is the heuristic that strengthens the relationship. In this section I 
provide further tests for the expectation error of growth sustainability being the source of 
the overreaction. First, if the observed predictability of the return after the asset growth 
formation is due to the correction of the overreaction to previous growth, I should see a 
run up (down) of the price for high (low) asset growth firms.  I examine this prediction. 
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Second, if the expectation error is the driver, the anomaly will be mainly concentrated on 
those firms that cannot maintain the growth rates. I, therefore, examine the asset growth 
effect conditional on the following year’s asset growth rate.   
4.5.1. Return Patterns around Asset Growth 
The main analysis in Section 4.4 demonstrates the predictability of returns according to 
their asset growth sorting. If this predictability is due to the correction of the overreaction 
to growth, I should observe a reversal in the return.  In other words, before the formation 
day, the return for the high asset growth portfolio should be greater than those of the low 
asset growth portfolio. To verify this, I examine the return pattern around the asset growth 
formation year. Figure 4-2 reports the average annual return up to and after the formation 
day. It shows a clear cross over pattern that confirms the predictability in the return can 
be attributed to a reversal in the return. The pattern is strikingly strong with the lowest 
asset growth group having the lowest pre-formation return and highest post-formation 
return and vice versa. Accordingly, the portfolios with a middle level of growth show the 
least reversal. This is consistent with Cooper, Gullen Schill (2008) that there is a stronger 
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Figure 4-2 Market-adjusted returns one year before and after the formation year 
This figure reports the market adjusted return one year before and after the formation year. At the 
end of June of each year t over 1965 to 2010, stocks are allocated into deciles based on asset growth 
rates defined as the percentage change in total assets over the previous fiscal year. Decile 1 is the 
lowest growth decile and Decile 10 is the highest growth decile. For each of the deciles in each 
formation year, one year average market-adjusted returns before and after formation day are 
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4.5.2. The Asset Growth Effect Conditional on the Subsequent Asset 
Growth 
If the asset growth anomaly is driven by investors’ error of expectations regarding the 
sustainability of the growth trend, I expect investors will be more likely to realize that they 
have made an error in their expectations of the growth trend when they find out that firms 
with a high (low) asset growth sequence at the formation year actually have low (high) 
asset growth in the subsequent year. Table 4-7 reports the analysis. I construct four 
portfolios including LH, LL, HH and HL, where the first letter refers to the group the 
firm belongs to at the formation year and the second letter refers to the group the firm 
belongs to after the formation year according to their relative asset growth. All firms are 
ranked into deciles and similar to the analysis in Section 4.4 I define the top two deciles as 
high asset growth (H) and the bottom two deciles as low asset growth (L). For example, 
LH indicates a portfolio consisting of stocks that have low growth at the formation year 
end and high growth one year after the formation. I report two test statistics. First, I report 
the subsequent monthly average return of the stocks in the one year post formation. 
Second, another potential sign of unsustainable growth is when the growth does not 
produce the expected earnings. Therefore, I adopt the expectation error test of La Porta 
et al. (1997) to examine if the reversal in the price of the asset growth portfolios is due to 
a correction in the market given the additional earnings information. 
For return measurement, Table 4-7 shows that the portfolio of stocks that cannot 
sustain the high growth expectation (HL) has a lower return than those that can (HH). 
The negative difference (annualized at 13.7%) is statistically significant17.  Furthermore, 
																																								 																				
17 −0.00114×12 = −0.1368. 
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when low growth firms break their low growth trend, there is evidence that the market 
makes corrections here as well.     
When the earnings announcement day (EAD) and non-EAD returns are studied, 
similar conclusions to the above can be reached18.  There is a large negative correction in 
the portfolio of stocks that cannot sustain their growth.  The expectation error measure 
(the difference between returns on the EADs and non-EADs) for the HL portfolio is 
negative and significant.  By contrast, for stocks that continued to grow as expected (the 
HH portfolio) there is no significant error correction within the earnings announcement 
dates. Furthermore, the difference of error between these two sub-portfolios of high 
growth firms is significant (see the Error row of the diff (HL-HH) column).  When the 
low growth portfolios are examined, there is evidence of error correction on the earnings 
day when low growth firms present high growth rates subsequently; the LH portfolio earns 
significantly higher returns on EAD than on non-EAD.  The difference between the LH 
and LL portfolios, however, is not statistically significant. This suggests that the 
expectation error is less prominent for low growth firms.    
Overall, in this section I show that the return predictability subsequent to asset 
growth is consistent with an overreaction and subsequent reversal pattern. In addition, 
this reversal can be explained by the correction of expectation errors subsequent to the 
formation day. Furthermore, the evidence for the high growth deciles is stronger than for 
the low growth deciles in both magnitude and statistical significance.     
																																								 																				
18 EAD return is the mean daily return for the 3 days around the four quarterly EADs. Non-EAD return is 
the mean daily return for all non-EADs.  For a firm to be included in the tests it is required to have at least 
three daily EAD returns.  
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Table 4-7 The asset growth effect conditional on subsequent asset growth  
This table reports the asset growth effect conditional on subsequent asset growth.  At the end of June of each year t from 1965 to 2011, stocks are allocated into 
deciles based on their asset growth rates defined as the percentage change in total assets over the previous fiscal year. The top two deciles are defined as high asset 
growth (H) and the bottom two deciles as low asset growth (L). Using similar methods, the stocks’ growth deciles at time t+1 are obtained.  Based on the combination 
of the asset growth deciles at time t and t+1 I form four portfolios that are denoted by HL, HH, LH and LL where the first and second letters represent the growth 
deciles the stock was allocated at time t and t+1, respectively. Return is the average monthly return in the 1 year period post formation (from the portfolio formation 
day to the end of June of year t+1).    EAD[-1,1] is the mean daily return for the 3 days around the four quarterly earnings announcement days (Day –1 to Day +1) 
in the 1 year period post formation.  non-EAD is the mean daily return for all non-EADs in the 1 year period post formation. Error(EAD-nonEAD) is the mean 
difference between the EAD[-1,1] and  non-EAD.  t-values are reported in parentheses, where t-tests for statistical difference from zero are performed. *, **, and *** 
indicate the significance level at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01.  
 High Growth Portfolios Low Growth Portfolios 
Asset growth(t,t+1) HL HH diff(HL-HH) LH LL diff(LH-LL) 
Return -0.0009 0.0105 -0.0114*** 0.0240 0.0165 0.0075*** 
   (-5.93)   (4.74) 
EAD[-1,1] -0.0025 0.0011 -0.0035*** 0.0031 0.0022 0.0009 
   (-4.33)   (1.36) 
nonEAD 0.0007 0.0006 0.00004 0.0014 0.0015 -0.0002 
   (0.34)   (-1.08) 
Error(EAD-nonEAD) -0.0031*** 0.0004 -0.0036*** 0.0017*** 0.0007 0.0011 
 (-5.04) (1.01) (-4.30) (2.76) (1.26) (1.59) 
       
N 6585 13246   4552 15237   




This chapter unites the industry and academic debate on the valuation of growth by 
examining the drivers of investors paying too much for growth. Building on the literature 
of firm growth and behavioural biases in investors’ formation of expectations, I identify 
that investors’ expectation errors of the trend and benefit of growth is the core driver of 
the phenomenon of paying too much for growth in the context of an accounting valuation 
model. When such errors in expectation are corrected because of subsequent realized 
information, it induces a reversal in the stock price and hence produces the asset growth 
anomaly – a negative relationship between the growth rate and the subsequent return.   
I offer many tests of the above conjecture. I develop three hypotheses concerning 
investors’ expectation errors. First, when forming expectations regarding a company’s 
growth rate, the current growth trend is seen as influencing investors’ expectations. I 
hypothesize and document that investors extrapolate a past growth trend that induces a 
stronger asset growth anomaly when there is a longer consecutive sequence of a growth 
trend. Second, when forming expectations regarding future cash flows, investors may 
make errors in how much value the current growth will generate. In this regard, Aghion 
and Stein’s (2008) work provides further guidance on how the market may place different 
weights on the two profitability drivers (ATO and NPM) conditional on the adopted 
strategy of a firm. I hypothesize and show in the univariate analysis that firms with a higher 
asset turnover ratio (the ability to generate sales per unit of asset)/lower net profit margin 
are associated with a greater asset growth anomaly.   
I examine the two hypotheses in a regression framework controlling for an 
extensive list of control variables for three possible alternative explanations: limits to 
arbitrage, investment frictions (Q-theory Li and Zhang (2010)) and a traditional risk 
explanation (Berk, et al., 1999). Importantly I improve the empirical design by using factor 
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analysis that maximizes the information of the proxy variables while minimizing the 
multicollinearity issue. After controlling for existing explanations, the first hypothesis 
regarding the growth sequence is consistently supported by the evidence while the effect 
of the asset turnover ratio and the net profit margin is subsumed by the size factor.   
Therefore, the empirical analysis provides strong support to the first hypothesis 
suggesting that the asset growth anomaly is driven by investors’ overreaction to the growth 
trend. This is further confirmed in a series of robustness checks. I further demonstrate 
that the asset growth anomaly is consistent with the mispricing explanation by showing a 
clear reversal return pattern around the asset growth portfolio formation day. The reversal 
can be attributed to corrections of expectation errors; those stocks that do not maintain 
their growth trend show a significant reversal in their return and significant error 
corrections on the earnings announcement days.   
The study provides new insights into the drivers of the asset growth anomaly and 
therefore provides theoretical supports to the investment factor in the newly developed 
multi-factor asset pricing models (Hou, Xie and Zhang,2015 and Fama and French 2015).   
It identifies the potential sources of investors’ valuation errors via an accounting valuation 
model. This provides a unified framework for analyzing the anomaly that connects 
fundamentals with valuations. I present strong evidence that the asset growth anomaly is 
due to mispricing and that overreaction to growth, underpinned by the representativeness 
heuristic, is the source of the mispricing. 
There are two limitations of this chapter. First, the study does not distinguish 
between mispricing and q theory, because the growth sequence cannot rule out the 
explanatory power of investment frictions. Therefore, how to distinguish the two 
explanations needs further investigation. Second, the evidence for the second and third 
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hypotheses is relatively weak in regression of full set of variables although the results are 
significant in univariate tests.        
 To decide the dominant explanation, Watanabe et al (2013) compare mispricing 
and q theory in a global context and support q theory. They argue that managers are likely 
to focus on the investment-return relation and therefore the asset growth anomaly is 
stronger in developed markets than emerging markets. However, this can only apply to 
investment-related anomalies. And it raises the question whether there are more anomalies 
in developed markets than emerging markets and why. I will address the two questions in 
the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5  
Understanding Asset Pricing Anomalies across the Globe:  
The Role of News Watchers  
 
5.1. Introduction 
The presence of an asset pricing anomaly in a given market is often seen as a sign of market 
inefficiency since there are excess returns to be earned that cannot be explained by 
traditional risk metrics. Some recent studies post a challenge to this argument by showing 
that developed markets are more prone to some anomalies than emerging markets. For 
example, McLean, Pontiff and Watanabe (2009) show a stronger stock issuance effect in 
developed countries, while Watanabe, Xu, Yao and Yu (2013) and Titman, Wei and Xie 
(2013) show a stronger asset growth anomaly in developed countries.  These papers, 
however, only focus on a single anomaly.  In order to offer a more general explanation of 
the variation in the presence of anomalies in different markets, I provide a unified study 
of multiple anomalies around the world.   
I have two objectives. First, it is to establish whether there is a clear difference, 
after adjusting for risk with the latest asset pricing models, between the number of 
anomalies in developed and emerging markets. In particular, there are two new 
developments in empirical asset pricing by Hou, Xie and Zhang (2015) and Fama and 
French (2015). If the additional investment and profitability factors, noted by these 
authors, are relevant to capturing the appropriate hidden state variables, they should help 
to explain anomalies in different country settings. Second, it is to explore a possible 
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theoretical framework that may improve the understanding of the relationship between 
market development and anomalies.   
 Empirically I study 16 well documented accounting and market based asset 
pricing anomalies for 45 markets for the period between 1980 and 201319.  Regarding the 
first objective, I show that developed markets have significantly more anomalies than 
emerging markets when both equal- and value- weighted anomaly returns are considered.  
Applying the q- and 5- factor models gives two main observations. First, the recent multi-
factor models reduce the number of significant anomalies in both emerging and developed 
markets, with the reduction being more pronounced in the latter. If risk factors are the 
main driver of the difference, it suggests that investing in the anomaly portfolio in 
developed markets will bear higher risk than is the case in emerging markets.  I show that 
the newly added investment and profitability factors do play a more important role in 
explaining anomaly returns in developed markets (a greater number of significant loading 
coefficients are observed for these markets). Second, while the gap between the developed 
and emerging markets narrows in terms of the number of significant anomalies, the 
difference still persists after controlling for the factor models.  For example, on average, a 
significant alpha is documented in 37% of the developed markets compared to 22% in the 
emerging markets when equal weighted returns are studied with the q-factor model. When 
valued weighted returns are studied, the percentage reduces to 18% (9%) for the developed 
(emerging) markets.  
This new evidence presents two challenges to the existing understanding. First, the 
puzzle that developed markets have more anomalies is still unresolved after taking into 
account the latest empirical asset pricing factors. Rational theories suggest that developed 
																																								 																				
19 The 16 anomalies include asset growth, investment growth, accrual, working capital accrual, gross profits, 
book-to-market, distress risk, momentum, beta, idiosyncratic volatility, illiquidity, long term reversal, 
maximum daily return, trading volume and short term reversal. See Table 5-1 for detail. 
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markets are more efficient and, therefore, they should have less pricing anomalies.  While 
q- theory helps to reconcile the difference between developed and emerging markets in 
some investment related accounting anomalies (Watanabe, Xu, Yao and Yu, 2013; Titman, 
Wei and Xie, 2013), it is less effective for other types.  Furthermore, this puzzle also 
challenges existing behavioural mispricing theories.  Emerging markets are expected to 
have more limits to arbitrage and their investors to suffer more behavioural bias given that 
their education, especially financial education, is lower and this should lead to more rather 
than less anomalies. Second, an additional question that arises from the analysis is why the 
difference between developed and emerging markets is strongest when using equal-
weighted hedged returns. I find that the difference between the two types of market is 
reduced significantly by the value-weighted method. Since a value weighted portfolio will 
place more weight on large stocks, while an equal weighted portfolio places more weight 
on small stocks, the finding suggests that the difference between the emerging and 
developed markets is most pronounced for smaller firms.  Fama and French (2015) suggest 
that “…one of the main messages here and in Fama and French (1993, 2012, 2014) is that 
the most serious problems of asset pricing models are in small stocks.” (p.19). In other 
words, factor models fail to account for the small size effect (i.e., anomalies are more 
pronounced in smaller than larger size firms).   It is a further puzzle to see that the small 
firm effect is stronger in developed markets. Existing limits to arbitrage or behavioural 
bias explanations of the small firm effect would seem to suggest that the small size effect 
should be stronger in emerging as compared to developed markets.  
Another concern is investor’s learning. Theoretically, an anomaly should become 
weaker or disappear after the publication of evidence of the anomaly, because investors know the 
anomaly and they can take the arbitrage opportunities to trade away the anomaly. McLean and 
Pontiff (2016) show lower anomaly return post publication which indicates that investors learn 
about the anomaly from publication. However, this cannot explain the puzzle that there are more 
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anomalies in developed markets than emerging markets. The awareness of an anomaly and limits-
to-arbitrage play an important role in this argument. All of the 16 anomalies in my study are initially 
examined in the US market and developed markets should be aware of these anomalies more than 
emerging markets. Further, knowing the anomaly does not necessarily mean that investors can 
arbitrage for profits. Many anomalies are weaker in large firms which suggests that anomalies may 
exist in less liquid stocks (see Fama and French, 2015). This would limit the arbitrage activities. In 
addition, there are higher limits-to-arbitrage in emerging markets than developed markets, for 
example, stocks are considered as less liquid, high transaction cost, and small size. Therefore, we 
should expect that emerging markets have more anomalies than developed markets. 
Given the two challenges noted above (after taking into consideration the latest 
rational risk models), the second objective of this study is to explore a possible theoretical 
framework that may improve the understanding of the relationship between market 
development and anomalies from a behavioural perspective. There are three unified 
behavioural models that offer insight into the formation of pricing anomalies. The models 
by Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam 
(1998) assume prices are driven by a single representative agent prone to a small number 
of cognitive biases (conservatism, representativeness, or overconfidence).  Whereas, Hong 
and Stein (1999) propose a more general model that focuses on the interaction between 
heterogeneous agents and avoids a direct reference to any specific behavioural bias. They 
model a market populated by two groups of boundedly rational agents: “news watchers” 
and “momentum traders.”  One of the key insights of their model is that the presence of 
news watchers is a necessary condition for the existence of a pricing anomaly; with the 
seeds of momentum trading being sown by information diffusing gradually across the 
population and prices under-reacting in the short run.  
Hong and Stein (1999) build their model with a focus on explaining anomalies in 
developed markets. Their original model predicts that as the efficiency of news watchers 
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(measured by the speed of information diffusion) increases, the number of anomalies 
decreases. Applying their model to studying cross-country differences, I reveal an 
important insight regarding the role of news watchers and the presence of anomalies. 
Particularly, the efficiency of news watchers has two distinct phases of impact on price 
discovery and, therefore, the formation of anomalies - with Hong and Stein’s (1999) 
predictions being observed in the second phases.   
In Phase I, in markets where news watchers are very low in number and efficiency 
(and hence news diffusion is very slow), pricing anomalies are less likely to be observed in 
the short run because of two reasons. First, price converges to its fundamental value in 
the long run very slowly.  Therefore, under-reaction will be difficult to quantify in the 
short-run since the small and gradually informed price movement is difficult to distinguish 
from noise in the market between the time of the new information and when it is fully 
reflected in price. Second, without the leads from news watchers to follow, momentum 
traders have no trend (respective to that particular piece of news) to chase. The central 
prediction is that the absence of some anomalies in emerging markets can be attributed to 
the general absence of news watchers who would have paid attention to that particular 
type of news.   
As the market develops, there are more efficient news watchers who pay attention 
to fundamental news and reveal this information in price in a more timely fashion.  
However, the diffusion of information among news watchers is still relatively slow. The 
combined actions of news watchers and momentum traders will produce short run under-
reaction, subsequent over-reaction and long run reversal around that type of information. 
Overall, this Phase applies to countries ranging from very low to medium news watcher 
efficiency. The increases of news watcher efficiency from a relatively low level will lead to 
more clear underreaction patterns and induce more momentum trading.  Therefore, the 
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number of anomalies observed in a given country is positively correlated with the overall 
efficiency of news watchers in that market.    
In Phase II as a market develops further and the number/efficiency of news 
watchers continues to increase/improve, the speed of information diffusion increases. At 
this high level of news watcher efficiency, an increase of news watcher efficiency would 
further squeeze the profit for momentum traders and hence, there will be less subsequent 
over-reaction. For countries that are in this phase, the cross-sectional prediction on the 
marginal effect of news watcher efficiency on the number of anomalies is expected to be 
negative as Hong and Stein’s (1999) original analysis shows.   
The above two phases suggest that a nonlinear relationship is to be expected 
between the efficiency of news watchers and the number of anomalies. The number of 
anomalies will be increasing (decreasing) with news watcher efficiency in Phase I (II).  
Empirically I test the relationship between the efficiency of news watchers and the number 
of significant anomalies by using three proxies to capture cross-country difference in news 
watcher efficiency - education, sophistication of buying behaviour and accounting quality. 
Sorting the countries by the three proxies into quintiles from low to high news watcher 
efficiency, I show, as expected, that emerging countries are concentrated in the low and 
median groups while developed countries are in the median and high groups. 
I show that the number of anomalies measured by hedged returns and alphas 
demonstrates a nonlinear pattern (the only exception being the results for the 
sophistication of buying behaviour variable).  The number of anomalies normally peak at 
the fourth quintile suggesting that the majority of the countries are still in Phase I (the 
increasing phase). In other words, only very few developed countries have entered Phase 
II (the declining phase).  These findings provide an important insight for solving the 
puzzle. Combining these findings with the fact that emerging countries are concentrated 
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in the low and median groups while developed countries are in the median and high groups 
it provides a new explanation for the difference in anomalies between developed and 
emerging markets. Emerging markets are concentrated in the early part of Phase I, where 
a lower average number of anomalies are observed, while the majority of the developed 
markets are concentrated in the latter part of Phase I, where a higher average number of 
anomalies are observed.   
The predicted nonlinear relationship between the efficiency of news watchers and 
the number of anomalies also provides insight into why the small size effect is more 
observable in developed markets.  If size is used as a proxy for news watcher efficiency, 
then there will be a nonlinear relationship between size and the number of observed 
anomalies20. Such a prediction is supported by Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) who document 
that the smallest size firms (in the smallest two deciles; I refer to them as micro firms) have 
less anomalies than small size firms (in the third and fourth smallest deciles). In other 
words, there is an inverted U shape relationship between size and anomaly returns that is 
similar to the theoretical prediction of a two-phase effect21.  I replicate their analyses on 
all 16 anomalies for emerging and developed markets separately. Examining the plots of 
hedged anomaly returns against firm size deciles, I document an inverted U shape 
relationship in both markets. When comparing between the two types of market, the 
anomalies in developed markets are stronger than is the case in emerging markets as the 
puzzle suggests. Importantly, this difference is much stronger in the small size deciles part 
of the plot and weaker in the larger size deciles part. This explains why for equal weighted 
hedged returns the difference between emerging and developed markets is larger than is 
the case of value-weighted hedged returns. It suggests that more of the small stocks in 
																																								 																				
20 Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) use size as a sorting variable to capture variations of information diffusion 
speed.   
21 A clear inverted U shaped relationship between size and the hedged return of the momentum anomaly is 
presented in Figure 1 of Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000).		
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emerging market would have behaved like the US micro stocks that have close to zero 
anomalies. Therefore, I observe fewer anomalies in small firms in emerging markets. In 
other words, the evidence supports that the very low efficiency of news watchers for small 
size firms in emerging markets helps to explain why there are less anomalies in emerging 
market small size firms than in developed market small size firms.   
 I contribute to the debate on asset pricing anomalies by presenting a 
comprehensive and unifying study of multiple anomalies around the world.   Prior cross-
country studies have limited themselves to analyzing a single anomaly. While explanations 
have been proposed for specific individual anomalies (see for example, Watanabe, Xu, Yao 
and Yu, 2013; Titman, Wei and Xie, 2013), there is a lack of a more general and cohesive 
explanation for the cross-country differences in anomalies; such an explanation can only 
be developed and tested by studying anomalies with different characteristics. I, therefore, 
contribute to the literature on asset pricing anomalies by providing a more comprehensive 
analysis with consideration being given to rational risk and investment based models, and 
an extension of behavioural theories.   
Regarding the risk and investment based analyses, the global markets provide an 
out of sample test for these models that are normally developed and tested in the US 
market (arguably the most advanced financial market). On the one hand, factors that are 
important in developed markets may not be readily relevant to emerging markets. On the 
other hand, if a factor is indeed capturing fundamental risk it should have good 
explanatory power in different market set-ups. I offer important insights on how rational 
factors can improve the understanding of the difference in anomalies between emerging 
and developed markets. 
In terms of the extension of behavioural theory, building on Hong and Stein 
(1999), I offer a new angle for studying international anomalies: news watcher efficiency.  
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This concept helps solve two aspects of the current puzzle: why market development and 
the number of significant anomalies are not found to be negatively associated in prior 
studies and why there is a difference in the size effect in the two types of market 
documented in the current study. Hong and Stein (1999) develop their model with the aim 
of explaining short-term under-reaction and long-term reversal in a relatively developed 
market where there is a reasonable efficiency of news watchers in the market.  I apply its 
prediction to a cross-market setting with a wider range of news watcher efficiency which 
provide a good ‘out of sample’ test of the theory.  Such an analysis does not rely on the 
argument that investors in different countries possess different levels of behavioural bias. 
It emphasizes that it is the mix of the investors (news watchers and momentum traders) 
and the relative efficiency of the news watchers that play important roles in affecting price 
discovery. This finding has a strong implication for the relationship between pricing 
anomalies and market efficiency. Market efficiency cannot be associated with the absence 
or otherwise of anomalies; a market with less anomalies could be a reflection of low 
information asymmetry, less market frictions and biased investors or it could simply be 
the case that there are insufficient sophisticated investors to obtain and process price 
related information. The analyses provide a consistent framework that helps us to 
understand the links between market development, anomalies and market efficiency. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the analysis 
of anomalies around the world with q- and 5- factor models. Section 3 presents the search 
for a behavioural explanation and an extended numerical analysis of Hong and Stein 
(1999).  Section 4 presents the analyses. I provide conclusions in section 5.   
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5.2. Anomalies around the World and Recent Multi-Factor Models  
In this study I examine a wide range of 16 anomalies that include investment related 
anomalies, accrual anomalies, financial distress anomaly, value premium, price 
momentum, return reversal, trading friction and profitability anomalies22. I further classify 
these anomalies into accounting and market based anomalies given the key information 
type used to construct the anomaly portfolios.  The definitions of these anomalies are 
given in Table 5-1. The details of the construction of these anomaly variables are given as 
follows.  
For accounting based anomalies, for each market all firms are divided into quintiles 
based on the anomaly variable at the end of June in each year t. The average return for each 
quintile is computed monthly from July in year t to June in year t+1.  The definitions of 
the accounting based anomalies are shown below. 
Accrual (AC). Following Sloan (1996), accrual is computed via the following formula: 
!""#$%&' = ∆*! −	∆*%'- − ∆*. −	∆/01 − ∆02 	–145     (Eq. 5-1) 
	
Where ∆67 is the change in current assets; ∆689ℎ is the change in cash and short-term 
investments; ∆6; is the change in current liabilities; ∆<=> is the change in debt included 
in current liabilities; ∆=? is the change in income tax payable; and Dep is the depreciation 
																																								 																				
22 There are studies of single anomalies in a global context.  For example, Ang, Hodrick, Xing and Zhang 
(2009) document a high idiosyncratic volatility-low return relationship in developed countries (the G7). After 
a comprehensive test of different explanations, they rule out the risk factor explanation. Griffin, Kelly and 
Nardari (2010) show the return of the momentum strategy is, on average, 14% per year in developed markets 
while it is 8.5% per year in emerging markets. Chui, Titman, and Wei (2010) show that the momentum 
magnitude is larger in markets with a higher individualism index. Kaniel, Ozoguz and Starks (2012) show 
the phenomenon that most developed countries have a stronger extreme volume effect than less developed 
countries. Watanabe, Xu, Yao and Yu (2013) and Titman, Wei and Xie (2013) report a stronger asset growth 
anomaly in developed markets than emerging markets. 
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and amortization expense. Accruals are then scaled by average total assets in the previous 
two years.  
Asset growth (AG). Asset growth is defined as the yearly percentage change between 
previous and current fiscal years.  
Asset-to-market (AM). Asset-to-market is the ratio of total assets in the previous fiscal year 
over the market value of equity at the end of the previous year.   
Book-to-market (BM). Following Fama and French (1993), the book-to-market ratio is the 
book value of equity in the previous fiscal year over the market value of equity at the end 
of the previous year. Book value is total assets minus liabilities, plus balance sheet deferred 
taxes and investment tax credits, and minus preferred stock liquidation or carrying value 
if available.  
Gross profits (GP). According to Novy-Marx (2013), I construct gross profits as firm gross 
profits scaled by firm total assets. Firm gross profits are the difference between total 
revenue and cost of goods.  
Investment growth (IG). Investment growth is the percentage change of capital expenditures 
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Table 5-1 Summary of anomalies 
Type Anomaly Abbreviation Key papers Short description 
accounting Accrual AC  Richardson et al  (2005)  Negative association of accruals and stock returns 
accounting Asset growth anomaly AG  Cooper, Gullen and Schill (2008)  Negative relationship between the asset growth rate and 
subsequent one year return 
accounting Asset-to-market anomaly AM  Bhandari (1988)  Firms with a higher asset-to-market ratio have higher returns 
accounting Book-to-market anomaly BM  Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein 
(1985), DeBondt and Thaler (1987)  
High book-to-market ratio stocks will earn higher returns 
accounting Gross profits GP  Novy-Marx (2013) Higher stock return for profitable firms than unprofitable 
firms 
accounting Investment growth anomaly IG  Xing (2008)  Negative relationship between investment growth and future 
returns 
accounting Financial distress OS  Dichev (1998) Firms with a high probability of bankruptcy have lower stock 
returns 
accounting Working capital accrual WAC  Sloan (1996)  Negative correlation of stock returns and operating accruals 
market Beta BETA  Frazzini  and Pedersen (2014) Negative relation between stock returns and beta 
market Trading volume DVOL  Brennan, Chordia, and 
Subrahmanyam (1998) 
Negative dollar trading volume return relation 
market Illiquidity ILLIQ Amihud (2002) Positive return illiquidity correlation 
market Idiosyncratic volatility IVOL Ang, Hodrick, Xing and Zhang 
(2006, 2009) 
Stock return and idiosyncratic volatility is negatively 
associated 
market Long-term reversal LREV  De Bondt and Thaler (1985)  Stock return reversal, that is, winner stocks in the past 5 years 
will become loser stocks 
market Maximum daily return MDR  Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011) Negative relationship between a firm’s extreme daily return in 
the last month and stock returns in the next month 
market Momentum MOM  Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) Firms with a higher return in the past 6 months continue to 
have higher returns in the following 6 months 
market Short-term reversal SREV   Jegadeesh (1990)  Firms with a higher return in the past month tend to have 
lower stock return in the following month 
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Distress risk (OS). Distress risk or O score is formed by following Ohlson (1980). O score 
is calculated as follows: 
−1.32 − 0.407*log(TA) + 6.03*TLTA − 1.43*WCTA + 0.076*CLCA − 1.72*OENEG 
− 2.37*NITA − 1.83*FUTL + 0.285*INTWO − 0.521*CHIN          (Eq. 5-2) 
	
Where TA is a firm’s total assets, TLTA is total liabilities divided by total assets, WCTA is 
working capital divided by total assets, CLCA is current liabilities divided by current assets, 
OENEG is a dummy variable of 1 if total liabilities are greater than total assets and 0 
otherwise, NITA is net income divided by total assets, FUTL is funds provided by 
operations plus depreciation and then divided by total liabilities, INTWO is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if net income is negative in the last two years and 0 otherwise, CHIN 
is a ratio where the numerator is net income change and the denominator is the sum of 
the absolute value of net income in year t and the absolute value of net income in year t-
1.  
Working capital accrual (WAC). Working capital accrual is defined as the sum of accruals 
(see AC) and depreciation divided by the average total assets of the previous two years. 
For market based anomalies, portfolios are formed and updated monthly.  The 
definitions of the market based anomalies are as follows. 
Beta (Beta). Beta is estimated via the following formula: 
!" = $ %"%&     (Eq. 5-3) 
	
' is the correlation between stock return and market return. Correlation is calculated in 
each month by using the past five years’ daily return. A longer horizon for calculation of 
correlation is required because correlations tend to move slowly (see Frazzini and 
Pedersen, 2015) and at least 750 daily returns are required. () and (* are the standard 
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deviations of stock returns and market returns respectively. The standard deviation is 
estimated in each month by using the past two years’ daily return and at least 120 daily 
returns are required. All firms are then divided into quintiles based on beta in the last 
month. The current month return is computed for each quintile. 
Trading volume (DVOL). I separate firms into quintiles according to the average daily value 
trading volume in the past six months and compute the decile returns in the current 
month. 
Idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL). It is the standard deviation of residuals from regressions of 
daily stock returns on market returns in each month. Quintiles are constructed at the end 
of each month based on previous idiosyncratic volatility.  The current month return is 
computed for each quintile. 
Illiquidity (ILLIQ). Illiquidity is the average of daily returns divided by daily trading volume 
over the past six months. Daily trading volume is the price multiplied by the number of 
shares traded. All the firms are ranked into quintiles in each month t based on illiquidity 
in month t-1. The current month return is computed for each quintile.  
Long-term reversal (LREV). Firms are ranked into quintiles based on returns from t-60 to t-
13 in each month and I compute the average quintile returns on the current month. 
Maximum daily return (MDR). Following Hou et al (2014), I rank firms into quintiles 
according to the maximum daily return in the past month, and calculate returns on the 
current month. The anomaly is first documented by Bali, Cakaci and Whitelaw (2011) 
where they find that the maximum daily return in the previous month is negatively related 
to return in the next month due to overreaction to assets with a small chance to have high 
profits. 
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Momentum (MOM). Momentum is about price continuation, i.e. stocks with higher returns 
in the past 6 to 12 months perform better in the future 6 to 12 months (Jegadeesh and 
Titman, 1993). I form momentum portfolios based on the previous 6 months’ returns. All 
firms are divided into quintiles based on the buy-and-hold return in the past six months 
in each month. And the subsequent six months return is computed for each quintile in 
each month.   
Short-term reversal (SREV). Firms are divided into quintiles based on past month returns 
and I compute the average decile returns on the current month.
For the coverage of markets I include 23 developed and 22 emerging markets. The 
classification of market development is based on the MSCI classification. All data are 
obtained from Worldscope and Compustat. Table 5-2 presents a list of the countries and 
the data availability for each country. Most of the developed markets have data from the 
early 1980’s, while emerging markets have valid data from 1990 or even later. In summary, 












Table 5-2 Market summary 
The table summarizes the markets included in this study, the time periods for data availability and 
the development classification. The market development classification is according to the MSCI 
market classification. 
Market Start End Development Status 
Australia 1980 2013 Developed 
Austria 1980 2013 Developed 
Belgium 1980 2013 Developed 
Canada 1980 2013 Developed 
Denmark 1980 2013 Developed 
Finland 1987 2013 Developed 
France 1980 2013 Developed 
Germany 1980 2013 Developed 
Hong Kong 1980 2013 Developed 
Israel 1986 2013 Developed 
Italy 1980 2013 Developed 
Japan 1980 2013 Developed 
Netherlands 1980 2013 Developed 
New Zealand 1986 2013 Developed 
Norway 1980 2013 Developed 
Singapore 1980 2013 Developed 
South Korea 1980 2013 Developed 
Spain 1980 2013 Developed 
Sweden 1980 2013 Developed 
Switzerland 1980 2013 Developed 
Taiwan 1988 2013 Developed 
United Kingdom 1980 2013 Developed 
United States 1980 2013 Developed 
Brazil 1991 2013 Emerging 
Bulgaria 1998 2013 Emerging 
Chile 1990 2013 Emerging 
China 1991 2013 Emerging 
Cyprus 1993 2013 Emerging 
Egypt 1995 2013 Emerging 
Greece 1988 2013 Emerging 
India 1981 2013 Emerging 
Indonesia 1990 2013 Emerging 
Malaysia 1980 2013 Emerging 
Mexico 1988 2013 Emerging 
Pakistan 1988 2013 Emerging 
Peru 1991 2013 Emerging 
Philippines 1980 2013 Emerging 
Poland 1991 2013 Emerging 
Romania 1996 2013 Emerging 
Saudi Arabia 1996 2013 Emerging 
South Africa 1980 2013 Emerging 
Sri Lanka 1987 2013 Emerging 
Thailand 1987 2013 Emerging 
Turkey 1988 2013 Emerging 
Vietnam 2007 2013 Emerging 
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5.2.1. Anomaly Variables Sorted Hedged Returns 
To measure the degree of an anomaly, both economic scale and significance are important. 
In this chapter, I focus on the significance rather than the scale for two reasons. First, 
persistence is important to confirm an anomaly. An anomaly is robust only if the anomaly 
can persist in the market for a longer period, otherwise it may be by chance. Further, 
another consideration about the existence of an anomaly is whether the anomaly return is 
volatile. If there is high volatility of anomaly return, the large magnitude may be driven by 
some large returns in certain time periods. The significance of an anomaly is emphasized 
in Harvey, Liu and Zhu (2015) that higher t value should be employed to determine the 
existence of an anomaly. The two effects should be stronger in emerging markets due to 
the highly volatile stock markets. Using significance (determined by t value) rather than 
raw return can overcome the two problems. If the anomaly is just by chance or the 
anomaly returns are too volatile, even if there is a large magnitude, the t test cannot 
confirm the significance. And therefore, I do not consider it as an anomaly. Second, the 
number of significant anomalies is more reasonable for the cross markets regression in 
section 5.4.2. There are 16 anomalies in my study, if I aggregate an anomaly measurement 
for a market by using the average return of the 16 anomalies, the scale suffers a problem 
that it is driven by some particular anomaly. Therefore, the scale is not a proper proxy for 
anomalies for the entire market. Scale is more important for a single anomaly and in time 
series or panel regression specification which can avoid the two concerns.      
To study the overall distribution of anomalies I summarize the number of countries having 
significant anomalies in Table 5-3. All stocks in each market are ranked into quintiles based 
on the anomaly variables. To facilitate the discussion, I sort the five quintile portfolios by 
the anomaly variable into either ascending or descending order so that the first quintile 
always contains stocks that are expected to earn higher returns according to the anomaly. 
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The significance of an anomaly is determined by examining the post-formation return 
spread (hedged return) between the first and fifth quintiles.  Following Hou, Xue and 
Zhang (2015) I apply a stronger hurdle rate of a 5% significance level.  Num of sig. is the 
number of significant hedged returns. % of sig. is the number of significant anomalies 
divided by the number of countries.   
When equal weighted hedged returns are considered, Panel A in Table 5-3 shows 
that, on average, 10 out of the 23 developed markets produced significant anomalies, while 
this was the case for only 4 out of the 22 emerging markets. The difference between the 
two market types is statistically significant in most anomalies. Among the anomalies the 
most commonly documented is the momentum anomaly - found in 87% and 59% of the 
developed and emerging markets, respectively (Japan has no momentum effect). Another 
widely observed anomaly is value premium especially for equal-weighted hedge return, i.e. 
19 out of 45 markets exhibit significant value premium. This is consistent with existing 
evidence, for example, Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013). At the other end of the 
spectrum, the asset growth anomaly is among the least documented in both developed and 
emerging markets which is consistent with Watanabe, Xu, Yao and Yu (2013).  
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Table 5-3 Anomalies across the world 
This table reports the number of significant anomalies and the percentage of significant anomalies for developed and emerging markets. 16 anomalies 
are computed by using available data from 1980 to 2013 in 45 markets (23 developed and 22 emerging markets according to the MSCI classification). 
The anomalies include accrual, asset growth, asset-to-market, beta, book-to-market, distress risk, gross profit, idiosyncratic volatility, illiquidity, 
investment growth, long term reversal, maximum daily return, momentum, short term reversal, trading volume and working capital accrual. Accrual, 
asset growth, asset-to-market, book-to-market, distress risk, gross profit, investment growth and working capital accrual are constructed and updated 
yearly; while beta, idiosyncratic volatility, illiquidity, long term reversal, maximum daily return, momentum, short term reversal, trading volume are 
constructed and rebalanced monthly (see Section 5.2 for the detailed definition of variables and their construction). All firms in each market are then 
ranked into quintiles based on the anomaly variables. The significance of an anomaly is determined by examining the subsequent return spread between 
high and low quintiles. Num of sig. is the number of significant spreads at least at the 5% significance level. % of sig. is the number of significant 
anomalies divided by the number of markets. Diff(developed-emerging) is the percentage difference between developed and emerging markets. A Chi-
square test is conducted to indicate the significance of the difference with the null hypothesis being that the proportion having significant anomalies is 
the same. The average is also reported in the last row. For the US market, the financial data are from Compustat and the return data are from CRSP; 
for other markets, both financial and return data are from Datastream. Only common stocks are included and financial firms are excluded. Following 
Watanabe et al. (2012), to avoid price error in Datastream, Rt and Rt-1 are treated as missing if Rt or Rt-1 is greater than 300% and (1+Rt-1)(1+Rt)<50%. 
In addition, the returns are trimmed at 1% and 99% (after the above screening, there are still some extreme values; in order to avoid the influence of 
outliers, I trim the data).      
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Table 5-3 (continued) 
Panel A. Equal-weighted hedged return 
    Num of sig.   Percent of sig. 
Type Anomaly Developed Emerging   Developed Emerging   Diff(D-E) 
Accounting AC 6 2   26.10% 9.10%   17.00% 
Accounting AG 5 0  21.70% 0.00%  21.70%** 
Accounting AM 11 5  47.80% 22.70%  25.10%* 
Accounting BM 14 5  60.90% 22.70%  38.10%*** 
Accounting GP 13 3  56.50% 13.60%  42.90%*** 
Accounting IG 4 1  17.40% 4.50%  12.85% 
Accounting OS 14 3  60.90% 13.60%  47.20%*** 
Accounting WAC 7 2  30.40% 9.10%  21.30%* 
Average   9 3   40% 12%   28% 
         
Market BETA 3 0   13.00% 0.00%   13.00%* 
Market DVOL 3 7  13.00% 31.80%  -18.78% 
Market ILLIQ 13 0  56.50% 0.00%  56.50%*** 
Market IVOL 19 5  82.60% 22.70%  59.90%*** 
Market LREV 5 4  21.70% 18.20%  3.56% 
Market MDR 11 9  47.80% 40.90%  6.92% 
Market MOM 20 13  87.00% 59.10%  27.90%** 
Market SREV 14 11  60.90% 50.00%  10.87% 
Average  11 6  48% 28%  20% 
         
All   10 4   44% 20%   24% 
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Table 5-3 (continued) 
Panel B. Value-weighted hedged return 
    Num of sig.   Percent of sig. 
Type Anomaly Developed Emerging   Developed Emerging   Diff(D-E) 
Accounting AC 5 0  21.70% 0.00%  21.70%** 
Accounting AG 5 0  21.70% 0.00%  21.70%** 
Accounting AM 5 4  21.70% 18.20%  3.56% 
Accounting BM 5 2  21.70% 9.10%  12.65% 
Accounting GP 6 2  26.10% 9.10%  17.00% 
Accounting IG 2 2  8.70% 9.10%  -0.40% 
Accounting OS 8 4  34.80% 18.20%  16.60% 
Accounting WAC 6 0  26.10% 0.00%  26.10%** 
Average   5 2   23% 8%   15% 
         
Market BETA 1 0   4.30% 0.00%   4.35% 
Market DVOL 6 6  26.10% 27.30%  -1.19% 
Market ILLIQ 9 2  39.10% 9.10%  30.0%** 
Market IVOL 0 0  0.00% 0.00%  0.00% 
Market LREV 7 5  30.40% 22.70%  7.71% 
Market MDR 0 3  0.00% 13.60%  -13.60%* 
Market MOM 20 15  87.00% 68.20%  18.78% 
Market SREV 3 3  13.00% 13.60%  -0.59% 
Average  6 4  25% 19%  6% 
         
All   6 3   24% 14%   10% 
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When value-weighted returns are considered in Panel B of Table 5-3, the number 
of significant anomalies decreases. This difference between equal and value weighted 
returns confirms that anomalies are more common in small companies. Furthermore, 
Table 5-3 shows that this is especially the case for developed markets. The difference in 
the number of anomalies between developed and emerging markets becomes smaller when 
value weighted returns are considered. Furthermore, the main difference between 
developed and emerging markets is observed in the accounting anomalies.   
5.2.2. Rational Explanations: Multi-Factor Asset Pricing Model 
Analyses 
The asset pricing anomalies are normally established by passing a series of tests with a 
traditional asset pricing model, such as CAPM, acting as the ‘control’.  The search for the 
drivers of anomalies has led to the incremental development of multi-factor models.  For 
example, in the latest development of Fama and French (2015) and Hou, Xue, and Zhang 
(2015), profitability and investment/asset growth have been introduced as new pricing 
factors.   
For the construction of the factors in the q factor model I follow Hou, Xue and 
Zhang (2015) and form 2 by 3 by 3 portfolios on firm size, asset growth and the return on 
equity (ROE). To form the two firm size groups, at the end of June in each year, all the 
firms are grouped into two size groups according to the median of market value. Firms 
are divided into three asset growth groups and three ROE groups based on 30, 40 and 70 
percentile cutoffs23. With the intersection of 2 size, 3 asset growth and 3 ROE portfolios, 
there are 18 portfolios in total. I calculate 12 monthly returns for the 18 portfolios post 
formation. The size factor is the difference between the 9 small size groups and the 9 large 
																																								 																				
23 The cut-offs are calculated based on all sample firms in a given market. One exception is for the US 
market. I follow previous studies and use NYSE stocks to calculate cut-offs for sorting all US stocks.  
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size groups; the investment factor is the difference between the 6 low asset growth groups 
and the 6 high asset growth groups; the profitability factor is the difference between the 6 
low ROE groups and the 6 high ROE groups.    
Similarly, for the construction of the 5-factor model I follow Fama and French 
(2015) to form 2 by 2 by 2 by 2 portfolios on size, the book-to-market ratio (BM), asset 
growth and ROE24. There are 16 portfolios by taking the intersection of 2 size groups, 2 
book-to-market groups, 2 asset growth groups and 2 ROE groups. The size factor is the 
difference between the 8 small groups and the 8 large groups; the BM factor is the 
difference between the 8 high BM groups and the 8 low book-to-market groups; the 
investment factor is the difference between the 8 low asset growth groups and the 8 high 
asset growth groups; and the profitability factor is the difference between the 8 high ROE 
groups and the 8 low ROE groups. 
For each anomaly in each country, the monthly hedged returns are regressed 
against the factor-returns constructed above25. Before I look at a summary of the alphas 
from the regressions, it is beneficial to examine the loading of the risk factor in the anomaly 
returns. This will provide some insights into what systematic risk factors may have been 
driving the returns of the anomaly portfolios.  
																																								 																				
24 I follow the 2 by 2 by 2 by 2 portfolios set up rather than the 2 by 3 by 3 by 3 so that there are more 
observations in each portfolio group for countries with fewer listed companies in the sample. And the 
definition of ROE is different from Hou, Xue and Zhang (2015). The ROE represents profitability factor 
which is the RMW factor in Fama and French (2015) constructed by operating profits. The operating profits 
is measured by revenues minus cost of goods sold, minus selling, general, and administrative expenses, minus 
interest expense and then divided by book equity. Due to data availability of the accounting data in 
constructing operating profits in other markets but US, I use ROE factor to approximate the RMW factor 
to capture the profitability factor. The investment factor (I/A) in Hou, Xue and Zhang (2015) is the same 
with Fama and French (2015) where they use the name of CMA rather than I/A.   
25 See section 5.2 for details of the anomaly return constructions.  
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Table 5-4 reports the total number of significant factor loading coefficients for 
each anomaly type, market type and factor. It reports the number of factor loading 
coefficients that are significant at 5% in the country level regressions. The loading pattern 
is very similar for equal and value weighted returns. Therefore, I report only the results of 
the value return here26.     
For the q-factor model, Table 5-4 Panel A reveals several important findings.  First, 
for the overall summary I can see that the factor model provides much better explanatory 
power for accounting as compared to market based anomalies. The R-square is 17% (20%) 
for the accounting based anomalies and 8% (7%) for the market based anomalies in 
developed (emerging) markets.  This is also reflected in the total number of significant 
coefficients for the two types of anomaly.  Second, when examining the explanatory power 
of each individual factor, the investment and profitability factors provide better 
explanatory power than the market and size factors in terms of the accounting anomalies. 
By contrast, this trend reverses for market-based anomalies with the market and size 
factors having higher explanatory power. Third, comparing emerging with developed 
markets, the multi-factor models, in general, have similar explanatory power in terms of 
the anomalies’ returns in both markets. The average R-square is 12 and 13 percent for 
developed and emerging markets, respectively. This evidence suggests that the factor 
model is general enough to cover factors that are important for both developed and 
emerging markets.  For individual factors, it shows that q-related factors (INV and ROE) 
provide stronger explanatory power for developed than emerging markets – and this is 
especially the case for accounting anomalies. This suggests that the hedged returns of 
accounting based anomalies in developed markets are more likely to be due to the q-related 
risk factors. This is less true in emerging markets.  Fourth, when the individual anomalies 
																																								 																				
26 The equal weighted results are available on request from the author.  
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are examined, the multi-factor model performs best in explaining the asset growth anomaly 
with a 34% adjusted R-square27. Although the momentum factor has been dismissed from 
the q factor model, the study shows that the factor model performs poorly in explaining 
the momentum strategy return.   
When the Fama and French (2015) 5-factor model is considered in Panel B of 
Table 5-4, the added BM factor increases the adjusted R-square and this is especially the 
case in developed markets. The BM factor behaves more in line with the other two q-
factors than the size and market factors. In fact, it seems to be taking some of the 
explanatory power of the investment factor (INV). 
I show a summary of the anomalies by alpha of the two factor models in Table 5-
5. Table 5-5 shows that the average number of anomalies is reduced in general after 
considering the loading of risk factors.  This suggests that risk factors help to explain cross-
sectional differences in returns.  However, the difference between the two types of market 
still exists.  There are 15% (13%) and 9% (7%) differences in the equal and value weighed 
returns for the q- (ff5-) factor models. Although these differences are smaller when 
compared to the hedged return results, using the multi-factor model does not help to 






27 This is not surprising, as attempting to explain the asset growth anomaly was the original start of the 
investment based asset pricing research (Li, Livdan and Zhang, 2009; Li and Zhang, 2010; Hou, Xue and 
Zhang, 2015). 
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Table 5-4 Factor loadings with value weighted returns 
Panel A covers the q factor model. The four factors are MKT, SIZE, INV and ROE. MKT is the market return premium. For the construction of SIZE, INV and 
ROE factors I follow Hou, Xue and Zhang (2015) and form 2 by 3 by 3 portfolios on firm size, asset growth and return on equity (ROE). To form the two firm size 
groups, at the end of June in each year, all the firms are grouped into two size groups according to the median of market value. Firms are divided into three asset 
growth groups and three ROE groups based on 30, 40 and 70 percentile cutoffs. With the intersection of 2 size, 3 asset growth and 3 ROE portfolios, there are 18 
portfolios. I calculate 12 monthly returns for the 18 portfolios post formation. The size factor is the difference between the 9 small size groups and the 9 large size 
groups; the investment factor is the difference between the 6 low asset growth groups and the 6 high asset growth groups; the profitability factor is the difference 
between the 6 low ROE groups and the 6 high ROE groups.  Similarly, for the construction of the 5-factor model I follow Fama and French (2015) to form 2 by 2 
by 2 by 2 portfolios on size (SIZE), the book-to-market ratio (BM), asset growth (INV) and ROE. There are 16 portfolios by taking the intersection of 2 size groups, 
2 book-to-market groups, 2 asset growth groups and 2 ROE groups. The size factor is the difference between the 8 small groups and the 8 big groups; the BM factor 
is the difference between the 8 high BM groups and the 8 low book-to-market groups; the investment factor is the difference between the 8 low asset growth groups 
and the 8 high asset growth groups; and the profitability factor is the difference between the 8 high ROE groups and the 8 low ROE groups. When generating the 
cutoff point, for the US market the NYSE sample is used, while for other markets the full sample of the market is used.  I run regressions of the hedged return of 
each anomaly on the factors. For each anomaly, I count the number of significant factor loadings at 5% in developed, emerging and all markets respectively. The 
average adjusted R square is also reported.     
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Table 5-4 (continued) 
Panel A. q-factor model 
  All significant   Adj. R-square 
 Developed  Emerging  All markets  Developed Emerging 
Anomaly MKT SIZE INV ROE   MKT SIZE INV ROE   MKT SIZE INV ROE   Mean Mean 
Accounting anomalies 
AC 8 7 3 6  7 7 3 3  15 14 6 9  0.06 0.12 
AG 6 4 23 12  6 6 19 12  12 10 42 24  0.34 0.33 
AM 11 10 14 12  11 11 6 12  22 21 20 24  0.18 0.23 
BM 6 12 11 12  9 11 6 10  15 23 17 22  0.15 0.21 
GP 11 9 5 16  8 5 5 16  19 14 10 32  0.18 0.24 
IG 3 8 10 1  3 6 7 6  6 14 17 7  0.08 0.09 
OS 7 17 6 19  6 13 8 15  13 30 14 34  0.31 0.29 
WAC 4 3 6 3  9 2 2 3  13 5 8 6  0.03 0.08 
Sub-sum  56 70 78 81  59 61 56 77  115 131 134 158  0.17 0.20 
Market anomalies 
BETA 18 9 3 2  15 4 5 6  33 13 8 8  0.16 0.14 
DVOL 10 17 4 4  7 7 3 4  17 24 7 8  0.17 0.12 
ILLIQ 5 7 2 3  1 4 4 2  6 11 6 5  0.05 0.04 
IVOL 6 6 0 10  5 9 3 3  11 15 3 13  0.06 0.06 
LREV 2 6 9 10  4 5 4 7  6 11 13 17  0.05 0.07 
MDR 15 3 1 4  6 2 2 4  21 5 3 8  0.09 0.04 
MOM 1 0 2 1  3 2 0 2  4 2 2 3  0.00 0.01 
SREV 6 2 5 4  2 8 3 1  8 10 8 5  0.02 0.04 
Sub-sum 63 50 26 38  43 41 24 29  106 91 50 67  0.08 0.07 
                  
Total  119 120 104 119   102 102 80 106   221 222 184 225   0.12 0.13 
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Table 5-4 (continued) 
Panel B. 5-factor model 
  All significant   Adj. R-square 
 Developed  Emerging  All markets  Developed Emerging 
Anomaly MKT SIZE BM INV ROE   MKT SIZE BM INV ROE   MKT SIZE BM INV ROE   Mean Mean 
Accounting anomalies 
AC 5 5 8 2 3  7 6 3 4 4  12 11 11 6 7  0.07 0.10 
AG 6 5 7 22 13  8 0 3 15 10  14 5 10 37 23  0.26 0.20 
AM 14 13 22 9 13  10 12 16 4 13  24 25 38 13 26  0.26 0.30 
BM 7 11 22 5 14  5 9 20 6 8  12 20 42 11 22  0.29 0.32 
GP 8 8 16 6 17  10 6 10 4 16  18 14 26 10 33  0.21 0.25 
IG 4 8 4 12 2  3 8 4 6 8  7 16 8 18 10  0.09 0.10 
OS 8 20 8 9 21  4 12 6 10 15  12 32 14 19 36  0.30 0.32 
WAC 7 3 5 6 5  5 3 3 2 5  12 6 8 8 10  0.04 0.08 
Sub-sum  59 73 92 71 88  52 56 65 51 79  111 129 157 122 167  0.19 0.21 
Market anomalies 
BETA 18 16 5 2 2  14 3 5 3 3  32 19 10 5 5  0.17 0.13 
DVOL 11 22 6 1 7  8 7 4 1 1  19 29 10 2 8  0.18 0.10 
ILLIQ 2 9 1 4 3  1 3 2 2 2  3 12 3 6 5  0.04 0.03 
IVOL 8 11 2 1 9  4 6 3 1 4  12 17 5 2 13  0.07 0.06 
LREV 1 7 7 8 8  1 2 0 4 4  2 9 7 12 12  0.07 0.06 
MDR 18 4 2 3 5  7 3 1 2 1  25 7 3 5 6  0.10 0.05 
MOM 4 2 0 3 2  4 3 2 3 1  8 5 2 6 3  0.01 0.01 
SREV 6 3 1 0 2  4 7 4 3 1  10 10 5 3 3  0.02 0.04 
Sub-sum 68 74 24 22 38  43 34 21 19 17  111 108 45 41 55  0.08 0.06 
                     
Total  127 147 116 93 126   95 90 86 70 96   222 237 202 163 222   0.14 0.13 
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Table 5-5 Anomalies - summary by Alpha 
This table reports summaries of alphas that are estimated from the multi-factor regressions reported in Table 5-4.  Num of sig. is the number of significant spreads 
at least at the 5% significance level. % of sig. is the percentage of significant anomalies divided by the number of markets. Diff(developed-emerging) is the percentage 
difference between developed and emerging markets. A Chi-square test is conducted to indicate the significance of the difference - with the null hypothesis being 
that the proportion having significant anomalies is the same. The average is also reported in the last row.      
Panel A. Equal-weighted alpha (q-factor model)    
    Num of sig.   Percent of sig. 
Type Anomaly Developed Emerging   Developed Emerging   Diff(D-E) 
Accounting AC 7 1  30.40% 4.50%  25.90%** 
Accounting AG 2 0  8.70% 0.00%  8.70% 
Accounting AM 10 8  43.50% 36.40%  7.12% 
Accounting BM 15 9  65.20% 40.90%  24.31% 
Accounting GP 10 6  43.50% 27.30%  16.21% 
Accounting IG 2 0  8.70% 0.00%  8.70% 
Accounting OS 11 2  47.80% 9.10%  38.7%*** 
Accounting WAC 10 3  43.50% 13.60%  29.8%** 
Average   8 4   36% 16%   20% 
Market BETA 2 0   8.70% 0.00%   8.70% 
Market DVOL 2 8  8.70% 36.40%  -27.70%** 
Market ILLIQ 6 1  26.10% 4.50%  21.50%** 
Market IVOL 14 5  60.90% 22.70%  38.10%*** 
Market LREV 2 5  8.70% 22.70%  -14.03% 
Market MDR 9 6  39.10% 27.30%  11.86% 
Market MOM 21 11  91.30% 50.00%  41.3%*** 
Market SREV 13 12  56.50% 54.50%  1.98% 
Average  9 6  38% 27%  10% 
         
All   9 5   37% 22%   15% 
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Table 5-5 (continued) 
Panel B. Value-weighted alpha (q-factor model)    
    Num of sig.   Percent of sig. 
Type Anomaly Developed Emerging   Developed Emerging   Diff(D-E) 
Accounting AC 4 0  17.40% 0.00%  17.4%** 
Accounting AG 3 1  13.00% 4.50%  8.50% 
Accounting AM 5 2  21.70% 9.10%  12.65% 
Accounting BM 6 2  26.10% 9.10%  17.00% 
Accounting GP 3 3  13.00% 13.60%  -0.59% 
Accounting IG 0 1  0.00% 4.50%  -4.55% 
Accounting OS 1 0  4.30% 0.00%  4.35% 
Accounting WAC 6 1  26.10% 4.50%  21.50%** 
Average   4 1   15% 6%   10% 
Market BETA 1 2   4.30% 9.10%   -4.74% 
Market DVOL 4 4  17.40% 18.20%  -0.79% 
Market ILLIQ 3 0  13.00% 0.00%  13.00%* 
Market IVOL 0 1  0.00% 4.50%  -4.55% 
Market LREV 5 2  21.70% 9.10%  12.65% 
Market MDR 0 0  0.00% 0.00%  0.00% 
Market MOM 20 12  87.00% 54.50%  32.4%** 
Market SREV 4 1  17.40% 4.50%  12.85% 
Average  5 3  20% 12%  8% 
         
All   4 2   18% 9%   9% 
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Table 5-5 (continued) 
Panel C. Equal-weighted alpha (5-factor model)    
    Num of sig.   Percent of sig. 
Type Anomaly Developed Emerging   Developed Emerging   Diff(D-E) 
Accounting AC 8 3  34.80% 13.60%  21.10%* 
Accounting AG 2 1  8.70% 4.50%  4.15% 
Accounting AM 5 5  21.70% 22.70%  -0.99% 
Accounting BM 7 5  30.40% 22.70%  7.71% 
Accounting GP 12 4  52.20% 18.20%  34.0%** 
Accounting IG 2 1  8.70% 4.50%  4.15% 
Accounting OS 7 2  30.40% 9.10%  21.3%* 
Accounting WAC 9 2  39.10% 9.10%  30.0%** 
Average   7 3   28% 13%   15% 
Market BETA 3 3   13.00% 13.60%   -0.59% 
Market DVOL 2 6  8.70% 27.30%  -18.58% 
Market ILLIQ 6 1  26.10% 4.50%  21.5%** 
Market IVOL 15 6  65.20% 27.30%  37.90%** 
Market LREV 0 5  0.00% 22.70%  -22.73%** 
Market MDR 10 8  43.50% 36.40%  7.12% 
Market MOM 21 8  91.30% 36.40%  54.9%*** 
Market SREV 15 14  65.20% 63.60%  1.58% 
Average  9 6  39% 29%  10% 
         
All   8 5   34% 21%   13% 
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Table 5-5 (continued) 
Panel D. Value-weighted alpha (5-factor model)    
    Num of sig.   Percent of sig. 
Type Anomaly Developed Emerging   Developed Emerging   Diff(D-E) 
Accounting AC 3 1  13.00% 4.50%  8.50% 
Accounting AG 2 3  8.70% 13.60%  -4.94% 
Accounting AM 1 0  4.30% 0.00%  4.35% 
Accounting BM 1 0  4.30% 0.00%  4.35% 
Accounting GP 6 4  26.10% 18.20%  7.91% 
Accounting IG 0 1  0.00% 4.50%  -4.55% 
Accounting OS 5 1  21.70% 4.50%  17.20%* 
Accounting WAC 5 0  21.70% 0.00%  21.70%** 
Average   3 1   12% 6%   7% 
Market BETA 0 1   0.00% 4.50%   -4.55% 
Market DVOL 5 5  21.70% 22.70%  -0.99% 
Market ILLIQ 3 0  13.00% 0.00%  13.04%* 
Market IVOL 0 1  0.00% 4.50%  -4.55% 
Market LREV 3 1  13.00% 4.50%  8.50% 
Market MDR 0 0  0.00% 0.00%  0.00% 
Market MOM 21 11  91.30% 50.00%  41.30%*** 
Market SREV 4 2  17.40% 9.10%  8.30% 
Average  5 3  20% 12%  8% 
         
All   4 2   16% 9%   7% 
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Overall, the analyses so far reveal three new findings. First, multi-factor models 
help to explain some of the anomalies with the numbers of significant anomalies reducing 
after considering the risk loading of the hedged return. The reduction in anomalies is more 
profound in developed than in emerging markets, hence the gap is narrowed between the 
two market types. Second, the factor models only provide a partial explanation to the 
puzzle regarding the developed and emerging market differences, with the empirical fact 
of developed markets having more anomalies still being consistently observed. Finally, this 
puzzle is especially pronounced when the anomaly returns are equally weighted as 
compared to when they are value weighted.  This suggests that the small size effect on 
anomalies is more pronounced in developed markets - this is a new puzzle.  
5.3. Review of Theoretical Explanations and Predictions 
5.3.1. The Hong and Stein Model Revisited in an International Context 
As discussed in the introduction, the search for explanations of anomalies leads us to 
explore potential variations in countries’ investor mix as an explanation of cross country 
differences.  The root of this explanation is that pricing anomalies are driven by bounded 
rationality.    
In the Hong and Stein (1999, hereafter HS) model, there are two types of 
boundedly rational agents: news watchers and momentum traders. Specifically each type 
of agent is only able to process some subset of the available public information. Each news 
watcher observes some private information, but they fail to extract other news watchers’ 
information from prices. The consequent under-reaction means that the momentum 
traders can profit by trend chasing. Momentum traders base their forecast of price on 
simple (i.e. univariate) functions of the history of past prices. The key prediction of the 
HS model is that if information diffuses gradually across the population, prices under-
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react in the short run. Momentum traders’ attempts at arbitrage must inevitably lead to 
overreaction at longer horizons.  
In an international context, a direct application of the HS model implies that more 
efficient prices and less anomalies are observed in markets with faster information 
diffusion across news watchers. In other words, the marginal effect of improved 
information diffusion on the number of anomalies is negative.    
The above discussion, however, misses one important point – namely, that the 
existence of news watchers to set the trend is a necessary condition. Investors paying 
attention to and having the ability to process the appropriate type of information is a 
necessary condition for an anomaly to exist. Information is price relevant only if investors 
use it systematically in trading decisions. As HS point out, the very existence of under-
reaction by news watchers sows the seeds for overreaction, by making it profitable for 
momentum traders to enter the market. In markets where there is a general lack of news 
watchers, there is insufficient critical mass to create the price trend for momentum traders 
to follow.   
The above intuition can be summarized by an extended numerical analysis of the 
HS model. In the HS model the main parameter that captures the inverse of the 
information diffusion speed is z. z can be interpreted as the number of days for a piece of 
information to be fully diffused across the news watchers. The smaller is z the faster is the 
information diffusion. In addition, there are two parameters: the standard deviation of 
news shocks e, and the momentum traders’ holding period j. Given a set of parameters 
for z, e, and j, the model can be solved numerically for the momentum traders’ prediction 
coefficient phi that is similar to a positive feedback coefficient. In this framework, I can 
define an anomaly as an observation of a price process that exhibits short-term under-
reaction and subsequent over-reaction. The parameter that captures under-reaction is z 
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while the parameter that captures over-reaction is the parameter phi. I are interested in 
how the efficiency of news watchers, measured as the information diffusion speed (i.e. 
1/z), affects momentum traders’ behavior (i.e., phi). And the momentum intensity (!) 
follows the equation below (see equation (7) of Hong and Stein ,1999): 
" = $%&' ()*+,(),.()/0'12 .( '123 ()*+,() 	     (Eq. 5-4) 
	
 where P is the price and 5 is risk tolerance of momentum trader. 
I extend HS’s original numerical analysis by considering a wider range of 
information diffusion speeds 1/z; especially when z goes very large. Different z value will 
be used to simulate the price path then each z value will generate a ! value from equation 
(5-4). Figure 5-1 presents a plot of the numerical analysis of phi and 1/z using a set of 
parameters similar to HS’s analysis in their table A3, except that I use more variations of 
z. The phi values from simulated price are consistent and comparable with HS’s results 
(detailed phi values can be found in Table 5-6). The reason why the simulation results are 
not exactly the same is the input of an error term following a normal distribution. The 
price path depends on the initial setting of the error term matrix which is a random number 
generation process. Figure 5-1 shows that when the speed of information diffusion (1/z) 
is low (between 0 and 0.01 that corresponds to z between 100 and infinity) the momentum 
intensity is also low. This demonstrates the effect of news watchers efficiency at the start 
of Phase I. With very slow information diffusion, it is less likely that short-term under-
reaction (price hardly reflects information in the market) and subsequent over-reaction 
will be observed (momentum traders have no clear price change to chase the trend). As 
the speed of diffusion increases (up to 0.033 that corresponds to z equaling 30), the 
improved efficiency of news watchers leads to a general increase in the momentum 
intensity, although the changes are not monotonic. In this later stage of Phase I, anomalies 
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are most likely to be observed since there is significant short-term under-reaction (it can 
be interpreted as within 30 days given the z parameter) and there is significantly high 
momentum intensity (because momentum traders can follow the price change). When the 
speed of information diffusion further increases (for z less than 30), the momentum 
intensity starts to decrease as the profit of momentum trading is reduced (i.e. information 
is incorporated into price very quickly and therefore there is no room for momentum 
traders to do momentum trading). Therefore, news watcher efficiency is negatively 
correlated with momentum activities in this Phase II. Overall, as the news watcher 
efficiency improved, the speed of information is becoming faster, but the degree of 
momentum activities is nonlinear instead of linear during this process.    
To justify how price experience underreaction and overreaction after new 
information comes to the market. I also calculate the cumulative impulse response and 
plot them. Following HS’s model, the cumulative impulse response function is as the 
following equation: 
.() = 	 6)*7
8/0
79:
8 + 	".(),0 − 	".(), +=0      (Eq. 5-5) 
	
where P is price, z is measurement of information diffusion speed, > is news shock, 
! is momentum intensity and j is holding period of momentum traders. 
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Figure 5-1 Information diffusion speed and momentum intensity 
This figure plots the relationship between information diffusion and momentum intensity. The solution to momentum intensity is based on equation (7) from Hong 
and Stein (1999). The predetermined parameters are as follows: the momentum traders’ horizon is 12, the volatility of news shocks is 0.5, and the momentum traders’ 
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Figure 5-2 presents the impulse response functions given z. It shows that for those 
z that are large (larger than 100) news watchers are very ineffective and, therefore, 
information diffuses very slowly.  In the short term (consider the short term window of 
30 days), there is substantial under-reaction to a given news shock. However, such under-
reaction is less likely to be observed empirically as the magnitude of the price discovery 
driven by this new information is too small and it will take a very long window to reach 
the equilibrium (fully informed) pricing benchmark to identify such an under-reaction.  
Therefore, the short-run under-reaction will not be clearly identified ex ante in the short 
term window.  In absence of an identifiable under-reaction, as I show in Figure 5-1, the 
momentum parameters are very low in this phase.  In other words, a lower number of 
anomalies (short-term momentum and long-term reversal) will be observed at this stage. 
As information diffusion speed increases (z reduced from 100 to 15), anomalies are more 
readily observable since news watchers, though still under-reacting to news, reveal 
substantial information in the price that gives momentum traders an opportunity to follow. 
The price converges to its fundamental value in a relatively shorter window as compared 
to those with (z greater than 100). Therefore, I clearly observe short-run under-reaction, 
and a subsequent over-reaction and reversal in price.  Overall, when z decreases from 2000 
to 15, I can see that the overreaction increases. This is corresponding to the Phase I in 
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Figure 5-2 Information diffusion speed and impulse response functions   
This figure plots cumulative impulse responses with respect to different information diffusion values (z). The cumulative impulse response function follows 
the equation (A2) from Hong and Stein (1999). The predetermined parameters are as follows: the momentum traders’ horizon is 12, the volatility of news 
shocks is 0.5, and the momentum traders’ risk tolerance is 1/3. Cumualtive impulse response function is !" = 	 %&'(
)*+
(,-
. + 	0!"12 − 	0!"1 452 . 
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In Phase II, as information diffusion speed increases (z decreases), anomalies are 
short-lived and with lower magnitude.  This can be seen by comparing the lines for z=15 
and z=3. The magnitude of the anomaly measured by the level of overshooting is smaller 
and the time length of mispricing (measured by the point of full adjustment to 1) is shorter 
when z=3 than when z=15. This suggests the increase of information diffusion speed (e.g., 
z decreases from 15 to 3) reduces anomalies.  
Following Hong and Stein (1999), I further show the standard deviation of price 
error and return autocorrelations. The price error is the difference between stock price at 
time t and rational expectation price at time t. The equations for price path and rational 
price are as below: 
Price path: 
!" = 	%" +
'() *"+), '(- *"+-,⋯,	*"+'/)
'
− 1 + 23 +	 45!"(6
2
67) 	     (Eq. 5-6) 
	
Rational price: 
!"∗ = 	%",'() − 1     (Eq. 5-7) 
	
where P is price, D is value of dividend, z is information diffusion speed, 9 is a 
random variable from a normal distribution, Q is asset supply, j is the holding period of 
momentum traders, A is a constant and : is momentum intensity.   
 Table 5-6 shows the simulated results and both of them can also confirm the 
above two-stage argument. Panel A in Table 5-6 shows that the standard deviation of price 
error that represents the distance from fundamental or the degree of mispricing. The 
standard deviation of price error increases as z varies until 28, while the standard deviation 
of price error decreases when the z value continues to grow. It means that mispricing is 
trivial when information diffusion at extremely fast or slow and therefore the observed 




anomalies are fewer. Panel B shows return autocorrelations given different information 
diffusion speed. Return autocorrelation indicates that there is some degree of 
predictability. Positive autocorrelation implies price continuation and negative 
autocorrelation implies reversal. With smaller z value (fast information diffusion), there 
should be short periods of momentum and return starts to reverse quickly. As information 
diffusion is getting slower, momentum trading activities should be stronger and the 
positive sign should appear in longer lag. In Panel B, we can observe that when the 
information diffusion is slow, the positive autocorrelation continues until the lag is long 
enough, in contrast, negative autocorrelation starts from very early when information 
















Table 5-6 Simulation of Hong and Stein (1999) model: standard deviation of price error 
and autocorrelation 
This table shows detailed simulation results. Panel A reports the momentum intensity (phi) and 
standard deviation of price error (std of price error) with respect to different z values. The price 
error is ;< − ;<∗, where ;< is the stock price at time t and ;<∗ is the rational expectation price at 
time t. Panel B reports the return autocorrelations based on the simulated price from different z 
values. Other parameters are fixed as follows: holding horizon of momentum trader is 12, volatility 
of news shock is 0.5 and the risk tolerance of momentum traders is 1/3.   
 
Panel A.  Momentum intensity and standard deviation of price error 
z phi std of price error 
3 0.0936 0.4428 
6 0.1763 0.6160 
9 0.2465 0.6429 
10 0.2564 0.8614 
11 0.2705 0.6723 
12 0.3061 0.8325 
13 0.3092 0.9379 
14 0.3319 1.0878 
15 0.3508 0.9922 
16 0.3676 1.3476 
17 0.3862 1.2929 
18 0.3963 1.7441 
19 0.4103 1.6883 
20 0.4308 1.2208 
21 0.4427 2.1110 
22 0.4600 1.7595 
23 0.4731 2.0224 
24 0.4879 2.7175 
25 0.4984 3.3021 
26 0.5107 6.1131 
27 0.5128 7.1801 
28 0.4977 9.9490 
29 0.4960 3.7372 
30 0.5053 4.6072 
40 0.4825 3.6999 
50 0.4760 2.6225 
60 0.3219 1.4269 
70 0.4017 1.8953 
80 0.1575 0.6962 
90 0.1849 0.6611 
100 0.1973 0.9044 
120 0.1016 0.5738 
140 0.0429 0.5691 
160 0.1050 0.8273 
180 0.0493 0.6388 
200 0.0642 0.6037 
300 0.0463 0.6185 
1900 0.0588 0.8357 








Panel B. Autocorrelations 
lag z3 z6 z10 z20 z50 z100 z200 z300 z2000 
1 0.4531 0.7519 0.8477 0.9063 0.9617 0.9873 0.9949 0.9933 0.9932 
2 0.0462 0.4918 0.6759 0.7955 0.9203 0.9744 0.9897 0.9865 0.9865 
3 -0.0088 0.2455 0.4925 0.6715 0.8768 0.9615 0.9845 0.9797 0.9796 
4 -0.0309 0.0377 0.3046 0.5375 0.8316 0.9486 0.9791 0.9728 0.9728 
5 -0.0500 -0.1065 0.1205 0.3971 0.7855 0.9356 0.9737 0.9659 0.9659 
6 -0.0690 -0.1629 -0.0511 0.2540 0.7391 0.9226 0.9682 0.9590 0.9589 
7 -0.0880 -0.2032 -0.2011 0.1121 0.6932 0.9096 0.9626 0.9520 0.9519 
8 -0.1072 -0.2400 -0.3203 -0.0244 0.6483 0.8966 0.9570 0.9450 0.9449 
9 -0.1265 -0.2717 -0.3994 -0.1512 0.6054 0.8836 0.9512 0.9379 0.9378 
10 -0.1457 -0.2934 -0.4292 -0.2639 0.5650 0.8706 0.9454 0.9308 0.9307 
11 -0.1631 -0.2997 -0.4340 -0.3581 0.5279 0.8576 0.9395 0.9237 0.9236 
12 -0.1597 -0.2849 -0.4181 -0.4297 0.4947 0.8447 0.9335 0.9165 0.9164 
13 -0.1136 -0.2434 -0.3811 -0.4750 0.4662 0.8318 0.9275 0.9093 0.9092 
14 -0.0554 -0.1884 -0.3301 -0.4950 0.4418 0.8188 0.9213 0.9020 0.9019 
15 -0.0098 -0.1286 -0.2701 -0.4914 0.4209 0.8058 0.9151 0.8947 0.8946 
16 -0.0001 -0.0705 -0.2046 -0.4659 0.4030 0.7926 0.9088 0.8874 0.8873 
17 0.0030 -0.0202 -0.1364 -0.4195 0.3874 0.7794 0.9024 0.8800 0.8799 
18 0.0052 0.0167 -0.0685 -0.3536 0.3736 0.7660 0.8959 0.8725 0.8725 
19 0.0073 0.0342 -0.0041 -0.2695 0.3612 0.7524 0.8893 0.8650 0.8650 
20 0.0094 0.0451 0.0535 -0.1686 0.3495 0.7388 0.8827 0.8575 0.8574 
21 0.0114 0.0542 0.1010 -0.0629 0.3379 0.7250 0.8759 0.8499 0.8499 
22 0.0135 0.0619 0.1350 0.0405 0.3260 0.7111 0.8691 0.8423 0.8423 
23 0.0156 0.0675 0.1520 0.1366 0.3130 0.6971 0.8622 0.8347 0.8346 
24 0.0176 0.0697 0.1577 0.2211 0.2984 0.6829 0.8552 0.8269 0.8269 
25 0.0174 0.0673 0.1549 0.2903 0.2814 0.6687 0.8481 0.8192 0.8191 
26 0.0128 0.0589 0.1441 0.3409 0.2617 0.6543 0.8409 0.8114 0.8113 
27 0.0067 0.0469 0.1274 0.3720 0.2389 0.6399 0.8337 0.8036 0.8035 
28 0.0016 0.0332 0.1067 0.3839 0.2135 0.6254 0.8263 0.7957 0.7956 
29 0.0001 0.0196 0.0834 0.3774 0.1859 0.6108 0.8189 0.7877 0.7877 








The above discussion demonstrates that there are two phases of the effect of news 
watchers on anomalies. The empirical prediction is that if the information diffusion speed 
in the world covers the whole spectrum from very slow (very inefficient market) to very 
fast (very efficient market) I should observe a nonlinear relationship between information 
diffusion speed and the number of observed anomalies.  
How can this theoretical insight help us to explain there are more anomalies in 
developed than in emerging markets?  A further empirical prediction to help solve this 
puzzle is that developed markets are more likely to be in the later stage of Phase I and 
beginning of Phase II, while emerging markets are more likely to be in the early stage Phase 
I.   
5.3.2. Alternative Explanations 
One of the rational explanations of anomalies is the Q-theory approach, which studies the 
investment-return relationship from a production-based asset pricing or a firm’s optimal 
investment standpoint (e.g., Cochrane, 1991, 1996; Chen and Zhang, 2010; Li, Livdan and 
Zhang, 2009; Li and Zhang, 2010). The basic argument is that firms with low discount 
rates (expected returns) have high net present values and high investment, whereas firms 
with high discount rates have low net present values and low investment.   
Watanabe, Xu, Yao and Yu (2013) and Titman, Wei and Xie (2013) assert q- theory 
is responsible for the difference in the asset growth effect across markets. The former 
suggest that the increase or decrease in assets depends on stock price efficiency, that is, 
firm managers rely on an efficient price to make decisions on asset expansion or reduction. 
As a result, developed markets show a stronger asset growth anomaly. The latter considers 
that managers in less developed markets put less weight on the maximization of 




shareholder value when they make investment decisions and, therefore, there is a weaker 
link between investment and expected returns in these markets.    
Following the above argument, Q-theory can be put forward to explain the 
difference between emerging and developed markets in most of the investment based 
anomalies. However, it cannot be used to explain non-investment based anomalies such 
as market-based anomalies.  
5.4. Analyses of News Watchers and Anomalies  
To test the central prediction regarding news watcher efficiency and the number of 
anomalies, I capture the cross-sectional difference of news watcher efficiency by three 
proxies: higher education, consumer buying sophistication and accounting standard. I 
choose these proxies with a number of considerations.   
 The speed of information diffusion depends on two components: information 
quality and investors’ ability to process the information. For example, You and Zhang 
(2009) find that information travels slower across the market when information readability 
is lower.  They show that the under-reaction to 10-K reports is stronger when they are 
more complex. In this regard, information diffusion speed can be increased by an 
improvement in two aspects: better disclosure practice (such as improved accounting 
standards) and improved investment analysis skills through investor education. Therefore, 
to capture cross-country differences in news watcher efficiency, I use accounting 
standards, higher education and consumer buying sophistication to proxy for information 
quality, investor education and sophistication. Higher accounting standards should 
increase the readability of accounting reports and Kaniel, Ozoguz and Starks (2012) argue 
that higher accounting quality can increase investor confidence. Investors with more 
confidence may lead to quicker reaction and faster information diffusion as a result. 




Investor sophistication and education will help measure the cross sectional difference in 
the ability of investors to process information. Chang, Hsieh and Wang (2015) show that 
less sophisticated investors tend to mis-react to information. The definitions and data 
sources of the variables are given in Table 5-7. Investor sophistication is measured based 
on whether buyers make decision by their analysis rather than only by price. So this 
variable can reflect investors’ sophistication when they make investment decisions. The 
ability to access financial information depends on the degree of financial analytical 
knowledge, hence I use higher education because financial theory is more likely to be 
delivered in higher education. The accounting standard is used to measure the 
transparency and reliability of accounting reports which can indicate the quality of 
accounting or financial information in a market. The disadvantage of the three news 
watcher proxies is that the time period is relatively short compared with the sample used 
to construct anomalies. Therefore, they may be not be representative in a longer period. 
This should be addressed when there are better proxies with longer time-series data.  
Table 5-8 provides summary statistics of the country characteristic variables.  Panel 
A shows that developed countries have higher measures in all the variables, and this is in 
line with expectations for more mature and developed economies. Specifically, there are 
significantly higher values of the three news watcher efficiency proxies in developed 
markets. Given that all of the measures capture dimensions of market development, one 
concern is the potentially high correlation among the variables.  Panel B presents a 
correlation matrix. The three news watcher efficiency measures have the highest 
correlations (ranging from 0.67 to 0.79).  Given these concerns over potential 




multicollinearity, I run analysis for each news watcher efficiency proxy separately with 
control variables28.  
5.4.1. Univariate Sort 
To explore how news watcher efficiency might help to explain the difference in anomalies 
between emerging and developed markets, I study the anomaly distribution by univariate 
sort using the three news watcher efficiency proxies. Table 5-9 reports the results. I sort 
countries by the three proxies into quintiles from low to high news watcher efficiency. 
Table 5-9 shows, as expected, that emerging countries are concentrated in the low and 
median (1 to 3) groups while developed countries are in the median and high (3 to 5) 
groups as indicated in the number of country columns.  It further shows that the average 
number of anomalies measured by hedged return and alphas demonstrate a nonlinear 
pattern (the results for the sophistication of buying behaviour variable being the 








28 The other notably high correlations are the CAP and REGU variables with the news watcher efficiency 
proxies. To make sure potential multicollinearity among the explanatory variables doesn’t affect the 
conclusion, I also experiment creating uncorrelated variables using factor analyses on each of the news 
watcher efficiency variables and the rest of the control variable.  I am able to identify three (two) factors for 
the analyses with the EDU and SOPHI (ACCT) variables.  When using the factors instead of the variable in 
the regressions the results for the documented nonlinear effect of news watcher efficiency still holds.   




Table 5-7 Information environment, investor sophistication and control variables   
Variable Definition Data source 
   
ACCT Accounting standard index. The index is computed 
based on 90 items of 1990 annual reports including 
general information, income statements, balance 
sheets, funds flow statement, accounting standards, 




   
SOPHI Average of buyer sophistication from 2006 to 2014. ‘In 
your country, how do buyers make purchasing 
decisions? [1 = based solely on the lowest price; 7 = 




   




   
CAP Average of market capitalization from 1980 to 2013. 
Market capitalization is the value of shares traded over 
GDP. 
World Bank 
   
TURN Average of the stock market turnover ratio from 1980 
to 2013. Turnover ratio is the total value of shares 
traded divided by the average market capitalization. 
World Bank 
   
AD Anti-director rights index. The index is created by 
aggregating: vote by mail, shares not blocked or 
deposited, cumulative voting, oppressed minority, pre-
emptive rights and capital. 
Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer(2005) 
   
LAW Dummy variable of legal system, 1 indicates common 




   
REGU Average of regulation of securities exchanges from 
2006 to 2014. ‘In your country, how effective are the 
regulation and supervision of securities exchanges? [1 
= not at all effective; 7 = extremely effective]’ 
World Economics 
Form 
   
ITEXE Dummy variable of insider trading law enforcement. 1 
indicates insider trading laws are enforced and 0 











Table 5-8 Summary statistics of market characteristics  
Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for the proxies of news watcher and control variables in 
developed and emerging markets and the difference between these markets. For the definition of 
these variables, see Table 5-7 for the detail. The number of observations, mean, minimum and 
maximum are reported for each variable. Diff(developed-emerging) is the difference between the 
developed and emerging markets, and the two sample t-test shows the significance of the 
difference. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Panel B reports the correlation matrix for these variables. 
Panel A. Summary statistics  




 N Mean Min Max  N Mean Min Max   
EDU 23 5.478 4.613 6.110  22 4.156 2.837 4.843  1.323*** 
SOPHI 23 4.712 4.040 5.417  22 3.831 2.605 4.655  0.881*** 
ACCT 23 68.304 54.000 83.000  12 55.500 24.000 76.000  12.804*** 
TURN 22 0.846 0.309 1.946  21 0.568 0.126 1.552  0.278** 
CAP 22 0.750 0.096 2.403  21 0.218 0.014 0.706  0.531*** 
AD 23 3.565 2.000 5.000  19 3.553 1.000 5.000  0.013 
LAW 23 0.348 0.000 1.000  22 0.318 0.000 1.000  0.030 
REGU 23 5.275 4.145 5.927  22 4.630 3.578 6.230  0.646*** 
ITEXT 23 0.913 0.000 1.000  22 0.455 0.000 1.000  0.459*** 
 
Panel B. Correlation matrix 
Variable EDU SOPHI ACCT TURN CAP AD LAW REGU ITEXE 
EDU  1.00         
SOPHI  0.79 1.00        
ACCT 0.67 0.75 1.00       
TURN 0.17 0.28 0.27 1.00      
CAP 0.47 0.61 0.46 0.49 1.00     
AD -0.02 0.11 0.42 -0.17 0.20 1.00    
LAW -0.01 0.17 0.42 0.01 0.25 0.54 1.00   
REGU 0.62 0.67 0.66 0.02 0.43 0.31 0.34 1.00  
ITEXE 0.54 0.48 0.27 0.31 0.39 0.09 -0.03 0.44 1.00 
 
  





Table 5-9 Univariate sort by news watcher efficiency proxies  
The table reports the average number of significant anomalies for news watcher quintiles. All 
markets are divided into quintiles based on higher education, investor sophistication and the 
accounting standard index respectively. Then the average number of significant anomalies is 
computed in terms of equal (value)-weighted hedged return, alpha from the q factor model and 
alpha from the Fama-French 5-factor model. The number of developed and emerging markets is 
also reported (N) for each quintile. See Table 5-3 for the hedged return calculation; and see Table 
5-4 for the construction of the q factor model and the Fama-French 5-factor model. 
Panel A. Rank for variable EDU 




model  N 
Group EW VW  EW VW  EW VW  Dev Eme All 
1 (Low) 3.22 2.89  3.78 1.56  3.44 1.67  0 9 9 
2 3.33 1.44  3.78 1.33  3.22 1.33  1 8 9 
3 4.44 3.00  4.33 2.33  4.33 1.67  4 5 9 
4 8.33 4.56  6.33 3.33  5.44 2.89  9 0 9 
5 (High) 6.44 3.22  5.44 2.22  5.56 2.44  9 0 9 
                          
Panel B. Rank for variable SOPHI 




model  N 
Group EW VW  EW VW  EW VW  Dev Eme All 
1 (Low) 2.89 1.78  2.78 1.00  2.44 0.89  0 9 9 
2 3.44 2.33  4.33 1.67  3.67 1.56  3 6 9 
3 5.89 3.44  4.78 1.89  4.78 2.00  3 6 9 
4 6.67 3.11  5.67 2.44  5.11 2.67  8 1 9 
5 (High) 6.89 4.44  6.11 3.78  6.00 2.89  9 0 9 
             
Panel C. Rank for variable ACCT 




model  N 
Group EW VW  EW VW  EW VW  Dev Eme All 
1 (Low) 2.86 2.43  3.43 1.57  2.43 1.57  1 6 7 
2 6.14 3.29  6.14 2.57  4.86 2.86  5 2 7 
3 4.71 2.43  4.43 1.57  3.86 1.57  5 2 7 
4 7.75 4.63  6.88 3.13  6.50 3.25  7 1 8 
5 (High) 7.33 4.00  5.50 3.50  6.17 2.00  5 1 6 
  




These findings provide support to the explanation of the difference in anomalies 
between developed and emerging markets. The results of the EDU sorting exemplify this 
explanation clearly, while emerging markets are spread from groups 1 to 3, they are 
concentrated in the first two groups where the number of anomalies are at their lowest. In 
other words, from group 1 to 3, most of emerging markets have lower education level 
than developed markets and the number of anomalies is greater in developed markets 
(there is an increasing trend of the number of anomalies from group 1 to group 3). This 
supports the conjecture that emerging markets are more likely to be in the early stage of 
the Phase I of the model where anomalies are less likely to be observed and news watchers 
have clear effect on the variations. By contrast, developed markets are meaningfully 
featured from group 3 and concentrated in groups 4 and 5, there are large increases from 
groups 3 to 4 which fits into the definition of Phase I and slight decreases from 4 to 5 
which suggests there are a small number of developed countries which may be entering 
into Phase II.  The results for SOPHI and ACCT provide similar results except that for 
SOPHI variables, after the peak at group 4 there is no sign of decreasing of number of 
anomalies in group 5. This suggests that if I use buyers’ sophistication as a measure of 
news watcher efficiency, there is no sign of developed markets entering in the phase II of 
the news watcher efficiency and anomaly relationship. Overall, these findings suggest that 
developing markets are more likely to be concentrated in the early stage of Phase I while 









5.4.2. Regression Analysis 
In order to control for potential alternative explanations I run a multivariate regression 
analysis. Stock market turnover (TURN) and market capitalization (CAP) are considered 
as measures of market efficiency in Watanabe, Xu, Yao and Yu (2013). Higher turnover 
and capitalization imply more efficient prices and hence a positive relation between the 
asset growth effect and market efficiency is in line with Q-theory. Higher turnover and 
capitalization should lead to a stronger link between investment decisions and shareholder 
value (Titman, Wei and Xie, 2013). In addition, Titman, Wei and Xie (2013) argue that 
corporate governance may lead to cross country differences in the asset growth anomaly. 
Griffin, Hirschey and Kelly (2011) suggest that the regulatory environment is one of the 
sources of cross country differences in news reaction. To control for corporate governance 
or regulation, I consider anti-director (AD), law system (LAW) and regulation (REGU). 
Further, Griffin, Hirschey and Kelly (2011) advocate insider trading as an explanation of 
the different level of information reaction across countries. Therefore, insider trading law 
enforcement (ITEXE) is included as another control variable.  Variable definitions are 
given in Table 5-7. 
Table 5-10 shows the regression results with a nonlinear specification of the news 
watchers proxies. The dependent variable is the number of significant anomalies measured 
by the 5% significant alpha in the multi-factor model regression. It reports multi-factor 
model analyses of both the q- and 5- factor models. Panels A and B report the results for 
alphas from the equal-weighted return analyses, while Panels C and D report those from 
the equal-weighted return analyses. The nonlinear cross sectional regression model is as 
follow: 
=>?3@A?BCD6 = 	E +	F)=G+	F-=G- +	 H6
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where NumAnomaly is the number of significant anomalies for each market, NW 
is new watcher efficiency (higher education, investor sophistication and accounting 
standard index), NW2 is the square of new watcher efficiency. To capture the nonlinear 
relationship indicated by the simulation, I include the square of news watcher proxy. The 
negative sign of the squared term means that there is an inverted U shape. Control is 
control variable including dummy variable of developed markets, turnover, market 
capitalization, anti-director right, law system, stock exchange regulation, insider trading 
enforcement. 
Table 5-10 has the following notable results. First, news watcher efficiency has a 
nonlinear relationship with the number of anomalies.  This is especially the case for the 
equal weighted analyses. The coefficients for the quadratic term of the news watcher 
efficiency measures are negative and significant in most of the equations in Panels A and 
B. It suggests that as news watcher efficiency increases the number of anomalies increases 
and then decreases and this forms an inverted U-shape as predicted.  Examining the 
turning point of the nonlinear curve, it suggests that the number of anomalies are at the 
highest when SOPHI, EDU and ACCT are at 4.55, 4.59 and 66.17 respectively according 
to the coefficients of NW and NW2 in panel A29. Comparing these values with the 
distribution of the news watcher variables in Panel A of Table 5-9, it clearly shows that 
these turning points are in between the means of the emerging and developed markets, 
with the means of the emerging market measures being lower than the turning points. I 
illustrate the effect of news watcher efficiency on the predicted number of anomalies using 
the parameters in Panel A of Table 5-10. I calculate the predicted value of the dependent 
variable (number of significant anomalies) by varying the news watcher efficiency variable 
(NW) from its sample minimum to maximum while holding other variables in the equation 
																																								 																				
29 The turning point of a quadrative function (M = NOP + QO + R) can be found at O = − S
PT
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at their sample mean level. These graphs are reported in Figure 5-3. In Panel A, Panel B 
and Panel C, the figure plots the nonlinear relationship between predicted number of 
anomalies and investor sophistication, higher education and accounting standard 
respectively. It clearly shows that developed markets are likely to be located around the 
peak or after the peak while emerging markets tend to be located before the peak. This 
confirms the two-stage simulation results.     
They demonstrate the nonlinear pattern of news watcher efficiency on the number 
of anomalies. Furthermore, emerging markets are more likely to be situated in the left side 
of the curve while developed markets are more likely to be on the right side of the curve.    
A second notable result in Table 5-10 is that the Developed dummy is positive and 
highly significant when it enters into the regression alone.  Importantly, however, its ability 
to explain the cross-sectional difference in anomalies disappears when the news watcher 
efficiency and other control variables are included.   This suggests that the status of being 
either an emerging or developed market carries no information regarding a country’s 
market anomalies once country specific characteristics have been controlled for.  Finally, 
regarding the alternative explanations in Table 5-8, there are consistent results for the 
TURN and CAP variables that are often positive and significantly associated with number 
of anomalies – such results are consistent with the Q-theory explanations put forwarded 
in Titman, Wei and Xie (2013) and Watanabe, Xu, Yao and Yu (2013). Importantly these 
results suggest that the news watcher efficiency explanation is robust to the inclusion of 










Table 5-9 Cross-market regression: news watcher efficiency against alternatives 
This table reports the results of cross sectional regressions of the number of significant anomalies 
on new watcher efficiency proxies and control variables: UVWXYZWN[M\ = 	] +	 _̂U` +
	 P̂U`P +	 a\
b
\7_ cZYdeZ[\ +	f\.  The dependent variable is the number of significant 
anomalies measured by the 5% significant alpha in the multi-factor model regression. It reports 
multi-factor model analyses of both q- and 5- factor models.  Panels A and B report the results for 
alphas from the equal-weighted return analyses, while Panels C and D report those from the equal-
weighted return analyses.  Developed is a dummy variable having the value of 1 for developed 
markets and 0 otherwise. The investor sophistication proxies include buyer sophistication 
(SOPHI), higher education and training (EDU) and accounting standard (ACCT). The control 
variables include a development dummy (DEV), capitalization (CAP), turnover ratio (TURN), 
anti-director right index (AD), a civil or common law dummy (LAW), stock exchange regulation 
(REGU) and an enforcement of insider trading law dummy (ITEXE). See the detail in Table 5-7 
for the definition of information environment proxies and control variables. Adjusted R square 
and the number of observations are reported and the t values in parentheses are based on robust 










Table 5-10 (continued) 
Panel A. q-factor model with equal-weighted return 
      SOPHI   EDU   ACCT 
  Slope t   Slope t   Slope t   Slope t 
Intercept 3.500*** 7.50   -19.832** -2.08  -26.562*** -2.60  -7.934* -1.99 
NW       11.083** 2.28  11.583*** 2.94  0.397*** 4.88 
NW2       -1.219* -1.95  -1.263*** -2.72  -0.003*** -3.78 
Developed 2.413*** 3.38   0.707 0.64  1.702 1.00  0.087 0.10 
TURN       0.253 0.31  1.338 1.43  1.649* 1.79 
CAP       1.560* 1.70  0.953 1.07  1.393** 2.37 
AD       -0.240 -0.61  -0.199 -0.50  -0.790* -1.74 
LAW       0.734 0.89  0.925 1.00  1.231* 1.73 
REGU       -0.218 -0.28  0.726 0.85  0.251 0.28 
ITEXE       0.653 0.74  0.292 0.33  0.286 0.32 
            
Adj R-Sq 0.183     0.284    0.293    0.314   
Obs 45     40     40     33   
 
Panel B. Fama-French 5 factor model with equal-weighted return  
      SOPHI   EDU   ACCT 
  Slope t   Slope t   Slope t   Slope t 
Intercept 3.364*** 6.56   -31.753*** -3.78  -27.488*** -2.61  -5.790 -1.13 
NW       15.671*** 4.25  10.274*** 2.74  0.183 1.69 
NW2       -1.858*** -4.00  -0.996** -2.12  -0.001 -0.98 
Developed 2.028*** 2.89   0.582 0.70  -0.261 -0.22  0.212 0.191 
TURN       0.170 0.22  1.539** 2.28  1.344 1.37 
CAP       2.476** 2.52  1.330* 1.83  1.464** 2.15 
AD       -0.267 -0.88  -0.069 -0.24  -0.264 -0.64 
LAW       -0.221 -0.29  0.393 0.47  0.468 0.62 
REGU       0.743 0.90  1.079 1.08  0.580 0.60 
ITEXE       -0.678 -0.82  -1.014 -1.16  -0.947 -0.82 
            
Adj R-Sq 0.137     0.295    0.261    0.181   











Table 5-10 (continued) 
Panel C. q factor model with value-weighted return 
      SOPHI   EDU   ACCT 
  Slope t   Slope t   Slope t   Slope t 
Intercept 1.455*** 5.71   1.241 0.22  -12.470*** -2.91  -3.035 -0.90 
NW       -1.452 -0.45  4.580** 2.23  0.096 0.83 
NW2       0.303 0.70  -0.482* -1.97  -0.001 -0.67 
Develope
d 1.372*** 2.91   -0.411 -0.72  0.192 0.21  0.197 0.28 
TURN       0.549 1.10  0.810** 2.01  0.897 1.62 
CAP       0.821 1.54  1.171*** 3.09  1.327*** 3.30 
AD       0.243 1.21  0.189 0.98  0.209 0.65 
LAW       0.601 1.00  0.501 0.77  0.530 0.74 
REGU       -0.120 -0.30  0.349 0.91  0.071 0.11 
ITEXE       0.759 1.54  0.421 0.91  0.111 0.22 
            
Adj R-Sq 0.136     0.351    0.337    0.229   
Obs 45     40     40     33   
 
Panel D. Fama-French 5 factor model with value-weighted return 
      SOPHI   EDU   ACCT 
  Slope t   Slope t   Slope t   Slope t 
Intercept 1.409*** 4.94   -11.704 -1.57  -17.730*** -2.89  -6.317** -2.30 
NW       5.234 1.42  6.602** 2.47  0.150** 2.39 
NW2       -0.645 -1.46  -0.728** -2.30  -0.002*** -2.74 
Developed 1.156*** 2.55   -0.159 -0.22  0.124 0.13  0.122 0.17 
TURN       0.269 0.46  0.826 1.49  1.448* 2.02 
CAP       1.547*** 2.58  1.048* 1.76  1.202* 1.94 
AD       -0.102 -0.44  -0.072 -0.31  -0.188 -0.58 
LAW       0.143 0.24  0.273 0.43  0.976 1.65 
REGU       0.516 1.11  0.837* 1.87  1.058* 1.88 
ITEXE       0.366 0.67  0.162 0.30  -0.508 -0.98 
            
Adj R-Sq 0.105     0.176    0.218    0.239   








Figure 5-3 Predicted effect of news watcher efficiency 
This figure reports the effect of news watcher efficiency on the predicted number of anomalies 
using the coefficients reported in Table 5-10 Panel A.  The predicted values of the dependent 
variable (number of significant anomalies) are calculated by varying the news watcher efficiency 
variable (NW) from its sample minimum to maximum while holding other variables in the equation 
at their sample mean level. These predictions are plotted against the value of the NW variables. I 
also indicate the predicted ranges that covers the variations of NW for emerging and developed 
markets separately. 
Panel A. SOPHI 
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For the value weighted analyses in Panels C and D of Table 5-10, while most of 
the quadratic coefficients are negative, the coefficients are only significant in three out of 
the six equations. This suggests that the cross-sectional explanatory power of news 
watcher efficiency is weaker when the effect of small size firms is downplayed. Overall, 
Table 5-10 confirms that there is a nonlinear relationship between the news watcher 
efficiency proxies and anomalies, and this is especially the case for equal-weighted returns. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of news watcher efficiency helps explain the observed 
differences between emerging and developed market.  
 In addition, the slopes of squared ACCT are not always significantly negative. One 
reason is that the dependent variable is different in different regression specifications and 
the results of ACCT are sensitive to the number of anomalies measured in different 
models. Second, the number of observation for ACCT is quite small which may reduce 
the power of significance. Overall, the nonlinear relationship is weaker when ACCT is 
used as the news watcher proxy compared with higher education.  
5.4.3. Effect of Size 
The empirical analysis in the above section reveals a new puzzle. It shows that the 
difference between the developed and emerging markets is especially pronounced when 
the anomaly returns are equally weighted as compared to when they are value weighted.  I 
also show that the alphas from the equal-weighted return portfolios demonstrate a 
stronger nonlinear relationship with news watcher efficiency in Table 5-10. This suggests 
that the well documented small size effect on anomalies is more pronounced in developed 
than in emerging markets and the role of news watchers might help to explain the reason 
behind this.   
In order to understand the connection between firm size and anomalies, I start by 
examining the relationship between size and news watcher efficiency. Firm size can be a 




proxy for news watcher efficiency that affects the speed of information diffusion.   Hong, 
Lim, and Stein (2000) argue that when investors face fixed costs of information 
acquisition, they devote more effort to learning about those stocks in which they can take 
large positions. This suggests that information about small firms is transmitted more 
slowly.  If size is used as a proxy measure for news watcher efficiency, the theoretical 
extension in Section 5.3 predicts that there will be a nonlinear relationship between size 
and the number of observed anomalies. Specifically, there is an inverted U shape 
relationship between size and anomaly returns.  Such a prediction is supported by Hong, 
Lim, and Stein (2000) who document that the smallest size firms (in the smallest two 
deciles; I refer to them as micro firms) have less anomalies than small size firms (in the 
third and fourth smallest deciles). In other words, there is an inverted U shape relationship 
between size and anomaly returns that is similar to the theoretical prediction of a two-
phase effect30.   
Building on the above I propose that the difference between emerging and 
developed markets is stronger in equal- than in value- weighted returns because more of 
the small firms in emerging markets behave like micro firms where news watcher efficiency 
is at its weakest.  To confirm this prediction, I replicate the analyses of size and anomalies 
by Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) for emerging and developed markets separately. Figure 5-
4 reports the plot of anomaly hedged returns by size decile for developed and emerging 
markets. 
Figure 5-4 shows an inverted U shape relationship between size and anomaly 
returns in both markets.  When comparing the two types of market, the anomalies in 
																																								 																				
30 A clear inverted U shaped relationship between size and the hedged return of the momentum anomaly is 
presented in Figure 1 of Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000). Since the focus of Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) was 
to test the prediction of Hong and Stein (1999) that there is linearity between size and anomalies, they 
quantify their conclusion in their abstract by acknowledging that they find support for the theory only “once 
one moves past the very smallest stocks” p1517. 




developed markets are stronger than is the case for emerging markets and this confirms 
the puzzle documented earlier.  Importantly, this difference is much stronger at the small 
size deciles part of the plot and weaker at the larger size deciles part. The decreasing trend 
in the differences is observed in Panel B. Overall, this analysis explains why for equal 
weighted hedged returns the difference between emerging and developed markets is larger 
than is the case of value-weighted hedged returns. It suggests that more of the small stocks 
have behaved like US micro stocks that have close to zero anomalies.  Therefore, I observe 
fewer anomalies in small firms in emerging markets.  When the returns generated by firms 
across all sizes are equal weighted, the average number of anomalies is smaller for emerging 
markets. This evidence supports that the very low efficiency of news watchers for small 
size firms in emerging markets helps to explain why there are fewer anomalies in emerging 
market small size firms than in developed market small size firms.  
 Overall, to get results which can be compared with Hong, Lim and Stein (2000), I 
plot the anomaly return in each firm size by using more anomalies rather than a single 
anomaly. Although there are some swings from size 2 to size 5, the results showa  similar 














Figure 5-4 Anomaly returns and firm size  
This figure reports anomaly returns by size decile for developed and emerging markets. Panel A 
plots the median return of each size decile. For each of the 16 anomalies, I rank firms into three 
groups based on 30 and 70 percentiles (break points are based on the NYSE in the US market and 
based on the entire sample in other markets). Anomaly return is the difference between the top 
and bottom groups. Independently, firms are divided into deciles based on market value. For both 
developed and emerging markets, I calculate the median of the hedged return in each size decile 
for each anomaly; I then compute the median across different anomalies in each size decile. Panel 
B plots the return difference between developed and emerging markets in Panel A.      
Panel A. Anomaly return 
 




















































5.5. Conclusions  
Asset pricing anomalies have played a vital role in the evolution of asset pricing theories.  
Newly documented anomalies post challenges to existing asset pricing models and 
stimulate the search for new theoretical and empirical pricing models that can take account 
of the apparent mispricing of risk. Therefore, asset pricing research in recent decades, 
since Fama and French’s (1996) seminal paper, has been characterized by identifying a 
parsimonious multi-factor model that can account for the variations in the cross-sectional 
expected returns. Naturally, most of the ‘developed’ asset pricing theories have originated 
from research based on the developed markets.  Therefore, the evolution of asset pricing 
research has been driven by observations in markets that are characterized as relatively 
more efficient and complete. However, the conclusions and relationships drawn from 
developed markets cannot always be literally extended to emerging markets. This chapter 
contributes to the evolution of asset pricing theory by studying asset pricing anomalies in 
a global context with the specific aim of exploring the differences between emerging and 
developed markets.   
I establish a puzzle, via a wide array of anomalies in 45 countries, that pricing 
anomalies are more readily observable in developed than in emerging markets. 
Furthermore, this is still the case after considering the newly introduced factors of 
investment and profitability (Hou, Xue and Zhang, 2015) and Fama and French, 2015). 
The performance of the factor models in explaining anomaly returns are comparable 
between the emerging and developed markets suggesting that these multi-factor models 
capture systematic risk factors that are general and applicable to both types of markets. 
However, these risk factors alone cannot solve the puzzle.  More specifically, following a 
linear extension of the rational risk factor explanation, one would need to be able to 
demonstrate that holding anomaly portfolios in a developed market would have 




experienced higher systematic risk than a similar portfolio in an emerging market; it is 
difficult to identify a risk factor that would fit such a description.    
Given the unresolved nature of the puzzle, I turn to behavioural theories for 
potential explanations. I find that a linear extension of the behavioural explanation that 
originated from developed markets to emerging markets is not able to provide an 
explanation to the puzzle either.  For example, prior literature suggests that investor 
behavioural bias in combination with limits to arbitrage induces mispricing in the market.  
However, if this were to be the case, then emerging markets should have more anomalies 
than developed markets, as both of these two characteristics should be more acute in the 
former.    
 When digging deeper into the behavioural theories, I find that Hong and Stein’s 
(1999) theoretical framework provides a good starting point for examining international 
variations. Their model focuses on the investor heterogeneity that avoids making 
assumption specific behavioural bias by a single representative agent.  Building on Hong 
and Stein (1999), I show that the efficiency of news watchers in a market has a nonlinear 
impact on the observations of pricing anomalies. News watchers reveal private 
fundamental information in price gradually to sow the seeds of momentum. Therefore, 
the presence of news watchers is a necessary condition for observing short-term 
momentum and long-term reversal in the market. The absence of some anomalies in 
emerging markets can be attributed to the absence of news watchers who pay attention to 
that particular type of news. This is consistent with Bhattacharya et al. (2000) who argue 
that for information driven (fundamental) anomalies, investors have to be able to monitor 
and process the relevant data. Furthermore, the prediction also sheds new light on the role 
of firm size and anomalies. I show that the smallest size firms (micro firms) often have 
less pricing anomalies than other small size firms as news watcher efficiency is at its lowest 




in these micro firms. Overall, the study introduces the concept of news watcher efficiency 
and demonstrates its importance to understanding asset pricing anomalies across markets. 
There are five limitations in this chapter. First, there is noise for the cross sectional 
regression due to less observations. Second, there is a lack of time series evidence to 
support the nonlinear prediction. Third, it would be more helpful if there are more proxies 
for news watcher efficiency so that the results can be more robust. Fourth, an anomaly 
may disappear or become weaker after the publication. Therefore, it is useful to divide the 
sample into sub-period samples so that we can check whether the phenomenon can be 
explained by the different sub-period samples. Fifth, the news watcher proxies in cross 
sectional regression are constructed by using particular time periods due to data availability, so it 
cannot cover the entire sample period for constructing anomalies. Therefore, the results of cross 
sectional regression depend on the assumption that the certain period can represent the entire time 
period. 
   
  




Chapter 6  
Conclusions 
6.1. Introduction 
From the 1970s onwards, the efficient market hypothesis has been tested for more than 
40 years. Asset pricing anomalies are usually considered as evidence to reject the market 
efficiency hypothesis. According to the efficient market hypothesis, all the information is 
fully and correctly incorporated into stock prices, and therefore investors cannot earn 
abnormal returns without taking extra risk. The investigation of abnormal return also 
depends on an asset pricing model that is the benchmark to measure the abnormal return. 
The size effect (see Banz, 1977) challenges the efficient market hypothesis because the 
abnormal return based on CAPM is significant. However, this cannot be direct evidence 
against the efficient market hypothesis due to the problem of the asset pricing model being 
potentially inadequate. From the 1990s, the Fama-French 3-factor model has been 
examined many times and it is seen as outperforming CAPM. Previous anomalies, like the 
size effect, are explained under the new asset pricing model. Later on, many studies 
discover new anomalies which cannot be captured by the Fama-French 3-factor model. In 
addition, behavioural finance is emerging in explaining the anomalies. Therefore, how to 
explain the new anomalies is the task to be examined.  
Among these new anomalies, Cooper, Gullen and Schill (2008) find asset growth 
is negatively correlated with future stock returns. The asset growth anomaly is an aggregate 
anomaly because firm asset growth includes both the financing and investment sides. In 
addition, asset growth is directly related to investment-based asset pricing models and 
hence it raises attention to the investment-based model (the importance of asset growth is 




also seen by Hou, Xue and Zhang, 2015; Fama and French, 201531). In terms of explaining 
the asset growth effect, the debate between rational and behavioural explanations has no 
clear conclusion (see Lam and Wei, 2011). To this end, my study first investigates the asset 
growth anomaly in order to understand the underlying source of the effect. Then 
motivated by anomaly literature in the global context (see Watanabe, Xu, Yao and Yu, 
2013), I examine multiple anomalies in international markets. Most importantly, by 
examining global markets, I dig further into the explanation of anomalies based on news 
watcher efficiency and explain why developed markets have more anomalies than 
emerging markets. 
Chapter 3 shows results for the asset growth anomaly in different industries. 
Chapter 4 tests the overreaction explanation of the asset growth anomaly directly and 
explicitly by using asset growth sequences and turnover to measure the degree of investors’ 
overreaction. Further, it tests the expectation error based on the correction of the asset 
growth portfolio before and after the formation date. Chapter 5 shows comprehensive 
evidence of 16 different types of anomalies in global markets and notes there are more 
anomalies in developed markets. Furthermore, I use the most recent asset pricing models 
to check the existence of anomalies and extend the Hong and Stein (1990) model to 




31	Both Hou, Xue and Zhang (2015) and Fama and French (2015) add an investment factor into their new 
asset pricing models. The investment factor is constructed using asset growth. The difference is: the former 
construct the investment factor based on Q-theory; while the latter construct the investment factor based 
on empirical evidence.   




6.2. Main Findings           
6.2.1. Asset Growth Effect across Industries 
Chapter 3 examines the existence of the asset growth anomaly in different industries. I 
first divide all firms into 44 industries based on the Fama-French 48 industries 
classification (excluding financial industries). For each industry, I run the regression of 
stock return on firm asset growth. The regression analysis finds that 13 out of 44 industries 
have a significant slope of asset growth. The variation of the asset growth slope across 
different industries provides an opportunity to check the relation between the asset growth 
effect and industry characteristics. I include average sales growth within an industry, 
concentration, advertising expenditure, R&D expenditure and the number of firms as the 
measurement of industry competition or growth opportunity. The regression results show 
that R&D expenditure and concentration are positively correlated with the asset growth 
effect, while the number of firms in an industry and advertising expenditure are negatively 
correlated with the asset growth effect. The evidence suggests that the asset growth effect 
varies given different industry characteristics. However, the empirical results do not state 
whether the industry characteristics represent the source of mispricing or whether it is a 








6.2.2. Asset Growth Effect, Growth Sequence, Asset Turnover and Net 
Profit Margin 
Chapter 4 shows results as to whether overreaction is the source of the asset growth effect. 
The asset growth anomaly is tested in growth sequence groups, asset turnover groups and 
net profit margin groups. According to representativeness introduced by Barberis, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1998), I propose that consecutive growth trend can measure the degree of 
investors’ overreaction to asset growth, that is, overreaction becomes stronger as the 
growth trend increases. Based on the residual income model, I decompose the return on 
assets into asset turnover and net profit margin which can affect the degree of overreaction 
to asset growth. Specifically, the higher the asset turnover the stronger the asset growth 
effect. In contrast, the higher the net profit margin the weaker the asset growth effect. The 
group analyses show three main results. First, the hedge return between low asset growth 
and high asset growth is increasing monotonically when the growth trend is from 1 year 
to 4 years. In addition, the slope of asset growth in a regression of stock return on asset 
growth with controls for the book-to-market ratio, firm size and the past 6-month return 
is steeper as the growth trend increases. Further, the significant difference between the 
bottom and top sequence group in terms of both spread and slope also confirm a stronger 
asset growth effect in the longer sequence group. This is the first evidence to support 
overreaction. The growth trend is a proxy of the overreaction level. Therefore, if 
overreaction is the source of the asset growth anomaly, the asset growth anomaly should 
be stronger with stronger overreaction. Both the return spread and the slope coefficient 
confirm this hypothesis. Second, for the asset turnover rank, the full sample regression 
shows that the slope of asset growth is getting steeper when the asset turnover is increasing 
and the slope difference between the lowest and highest groups is significant. 
Furthermore, I divide the sample into low asset growth and high asset growth groups. 




Given the fact that investors will weigh more on asset turnover for fast growth firms, the 
overreaction should be stronger for high asset turnover firms in high asset growth groups. 
The regression slope exactly discovers the results and, therefore, I find a second round of 
evidence to support the role of overreaction in explaining the asset growth effect. Third, 
similar to the test of asset turnover rank, I undertake the analysis by using net profit margin 
rank. Net profit margin also has a different influence on high and low growth firms. On 
the one hand, investors put more weight on asset turnover for fast growth firms so net 
profit margin will reduce the level of overreaction for high growth firms. On the other 
hand, for low growth firms, investors should overreact more to low growth firms with low 
net profit margin. The regression slope indeed confirms this hypothesis: the slope 
becomes even less negative as the net profit margin increases and the significant difference 
between the low and high net profit margin groups in the full sample is driven by the low 
asset growth group. 
Furthermore, I run multivariate analysis to check if these overreaction 
measurements can still have explanatory power after controlling for existing explanations. 
The existing explanations of the asset growth effect are Q-theory with investment frictions 
and limits-to-arbitrage. Following Lam and Wei (2011), I include 10 proxies for limits-to-
arbitrage and 4 proxies for investment frictions as control variables. Lam and Wei (2011) 
suggest that the high correlation between investment friction and limits-to-arbitrage is the 
reason why it is difficult to distinguish between the two explanations. The correlation 
matrix shows some high correlation among these control variables, for example, the 
number of institutional shareholders has a correlation of 66%, 60% and 66% with analyst 
coverage, dollar trading volume and total assets respectively. To group control variables 
that capture similar information and avoid multicollinearity in the regressions, I conduct 
principal component analysis. Due to data availability and in order to make the test robust, 




I also run two versions of principal components analysis by combining different control 
variables. The factor analysis shows that three factors are generated. The first factor 
captures firm size (for example, total asset, firm age and analyst coverage), the second 
factor captures firm specific risk (for example, idiosyncratic volatility and cash flow 
volatility), and the third factor captures transaction cost (for example, bid-ask spread and 
illiquidity). The baseline regression without controlling for investment frictions and limits-
to-arbitrage shows a significantly negative sign for the slope of the growth sequence and 
for the slope of asset turnover; and a significantly positive sign for the slope of net profit 
margin. After controlling for investment friction and limits-to-arbitrage, the slope of the 
interaction term of sequence and asset growth is still highly significant; the slope of the 
interaction term of the net profit margin and asset growth is significant in one 
specification; but the asset turnover loses explanatory power (this may result from losing 
observations if I include more control variables because this requires valid data for each 
of the variables). Overall, the results confirm that the asset growth effect becomes stronger 
with a longer growth sequence and lower net profit margin even controlling for investment 
frictions and limits-to-arbitrage.  
To summarize, the contribution to the current literature is that the results directly 
link the asset growth effect with investors’ overreaction and support overreaction as the 
source of the asset growth anomaly. Li and Zhang (2010) support Q-theory after 
comparing with limits-to-arbitrage. Lam and Wei (2011) indicate that both Q-theory and 
limits-to-arbitrage have similar amounts of explanatory power. Lipson, Mortal and Schill 
(2011) find no asset growth effect in low idiosyncratic volatility which supports mispricing 
explanation, but there is no control for Q-theory. My study uses growth trend, asset 
turnover and net profit margin to measure the level of overreaction and finds results 
consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. Although limits-to-arbitrage is also a 




mispricing-based explanation, it is a second place solution. The limits-to-arbitrage already 
assumes mispricing in the first place rather than testing how the initial overreaction relates 
to the asset growth anomaly.  
6.2.3. Asset Growth Effect and Expectation Error 
In addition to testing the overreaction explanation, I also check if there is expectation error 
for the asset growth portfolio conditional on one period ahead asset growth and compare 
the error between three days around the earning announcement date and the non-earnings 
announcement date. I show the results in Chapter 4. For portfolios with high asset growth 
in year t, if the firms have low asset growth in year t+1, the average monthly return in the 
following one year after formation is -0.1%; In contrast, if the firms continue to have high 
asset growth in year t+1, the average monthly return is 1%. The difference of -1.1% is 
significant, so the lower return for high asset growth firms occurs when the following asset 
growth reverses. Such difference of these conditional portfolios is larger around the 
earnings announcement date, but there is only a tiny difference (nearly zero) outside the 
earnings announcement date. This indicates that investors are likely to make expectation 
errors based on firms’ performance. The expectation error is   -0.31% and significant when 
high asset growth firms reverse to low asset growth group while the error is close to zero 
and insignificant if the high asset growth firms can continue to the high growth. And, 
therefore, this confirms that investors do make expectation errors when they value the 
stock price based on asset growth and there is a correction after realized performance 
cannot support their expectation. As a result, it is consistent with the overreaction 
explanation that investors overreact to firm asset growth and there is a reversal after the 
investors know the realized asset growth.     
 




6.2.4. Facts of Multiple Anomalies in Multiple Markets 
Chapter 5 covers 16 different types of popular anomalies and 45 markets globally. I show 
comprehensive results with multiple anomalies in multiple markets compared with the 
previous literature. There are some studies with different anomalies but only for one 
market (Fama and French, 2008; Li and Zhang, 2010; Stambaugh, Yu and Yuan, 2012, 
Hou, Xue and Zhang, 2015) and some global studies but only for a particular anomaly 
(Griffin, Hirschey and Kelly, 2011; Chui, Titman, Wei and Xie, 2012). Griffin, Kelly and 
Nardari (2010) includes 46 markets but only three anomalies. With many anomalies in the 
context of international markets, I can compare the number of anomalies between 
developed markets and emerging markets. Existing global studies with a single anomaly 
show that the anomaly is more prominent in more developed markets than less developed 
markets (Ang, Hodrick, Xing and Zhang, 2009; Kaniel, Ozoguz and Starks, 2012; 
Watanabe, Xu, Yao and Yu, 2013; Titman, Wei and Xie, 2013).  
I divide all the 16 anomalies into two categories based on if the anomaly 
construction needs accounting information or price (volume) information. As a result, 
there are 8 accounting anomalies and 8 market anomalies. The study uses both equal-
weighted and value-weighted hedge return as the measurement of the anomalies. For 
equal-weighted returns, developed markets exhibit more anomalies, with 10 of the 16 
anomalies being significant (asset growth anomaly, asset-to-market anomaly, book-to-
market anomaly, gross profit anomaly, financial distress anomaly, working capital accrual 
anomaly, beta anomaly, illiquidity anomaly, idiosyncratic volatility anomaly and 
momentum effect). On average across the anomalies, 9 (11) developed markets show 
significant accounting (market) anomalies versus 3 (6) for the emerging markets. For value-
weighted returns, the difference between developed markets and emerging markets is 
reduced. However, on average, significant accounting (market) anomalies are shown in 5 




(6) developed markets and in 2 (3) emerging markets. Overall, the results show that 
developed markets tend to have more significant anomalies than emerging markets. With 
more anomalies, I confirm the fact which is consistent with previous single anomaly 
studies. Therefore, the fact that developed markets tend to have more significant 
anomalies than emerging markets is not by chance. 
The existence of an anomaly relies on an adequate asset pricing model. Hou, Xue 
and Zhang (2015) construct a q factor (four-factor) model and Fama and French (2015) 
construct a five-factor model. Both of these two recent models provide a tool to check 
the existence of an anomaly and the alpha from the model is the measurement of the 
anomaly. For the q factor model, the equal (value) weighted alpha shows that more 
developed markets have significant anomalies than emerging markets in 7 (4) out of 16 
anomalies. Similarly, for the Fama-French five-factor model, developed markets show 
more significant anomalies than emerging markets in 8 (4) out of 16 anomalies in terms of 
equal (value) weighted alpha. In summary, the new asset pricing models show a reasonable 
amount of explanatory power to capture some of the anomalies and they reduce the 
anomaly difference between developed and emerging markets. However, the 
improvement of the asset pricing model cannot explain the difference completely and 
there is still something left unexplained. And this motivates me to find a unified theory to 
explain the phenomenon. The unified explanation is also tested in Chapter 5 and 









6.2.5. Hong and Stein (1999) Model and News Watcher Explanation 
To explain the fact that developed markets have more anomalies than emerging markets, 
I revisit the Hong and Stein (1999) model and extend the model. The simulation of the 
model predicts a nonlinear relationship between news watcher efficiency (information 
diffusion speed) and the number of anomalies. Specifically, in the first stage where the 
information diffusion is extremely slow, there is no clear price change and a low level of 
momentum activities, and hence there are fewer anomalies. In the second stage, both price 
change and momentum intensity are more obvious when information diffusion becomes 
faster and, therefore, more anomalies can be observed. As the information diffusion is 
even faster, price will immediately reflect all information and there is no anomaly. In 
Chapter 5, higher education, investor sophistication and accounting standard are used to 
measure news watcher efficiency or information diffusion. For each of the proxies, the 
results show better news watcher efficiency in developed markets than emerging markets. 
The nonlinear regression confirms the inversed U shape implied by the model. The slope 
of squared news watcher efficiency term is significantly negative especially for equal 
weighted alpha of the q factor model and the Fama-French five-factor model. 
In addition, in Chapter 5, I find a smaller difference between developed and 
emerging markets for value-weighted results than equal-weighted results. To understand 
why this is observed, I show that the difference of average hedge return between 
developed and emerging markets is largest in small size firms. And, therefore, the large 
difference in small firms puts more weight on small firms when examining the equal-
weighted results.  
To summarize, my thesis confirms the asset growth anomaly is robust even after 
the anomaly is published and the asset growth effect exists in some industries rather than 




in each industry. Secondly, I explicitly examine whether overreaction is the source of the 
asset growth anomaly, and this provides evidence to support a behavioural explanation 
against Q-theory explanation. Finally, I show more anomalies in developed markets than 
emerging markets. Further, I give a unified explanation to explain the puzzle -- the inverted 
U shape relation between news watcher efficiency and anomalies. Overall, my thesis 
contributes to the understanding to asset pricing anomalies.    
6.2.6. Limitations and Future Research 
This study provides evidence about the asset growth anomaly in different industries and 
an overreaction explanation to the asset growth effect. However, the industry analysis of 
the asset growth anomaly is mainly based on empirical analysis which reflects how the 
asset growth anomaly varies with industry characteristics. It lacks a strong hypothesis 
development or underlying theory. Therefore, establishing the link between theory and 
industry results is important for future research.  
To examine the overreaction explanation to the asset growth effect, I also show a stronger 
asset growth anomaly as the growth sequence is increasing. However, Cooper, Gullen and 
Schill (2008) show that past asset growth can predict negative return in the next five years. 
According to this evidence, one can also predict that a longer growth sequence should 
have stronger asset growth effect. Although my prediction is motivated by investors’ 
representativeness bias, ideally we would want to determine if they are the same effect. In 
addition, the study also shows the evidence of how the asset growth anomaly varies 
positively (negatively) with asset turnover (net profit margin). However, to further test 
whether the asset growth anomaly is stronger when the degree of overreaction is high, a 
more direct test could be undertaken in future reserach. The elasticity of future asset 
turnover (net profit margin) with respect to current asset growth is one possible way 




forward. If investors overreact to asset growth, there should be a negative elasticity which 
forces investors to correct their overreaction and therefore we can observe the reversal. 
Furthermore, this study shows evidence on multiple anomalies in the context of global 
markets and suggests a news watcher efficiency explanation. The simulation results based 
on Hong and Stein’s (1999) information diffusion model provide a nonlinear relation 
between anomaly and market development. However, the design of the empirical test 
could be changed in future research. The proxies for news watcher efficiency may not be 
the best choice due to data availability. The problem is that the news watcher efficiency 
proxies only cover the latest period but no information for the beginning periods when 
the anomalies are constructed. Therefore, ideally the results need to be checked for 
robustness unless the current news watcher efficiency can represent the whole period. In 
addition, to make the results even stronger, the inverted U shape should be confirmed not 
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